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PLAYING ON WO'RDS: JUDGE RICIIARD A. POSNER'S 
APPEidi,ATE OPINIONS, 1981-82 RUMINATIONS ON 
SEXY JUDICIAL OPINION S1'YI.,E DURING AN 
EXTRAORDINARY ROOKIE SEASON 
• 
Robert F. Blomquist• 
0 0 
I. INTRODUCTION 
'(Style'' is a sexy, if ambiguous, concept, which, in many_ways, is at 
the very core ·or American culture. 1 The American media is obsessed 
. . 
· with matters of style. We learn ·by way of illustration of such stylistic 
concerns as the. following potpourri: the predotninandy black player 
' ' . . 
uni_on's perception of the 100 percent white owned National Basketball 
Association's negotiating committee as harboring "bargaining style" that 
is "disrespectful and provocative;"2 whether or not Martha Stewart's 
"housewife-cum-multimedia-entrepreneur" ideas and products for 
middle class ''polish and elegance" setves to "construct notions of 
whiteness and middle · class heterosexual i~entity;';3 how Steven 
• 
Spielberg's film Saving Private ·Ryan purportedly . "(r]epresent[s] 
Hollywood at its high-minded best '[in its promotion .of] the traditional 
values ofheroism, virtue and patriotic duty with gripping, cinema-verite-
style battle sequences to make it all seem fresh and up to date·;"4 the 
ostensible "essence" of the "Sinatra style'' as constituting "his ability, in 
this world gone increasingly_ stiff, to remain a. symbol of reckless 
• 
0 ' 
0 
. * Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B~S. (Economics), University of 
Pennsylvania (Wharton School) 1973; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1977. My thanks go to William 
Domnarski, Larry Albrecht, and Walter F. Kelly for helpful comments on an earlier draft. My thanks and 
' 
appreciation, also, go to my research assistant, Gary Selig, for his excellent insight,judgment and research. 
1. The word "style"· can be both a noun and a verb. As a noun, the chief definitions of "styleu 
include the following: "a distinctive manner ofexpression (as in writing or speech) (the flowery style of 18th 
century prose)"; "a particular manner or techniqU,e by which something is done, created, or performed (a. 
classical style of dance)"; "a distinctive ,quality, form, or type- of something (the Greek style of 
0 
architecture)"; "a state of being popular., COIJ.EGIATE DICTIONARY 504 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 'ed., 
1Oth ed. 1998). As a verb, the key definitions of "sty leu are as follows: "to design, make, or arrange in 
accord with the prevailing mode"; "to give a particular style to; "to call or designate by an identifying 
term.'' !d. · 
2. Selena Roberts & Mike Wise; Both Sules in N.B.A. Llckuut S~ Rae~ Complicilles T<tlkr, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 1998, at AI. · · · 
• 0 
3. Martlu1's Vm9ard, WAU. ST.j., Nov. 20, 1998, at Wl7 (quoting an "e-mail message from a 
University ofToronto graduate student proposing that the Model'n Language Association devote a session 
in its upcoming annual conference to Martha Stewart" to explore such questions). 
4. Stephen Holden, In Summer's Popc017} Season, Appr~cial,ing tht Champagne, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1998, 
EL 
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. 
independence;"5 features of President Clinton's controversial crisis 
management "style" in handling an_ international standoff with Iraq, 
which style involved· fund-raising trips, golf outings, and "reacting to 
events rather than shaping them,"6 and the reported adyice of 
Manhattan interior decorating gurus for combining "ease ... w~ile 
yearning for elegance" by such stylistic techniques as "learn [ing] from 
the scale,. proportio~s and lines of painting and sculpture, from the 
character of architecture and the wisdom of other cultures-''7 
Item: We encounter an entire issue of Civilization 
• • • Maga~ine published by. the Library of Congress on "The Style 
Around Us,'' with guest editor, Bill Blass picking the 20th century's 50 
"Most Stylish People. ''8. 
5. Rick Kogan, W/ult Would Frank Do?, CHI. TRill.; May 17; 1998, § 2, at 3. ''If there was a high 
roller -a· bit of ft·eewheeling frolic locked in the heart of everyone, Sinatra had the key." ld. See alro, 
Stehan Holden, Frank Sinatra DW at82; Matchkss S!Jlist of Pop, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1998, at AI. 
]d. 
In a series of brilliant conceptual albums, he codified a music~l vocabulary of adult 
relationships with which millions identified. The haunting voice heard on a jukebox in the 
wee small hours of the morning lamenting the end ofa love affair was the same voice that 
jubilantly invited the world to "come fly with me" to exotic realms. ~n a never-ending party . 
• • • • 
• 
It was as. a singer that he exerted the strongest cultural influence~ Following his idol Bing 
Crosby, who had pioneered the use of the microphone, Sinatra transformed popular singing 
by infusing lyrics with a pet-sonal, intimate point of view that conveyed a steady current of 
• • 
erottctsm. 
6. James Bennet, Clinton in a Crisis: A Qyestion tifS!Jk, N.Y. TI.MES, Nov. 20, 1997, at AIO. 
7. Julie V. Iovine, With a Nod anJ a Wink, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 18, 1997, at Fl (recommending, 
. . . . 
among :other things, "breaking [the]. rules'' regarding upholstery and bl~nding the textures of "gossamer 
curtains and whichwashed blinds, neoclassical wallpaper and [a] rustic washstand,'' iJ. at F9). See also 
Michael Pollan, A Room Wtlh Too Much Vuw, HARPERS, Mar. 1997, at 28 ("[w]henevera window looks_out 
on the street, it tells a story about the social world we inhabit; when its gaze is .on the landscape, it usually 
. has something to say about our relationship to nature"); Richard L. Berke, Bush Brothers Provide Iiglu ID 
Republicans Ajler a Dreary Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at A20 (feted as models of "compassionate 
conservatism,', the Governors Bush talked about "the style of governance" of George W. Bush ofTexas and 
,' 
the "style of-campaigning'' ofJeb Bush of Florida). 
8. Bill Blass, Bill Bloss's 50 Mosl S9lish People, CIVIUZATION, AUG./Sept. 1998, at 82. According 
to Blass, "[a]ll the people I've selected embody the qualities allure, mov~ment, wit, boldness, presence,. 
confidence, and undoubtedly, self-invention that I think sum up that elusive commodity known as. style". 
/d. Blass's list of the fifty peo·ple, along with a briefdesca-iption, in alphabetical order is as follows: 
Gianni Agnelli (Fiat chairman emeritus); Josephine Baker (entertainer); Nina Griscom 
Bakel· (food critic, TV personality); Billy Baldwin (interior designer); Cristobal Balenciaga 
(couturier); Duke of Beaufort (aristocrat, huntsman); Constance Bennett (actress); Mark 
Birley (English entrepreneur); Evangeline Bruce (Washington hostess); Coco Chanel 
(fashion designer); Tina Chow (model); Ina Claire (stage actress); Gary Cooper (actor); Sir 
Noel Coward (playwright}; Marlene Dietrich (entertainer, actress); Mica Ertegun (interior 
. ' 
designer); Loul..ou de Ia Falaise (fashion muse); Clark Gable (actor); Hubert de Givenchy 
(fashion·· designer);. Louise Grunwald (New York socialite); C.Z. Guest (garden guru, 
horsewoman); Gloria Guinness (style pet'SOnality); Nicky de Gunzburg (fashion sage); 
Ernest Hemingway (writer, sportsman); Anotiska Hempel {hotelier, style arbiter); Audrey 
Hepburn (actress); Carolina Herrera (fashion designer); Sli~ Keith (Amet·ican ideal); Nan 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
'• 
• 
• 
2000] 
. 
. 
• 
PLATING· ON WORDS 
. 
• 
653 
Item: Among the hundre·ds qf books-in-print on the Amazon.com 
webpage with "style'' in the title,9 we find the following works, chosen 
at random: Alain· Silver's and James Ursini's Tke Noir S~le (1999); 
Judith Miller's Tke S~le Sourcebook (1998); Letitia Baldridge's In the 
. Kennedy Sryle (1998).10 
• 
• 
Item: A professor of dramatic literature at Vassar College fancies 
himself as. a literary style sleuth; the New rork Times described him as 
Jf<>ll<>~s: · 
You are what you write. At least, that's how Donald W. Foster sees 
it. 
Dr. Foster, who is a professor ofdramatic literature at Vassar College; 
made a name for himself in the academic world by persuading many 
other scholars that a long and disappointingly bland funeral elegy 
came from th~ pen of William ·shakespeare . 
Now he spe~ds his spare moments helping to resqlve crimes. 
It all started last year after Dr. Foster wrote an article for New York 
magazine identifying Joe Klein, the journalist, as the anonymous 
author of ''Primary Colors," the political roman a clef. 
Since then, law-enforceinent officials have sought his help, and he has 
applied his talents at text analysis to the Unabomb case, the murder 
of JonBenet Ramsey and a 1996 double. murder in Windsor, 
Connecticut. Usually more ·at home with songs and sonnets, he is 
poring over extortion letters, pseudonymous tips and ransom notes. 
. . 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has asked him to teach agents 
. . 
some of his techniques to unmask authors, . 
Those techniques include using a computer to see if the authors oftwo 
d~fferent texts favor the same ·uncommon words and phrases. Then 
he compares stylistic mannerisms, looking for parallel patterns in 
grammar, syntax and sentence structure .. .. T and ideas and 
psychological underpinnings. 1 1 
•• 
Kempner (fashion maven); Serena Linley (British royalty by marriage); Carole Lombard 
(actress); Mary McFadden (fashion desiger); Kitty Millet• (social personality); Babe Paley 
. (VOGUE editor and model); Sidney Poitier (actor); Cole Porter (composer and ly .. icist); 
Linda Porter (wife of Cole, style icon); Chessy Rayner (Interior designer); Eliza Reed 
(fashion professional); Carolyne Roehm (tastemaker); Millicent Roget'S Oewelry designer); 
Pauline de Rothschild (fashion designer, writer); Bobby Short (entertainer); Tina Turner 
(singer); Valentina (fashion designer); ·Gloria Vanderbilt (writer, entrepreneur); Diana 
Vreeland (fashion empress); Reed Vreeland (husband ofDiana); the Duke and Duchess of 
Windsor (mythic couple). 
ld. at 82, 84. ' . 
9~ Amazon~com search (January 18, 2000) (6;507 books had the word "style" in the title) • 
• 
10. See aLro WILHELM WORRINGER, ABSTRACTION AND EMPATHY: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
PsYCHOLOGY OF S1YLE (1997); DlNTY W. MOORE, THE ACCIDENTAL B:UDI)HIST: MINDFULNESS, 
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND SrrnNG STilL, AMERJCAN STYLE (Main St. Books 1997). 
11. Tercy Pristin, FromSonnetstoRansomNo!a, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at Bl. The article also 
notes: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. 
' 
.• 
• 
• 
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Given the American cultural fascipation with "style,"12 it is, perhaps, 
• 
notsurprising that legal schola~ly attention should come .to focus on the 
style of appellate judicial opinion writing. 13 In this regard~ the most 
significant recent intellectual efflorescence on this subject occurred 
during the Fall of 1995 when the Universi~ of Chicago Law Review 
published a special colloquium issue onjudicial opinion writing, 14 with 
contributions by United States Circuit Courtjudges Patricia M. Wald15 
and Richard A. Posner, 16 and three full-time members of the 
professorate: James Boyd White, 17 Frederick Schauer, 18 and Martha C. · 
Nussbautn. 19 Indeed, one of the contributors .. ·····RichardA. ·Posner .... has 
captured considerable n·ational attention and developed a general 
reputation for his unique judicial opinion writing style as Chief judge of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.20 
. It is up to Dr. Foster to look fol' idiosyncl'asics making up a distinctive pattern. "One 
can make deliberate errors to tty to conceal one's identity," he_ said, "but it's ve•y hard to 
abandon one's ~ustomary habits." In the case of"Primary Colors,', for-example, Dr~ Foster 
found that Anonymous and Joe Klein were both fond of compound words, colons and shoat 
sentences. 
In his criminal work, he also hunts for psychological clues, the aspect of attributional 
work that he seems to find most engaging. "The person who is being criticized or is under 
' 
suspicion for committing some sort of serious misdeed,, he said, "will on the one hand 
adopt various strategies_ for self-:-Justification and va.rious su:ategies for concealing." 
• • • 
. • . . "Text analysis is now where DNA analysis was a few years ago, or where 
fingerprinting was 50 years ago,'~ he said. "We're realizing that we can ~earn an awful lot 
from evidence of this_sort.,• 
ltl. at BlO. 
' 
12. Se~ JujJrtl notes 1·11 and accompanying text. 
13. But se.c one contrasting example, Akhil Reed Amar, Conslilutwntll R~dundtmc:ies tlfl.d Clt~rf.{ying 
CiltuJ~, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. I, 6, I 0 ( 1998) (discussing ''stylistic" features of"a good constitution, which [by 
its textual language] rna y well feature a certain kind of good redundancy rcprcsen ted by val'ious clauses that 
are clarity-enhancing and doubt-removing"). 
14. See Sptcitd Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363·1519 (1995)~ See tllso Wlll.IAM 
D-OMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OFTHE.COURT(l996) {examination of judicial opinions as ,litcrat-y genre). 
15. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rh.ewric l![Resulls and !he Re.Julls tifRireloric: Jutlicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1371 (1995) [hereinaftel" Rhetoric]; Patricia M~ Wald,A Repg, w]ur{{e Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1451 
( 1995) [hereinafter Rep[, J. 
16. S~e Richard A. Posner,Jutlges' WritingS9.ks (Ant/Do TlvJMatw?}, 62 U.CHI.L.REV.l421 (1995). 
17. Seejames Boyd White, U'?lat'sAn OjJinion For?, 62U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995). 
18. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. LA\V REV. 1455 (1995). 
19. See Martha C. Nussbaum, PoeLr as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric tlfld .lk li16trry lmogintllion, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1477 (1995). 
20. Richard A. Posner is an outstanding and prolific intellect by any measure. As ofj unc 1999, 
Posner had authored or co-authored an assortment of books including th~ following: THE ECONOMICS 
OF jUSTICE (1981 ); THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); THE ECONOMIC STRUC.TURE 
OF TORT LAW (1987) (co-authot·ed with William M. Landes); LAW AND lJTERATURE: A 
. 
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION ( 1988); THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); CARDOZO: A STUDY 
IN REPUTATION (1990); THE ESSEN11AL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LEITERS, SPEECHES, 
jUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OUVER WENDELLHOLMES,JR. (Richard A. Posner ed., 
• 
• 
• 
2900] PlAYING ON WORDS 655 
• 
•' 
• 
1992); ECONOMICANALYSiSOFLAW(4th ed. l992); SEXANDREASON(l992}. 
. . 
· t As of june, 1999 Posne .. had authored or co-authored hundreds of"articles, essays and reviews 
on topics ranging from antitrust to aging; healthcare to homophobia, literature to sex." .Alexander Wohl, . 
Pa]ler Trailbltu;er, 83 A.B.A.J. 68 (April 1997). A sample of Posner's less .. than .. book·length intellectual 
expression in law journals and other publications is as follows: A Statirtical Stut!J w Antitrust Enfwcement, 13 
J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); A Theory f![Negligence, lJ. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); The Social Costs q[Monopo!J and 
Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); MarketPowerinAntilmst Cas&r(with William M. Landes), 94 HA~V. 
4 • • • • ~ 
L. REV. 937 (1981}; Economics, Politics, and 1M Reading l!{Silltules and lk Constitution, 49·U. CHI. L. REv. 263 
. ( 1982); An Economic Theory of/Ju. Crimintd TAW., 85 COLUMB. L. REv. 1193 (1985); 7k Summary Jury Trial tmd 
Other Metlwdr of Allernative Dispuu R&rolutwn: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986); 
. . 
ugislalion llntl Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L .. REV~ 431 (1989); Borkand Beellwven, 42 STAN. L~ REV. 
• 1365 (1990). . 
. . 
Judge Posner has captured attention from othet· scholars who have devoted considerable words 
. 
to respond usually quite critically to his multitudinous ideas. See, e.g., David Luban, The Posner Variations 
(27 Variations on a 17zemebyHolmes), 48 STAN. L. REv.l001 (1996); Robin Paul Malloy,lnviribkHand orSleighl. 
ofHand? Ailllin Smith, Richard Posner and the PhilosoplrJ q[Lnw and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209 (1988); 
David Campbell & Sol Picciouo, E.\fJ/oring the Interaction Between lmo and Economics: Th limits· of Formalism, 
• 
18 LEGAL STUDIES, 249, 255 ( 1998) ("By dispensing with ... mathematics, Posner has widened the appeal 
of the economistic gospel, but in doing so h-e has also removed the inherent check which mathematical 
modelling places on the miracles that that gospel can claim to have worked;"). 
Posner has also received lavish attention from the legal media. See, e.g., Musings of a "MonkP:J JtV'Uh 
ll Brain," NAT'L. L.J. A26 (June 17, 1996); Jeffrey Cole, EconomicJ· of llJW: An InlmMw. wilh]udge Posner, 22 
Litig. 23 (1995). 
Practicing lawyers, too, have had a lot to say about Posner-the:Judge. See, e.g., Chicago Council 
of Lawyers, Evtzlumion l!fthe Uniutl Seaus Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 793 
(1994). Indeed, extended exuacts of this Bar critique are worthy of extensive quotation by way of 
background to this Article. Impo1·tant comments, in this regard, include the following: 
• 
Richard Posner .•. is a 1962 graduate ofHatvard Law School, where he was president 
of the ~arvaad Law Review. After clerk.ng for Supreme CourtJustice William Brennan .... 
Posner spent two years as an assistant to a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission 
and another two years as an assistant to Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall. He spent 
a year at Stanford teaching law before moving to the University of Chicago in 1968, where 
he was a law professor until 1981. During his tenure at the University of Chicago, Judge 
Posner became known as a leading exponent of the "law and economics school." ... In 
addition to his scholarly activities, he is the co·founder of a highly successful company, 
Lexecon, Inc., which provides expert witness services to companies and litigants in antitrust 
matters. President Reagan appointed judge Posner to the Seventh Circuit in 1981, and he 
became Chiefjudge in September 1993. He continues to teach at the University ofChicago 
and he remains a prolific writer and lecturer. 
.. .. . . 
· Chiefjudge Posner is unquestionably one of the most influential legal thinkei~s in the 
• 
country.· He is a man of high personal integrity; Chief judge Posner is also a controversial 
' judge. The Council believes the controversy centers primarily around five characteristics 
of his decision-making. The. first is his use of economic theory in dedsionmaking [sic], 
especially concerning traditionally no~economic issues. The second source ofcontroversy 
is the report by lawyers that he tends to give short shrift to the facts. His opinions are often 
attacked by lawyers who feel that he did not take important facts into account, that he 
ignored facts which Would have changed the result had they been acknowledged, or that he 
simply did not care that much about the actual facts before him. The third criticism is that 
Chief judge Posner often looks for ways to modify or overturn settled precedent when he 
does not care for the outcome that precedent might dictate. Fourth, the Council believes 
that Chief judge Posner's opinions could be better structured and that his digressions into 
dicta should be severely restricted. Fifth, the Council believes that Chiefjudge Posnet must 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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The threefold purpose ofthis Articl~ and related plan of inquiry, is: 
First, to identify and synthesize the different theoretical views on the 
meaning and types of appellate judicial opinion writing style emanating 
from the aforementioned contributors to the University of Chicago Law 
Review special issue on judicial opinion writing;21 second, to amplify 
these extant views (hereinafter ''Chicago Law Review Colloquium 
Views") by identifying and_ grounding other theoretical characteristics 
of appellate judici~l opinion writing style, 22 paying particular attention 
to the thoughts of a 1996 book on the subject by.William Domnarski 
entitled In the. Opinion of the Court;23 and third, to apply these theoretical 
insights to a selective sample of the published judicial opinions written 
by Judge Richard A. Posner during 1981-82 his "rookie~' season on 
the federal appellate bench.24 It is my plan to build on the insights 
. gained-in this study byp~blishingfuture articles that will exa:mineJudge 
Posner's evolution ofhisjudicial appellate opinion writing style over the 
course of his judicial career. 25 - · _ 
• 
• 
II. A SYNTHESIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 
COLLOQUIUM VIEWS ON jUDICIAL OPINION STYLE 
• 
A. The Judges, Accounts 
l .. Judge Wald's View 
• 
According to Judge Wald,judges write opinions for seven reasons: (1) 
to legitimate their authority to say what the law requires litigants to doi 
(2) to demonstrate consistent and equal application of law to different 
citizens; (3) the force of tradition; (4) to reveal their intellectual thought 
processes; (5) to politically rationalize their decisions; (6) for personal 
· gratification; and (7) . to attract attention "in hopes of promotion to 
higher judicial office. ';2fi According to her, '~ [t] he symbiotic relationship 
• 
• 
follow the spirit as weil as the letteroffSeventh] Circuit R.ule 38 and not continue to impose 
de facto sanctions in the forrn of scathing language about the purported inadequacy of 
attorney performance without notice and a chance to be heard. 
/d. at 793, 811-12. Su also in.fra notes '172-77 and accompanying text. 
2'1. See-Judicial Opinion Writing, supra note 14; in.fra notes 26-113 and accompanying text. 
22. See infta notes 114-71 and accompanying text. -
• 
23. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14. • 
24. See infta notes 172-407 and accompanying text. . 
25. For example, the-tentative title of my next Posnerian style study is as follows: The Insighiful 
Contrarian: Tlu Dissenting and Concurring Opinions tif]udge Ri&kord A. PoSM, 1981-2000. 
26. Wald, Rhetoric, s11pra note 15, at 13 72 . 
·' 
• 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
' ' 
' 
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• 
between judicial style and substance must be appraiseq against all .these 
institutional and personal reasons why judges write, but. the quests for 
credibility and consistency, t:Wo goals· not always in harmony, are the 
most critical. "27 
A particularly valuable insight of Judge Wald regarding appellate 
judicial writing style is the recent development "[d]ue to the pressure 
of accelerating caseloads" at the federal ·level28 for individu~ federal 
circuit judges to exercise their own idiosyncratic approach in deciding 
whether to write full-blown, publishable opinions for the court or to use . 
"no-opinion dispositions"29 . defined as either no written opinion at all 
or, if written, unpublished in the official court reporters. In W aid's view, 
such "a double-track system allows ·for deviousness and abuse,"30 the 
fallout of a kind of"non-writing" and "non-reasoning~' style of appellate 
judicial opinions - "two different modes of decision making" that W aid 
differentiates as "rhetorical" and "non-rhetorical. "31 As persuasively 
explained by Judge Wald: 
. 
There is indeed a worrisome "lost horizon" aspect to no-opinion 
dispositions. Even when judges agree on a proposed result after 
reading briefs and hearing argument, the true test comes when the 
writing judge reasons it out on paper (or on computer). That process, 
more than the vote at conference or the courtroom dialogue, puts the 
writer on the line, reminds her with each tap of the key that she will 
be held responsible for the logic and persuasiveness of the reasoning 
and its implications for the larger body of circuit or national law. 
Most judges feel that responsibility keenly; they literally agonize over 
their published opinions, which sometimes. take weeks or even month~ 
to bring to term. It is not so unusual to modulate, transfer, or even 
switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream .because 
"it just won't write." ~ut writing to explain a preordained result with 
no concern for its precedential effe~t under a self-imposed time 
constrai~t of hours is something else entirely, inviting no backward 
looks or self-doubt. Rhetoric will always be tied to import and 
permanence, and its absence in unpublished decisions signifies that 
• 
27. /d. at 1373 . 
28. /d. 
29. /d. at 1374. 
• 
30. ld. Wald reports as follows about her recent experience as a Federal Circuit judge, during the 
1990s: 
ltL 
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an 
agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time·consuming public debate about what law 
controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with a result they do not like 
so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues 
under the rug, although most will not stay put for long. But what is the alternative? 
31. /d. at 1376. • 
f 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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they .are the product of a different and. much-abb~eviated decision.-
making process. 32 
Wald identifies three "[i]institutional constraints in the judging 
p~ocess"33 that put a practical limit on an individual appellate judge's 
preference for written opinion styles that would reflect that judge's 
unalloyed vision of comprehensive rationality and justice. 34 First, the 
reality. that the drafting of majority opinions is a delicate political and 
human relations undertaking, precludes the exercise of pure stylistic 
preference. by a judge in choosing relevant rationales, rhetoric, issues; 
legal doctrines, precedents, authorities, and even linguistic flourishes like 
literary allusion or humor.35 Second, the writing judge is affected by 
• 
32. Id. at 1374-75. Wald's important stylistic insight can be usefully compared to e-mail 
communications over the compute.r Internet in recent years. Arguably, people composing e-mail messages 
' 
compose them with less thought and meticulousness than they would compose written correspondence sent 
by "snail mail, because of psychologically-perceived ephemeral nature and relative lack ofimport of e-mail. 
Judge Wald sees a real danger for "oveaworkedjudges [to) be seduced too easily into preferring 
' ,· 
the easier, nonrhetorical route, especially in dose cases." /d. at 1376. Moreover, she opines that: · 
/d. 
More and more issues are being decided without opinion, almost in arbitral fashion 
(arbitrators need give no reasons, just bottom lines). Possible alternatives, such as per 
curiams shqrt on rhetoric but nonet~eless of precedential value and a·equit'ing minimally 
responsible rationales. have been largely bypassed. There ought; in my view, to be 
' ' 
periodic overviews of which kinds of cases get sent down one track rather than another . 
• Danger signals include the presence of obviously difficult issues or the predominance of 
certain kinds of cases (for example § 1983 prisoner cases) on one track, inconsistencies 
between published and unpublished results and rationales, and widely differing rates .. of 
published an~ unpublished opinions among different judges. 
Fo1· Wald, 
The law is coming to be defined by the issues and situations the judges (subjectively) decide 
to write about, not as in the old common law by the accretion of all the results in all the 
situations actually presented to the judges. If that fault becomes too wide, the ground on 
which judicial legitimacy rests can be disastrously shaken. 
/d. at 13 76.;.77. 
33. /d.atl377. 
, .34. In attractive and compelling prose, judge Walq explains this theoretical, unalloyed vision as 
follows: · 
I d. 
If judges' druthers prevailed, opinion writing "'ould go like this: read briefs, listen to 
argument, confer with colleagues, do research, organize thoughts and material, begin 
writing-with a tentative tilt but not a perrnanent fix toward a particular result. At each 
step the judge would rccanvass her building blocks to make sure they were solid i_n their own 
right and locked together in a systematic design. She would go where the facts, logic, and 
th~t sense of ultimate rightness call it conscience, moral compass, or asJ US,tice Holmes did, 
his "can~t helps" took her. And like a gifted novelist, she would let the characters and the 
plot take on a life oftheir own, drawing her along toward one irresistible conclusion. 
A Platonic guardian, or perhaps a single Chancellor in Equity, might so dispense justice; 
a modern-day appellate judge cannot. · 
35. See id. at 1377-79. Interestingly, Wald notes, in this regard~ that "[r]hetoric is the hostage of 
judicial politics ... (and] minority judges must find their rhetotic~l outlet mainly in dissents., /d. at 1380. 
" • 
•• 
. 
. 
• 
. 
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personal relationships on the court in choosing the style of an opinion; 
sometimes soothing or humorous words· are used when describing the 
past work-product of a respected colleague or ideological ally; other 
• • 
times ~a us tic prose is used to debunk the views of a disfavored colleague 
or doctrinal foe.36 Third, the pressures of docket volume coupled with 
human nature lead to stale, ''frozen," and "boilerpl~te" modes of written 
expression that tend to turn up in an appellate judge's opinions. 37 . 
In concluding her thought provoking article,Judge Wald discusses a 
grab-bag of idiosyncratic opinion writing styles that va~ous appellate 
judges have adopted to reflect their own personalities. 'rhe following 
examples, drawn from her account, are illustrative: the psychologically-
expansiveJudgeJerome Frank of the Second Circuit who was wont to 
make "excursions into other disciplines for insights on legal problems. 
• 
and the sharing of odd and interesting tidbits_ of infortnation along with 
spur-of-the-moment witticisms and literary allusions,"38 the caustic and 
combative Justice Scalia who '(uses con·ceptual phrases sarcastically, 
always set out in capital letters .. ~ Oike] 'Powers that Be; and 'Land of the 
Free,"'39 the resort by some judges to -"m.akeplays on words,_ or engage 
in double entendres, or sprinkle movie titles throughout their opinions, 
[in] a game of hide-and-see~ l with] the playful reader. "40 · · 
• 
In ·contradistinction, howevea•,Judge Wald points out that the crafty, strategic appellate· writer 
can subtly "'fram[e] the case, by what may be called the style of "spin" by selectively and judiciously 
'~'finding' the facts," id. at 1386 (original capitalization omitted); "setting the standard of review," id. at 
; 1391 (original capitalization omitted); "controlling the principles,'' id. at 1394 (original capitalization 
omitted); ''labeling the product" as ~ "narrow or broad;, holding, id. at 1398 .. 99 (original capitalization 
omitted); "parsing precedent'' by expanding or contracting it, bypassing it, contrasting it, downsizing it, 
or discrediting it, id. at 1399 (original capitalization omittd); "defending die tan by selective analysis of the 
• 
implications of the cited authoritie~, id. at 1408 (origi~al capitalization omitted); and setting the tone ofthe 
. . 
opinion (cautious, expansive, confident, etc.), see id. at 1412-15. 
36. See id. at 1380-85. According to Wald, "[r]egular dissenters such a5J ustice Scalia are particularly 
prone to [use] stylish stabs." ld. at 1383. Moreover, "thejudge's [usually symbiotic] relationship to his law 
-clerk(s)" typically results in most appellate judges incorporating "nice phrase(s]" and other stylistic 
enhancements to a written opinion. It!. at 1383, 1385. 
37. ld. at 1385. 
38. ld. at 1415. Wald noted, following her description of her former boss,JudgeJerome Fran~, 
''D.] ike Hemingway, other judges write to the bone,·abhorring descriptive adjectives; still others delight in 
injecting exotic language in their opinions., calculated to send readers, including other judges, scurtying to 
. 
the dictionary. We write what we are, and perhaps, more than others, judges are what they write!' /d. 
39. ld. at 1416. 
40. !d. Another "recent development in judicial style," identified by Judge Wald., is "the trend 
toward 'natural language' in judicial opinions as opposed to hypertechnicallegalistic prose." /d. at 1417. 
She contends that this development is salutary "because it helps avoid pitfalls in judicial thinking/' /d . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
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2. ,Judge Posner's View · 
_Citing and drawing upon his extensive scholarly interest in judges' 
writing styles, 41 Judge Posner starts his article in the Universi~ of Chicago 
• lAw Review Colloquium by "trying to explain the elusive concept of 
'style': and to distinguish it from related concepts," including the concept 
of "rhetoric."42 In this regard, Posner provides an insightful working 
definition of writing style, in general, as: . 
• 
[TJhe specific written form in which :a ·writer encodes an ·idea, a 
"message," that he wants to put across. His tools of communication 
are, of course, linguistic. But they include not only vocabulary and 
·grammar but also the often tacit principles,goveming the length and 
complexity of sentences, the organization of sentences into larger units 
such as paragraphs, and the level of formality at which to pitch the . 
writing. These tools are used not just to communicate-an idea but 
also to establish a .mood or perhaps a sense of the writer's 
personality. 43 · 
·Posner continues his analysis by observing that ''rhetoric" is broader 
than "style" since the former involves "a process of reasoning as well as 
the medium of verbal expression,"44 yet, he also p·oints out that 
'"rhetoric' is narrower than 'style,' because-its focus is on persuasion and 
that is only one function of.expression."45 For Posner, ''style is what is 
left out by paraphrase". 46"the range of options for encoding the 
paraphrasable content of a writing."~7 A truly remarkable judicial 
. . 
writing style is "portabl [ e]," a~cording to ·Posner; since it may transcend 
a particular legal issue discussed in the judicial opinion. 48 "The 
sparkling, vivid, memorable opinion is not so chained to the immediate 
• 
• 
• 
41. Posner, supr':' note 16, at 1421, n.l (citing some of his prior writings on judicial writing style: 
THEFEOERALCOURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM, 1-07-15, 2~0-36(1985); Goodbyem~Bhuhook, 53 U. CHL 
L. REV. 1343 (1986); LAW AND LITERATURE: A M -ISUNDERSTOOD RELATION, 281-299 (19,88); 
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN R£PUTA TION, 33-5 7, 125-43 (1990)). 
/d. 
42. Jd. at 1421. 
43. /d. a·t 1422. 
44. Id. 
45. /d. Posner offers the following explanation for this distinction: 
A judge might crack a joke in an opinion merely to amuse, or to show ofT, or to grip the· 
reader's attention and thus make the opinion more likely to be remembered. The joke 
would affect the style of the opinion but it might not be intended to induce agreement with 
the outcome -though then again it might, by making the reader more receptive, as with the 
conventional speaker's opening joke. · 
46. Id. Q.nternal quotation marks omitted). 
47. /d. at 1423. 
48. Jd. at 1424. 
' 
• 
·. 
•• 
. . 
·. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
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context of its creation. It can be pulled au~ and made exemplary of 
law's abiding concerns. ''49 . . 
The s.econd key contribution of Posn~r's article is to define and 
differentiate between what he refers to as ''the pure and the impure 
judicial style [ s]. ''50 Essentially, Posrier sees this dichotomy as a matter 
. . 
of ''tone'': he notes that "[t]one depe·nds on many things, notably 
though not only the choice of words and phrases anq the decision to 
e~brace or avoid contractions,·· colioqui~isms, humor, arid jargon.·"51 
Moreover, according to Posner, " [ t] one is .also s~aped by the length .and 
structure of sentences,"52 as well as the use of headings, subheadings, ·or 
footnotes in a judicial opinion (which tend to raise the tone), ·"technical 
terms and acro~yms" (which tend to raise the tone),. "candor, 'straight 
talking,' and spontaneity" (which tend to lower the tone), among other 
ways of writing.53· Posner, however, perceives a problem with the 
negative connotation of"low" tone in judicial opinions since, py way of 
an example, 'judges such as Holmes who have used .. . ~ the 'low' style. 
:are by and large the judges who were intimate with high culture, fussy 
about their style, aristocrats of writing and thought, judicial 
· Coriolanuses even.u54 Accorqingly, Posner substitutes what he 
characterizes as "a parall~l contrast'' the distinction between "pure"' 
and '~impure" literary styles55 first proposed in an essay by the poet 
• 
/d. 
/d. 
• 
49. ld. at 1425. 
• 
· 50. ld. at 1426 (capitalization omitted). 
' 51. Id. Posner describes his definition of'~argon" as follows: 
I do not mean the names oflegal doctrines, which could hardly be dispensed with in judicial 
opinions. I mean turns of phrase characteristic of legal writing but avoided in good 
writing such words or phrase~ as ''absent" (when used as a preposition), "implicate'; (to 
· mean relate to or invoke, as in ''the due. process ,clause implicates privacy concerns"), 
"ambit/' ''chilling effect, (to describe the affect of the regulation of speech on the 
marketplace of ideas and opinions) ... ''instant" {for present, as in "the instant ca~e"), 
"facially''- (to mean "on its face"), "impeach" (to mean "contradict") ... '"mandate'' (as a 
verb meaning to order or to require), "prong" (to describe one el·ement of a multifactor test 
or-standard), and '"progenf' (cases that follow or derive from an earlier case are the earlier 
case's "progeny"). These usages are eminently avoidable. If they were not, they would not 
mark a. style; styles are optionaL 
52~ ld. at 1427. Posner amplifies this observation by noting: 
Suppression of ornamentation and parentheticals, simplicity and brevity, .and short 
• 
• 
• 
sentences and sentence fragments all tend, generally, to "lower" the toile of a writing, to · · 
make it more like speech. But the qualification implicit in "generally" is important. The 
• 
elimination of all ol'namentation may impart an, impersonal, bureaucratic, and he11ce fonnal 
Lone to ,a writing) while an excess. of brevity may lend it an oracular, dogmatic, imperative, 
and thus, again, a formal tone . 
• • 
; 
• 
53. ld. 
54. ld. at 1428. 
55. Itl 
• 
• 
• 
i 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
. .. . . Robert Penn Warren,56 and applies it to judicial 
According to Posner, "pu~e- style" judicial opinions: 
op1n1on wnt1ng. 
tend to be long for what they have to say, solemn, highly polished and 
artifactual far removed from the tone of conversation impersonal 
... and predictable in the sense of conforming closely to professional 
expectations about the structure and style of a judicial opinion. If we 
had a judicial laureate, that is how he or she. would write. The 
standard "pure" opinion uses technical legal terms without translation 
into everyday Englis-h, quotes heavily from previousjudicial.opinions, 
includes much detail concerning names, times, an·d places, complies 
scrupulously with whatever are the current conventions of citation 
form, avoids any note of levity, conceals the author's personality, 
prefers familiar and ready-made formulations to novelties; and b.ows 
to the current norms of"political correctness" (corresponding to the 
euphemisms for which the Victorians became notorious) at whatever 
. ' 
• 
56. See id. at n.ll (citing ROBERT PENN WARREN, Pure and lmpur~ Poetry, in S~LECTED ESSAYS 3 
( 1958)). Posner summarizes the application ofWarrcn's literary dichotomy to various figures in the history 
or literature; 
-
Warren was writing at a time when the most celebrated modern poets, such as Yeats 
and Eliot, were in self-conscious revolt against the c~aracteristic style of much nineteenth-
century Romantic, and particularly, Victorian poetry. Te.nnyson•s poetry, for example, is 
very refined, like Victorian culture generally "correct,U smooth, polished, sonorous, and 
proper. He was, after all, the poet laurea.te of Victoria's England. "Pure, poetry as 
. ' 
exemplified by Tennyson avoids ''low" subjects and diction; upholds conventional values, 
expresses conventional emotions, is self-consciously "poetic'• and "elevated!' As a corollary 
of all these things, it lacks a ~ertain tang and texture, as well as .conversational immediacy. 
As Warren puts it, '•(.T]he pure poem tries to be pure by excluding, more or less rigidly, 
certain elements which might qualify or contradict its original impulse. In other words, the 
pure poems want to be, and desperately, all ora piece/' 
Tennyson was a vety gre'lt poet, but it is possible also to enjoy, or even to prefer, a 
"rougher," sometimes even bawdy, sometimes startlingly direct, freer•fo•·m poetic style, one 
that is more concrete, more personal,franker, wittier, more intellectual and that has a wider 
emotional register and range of subject matter and employs a more varied diction, one. 
closer to that of everyday life (to prose, even). 
It is the style ofShakespeare, of Donne, and the other "metaphysical" poets, ofByron, 
and among modern poets ofT.S~ Eliot ... Wallace Stevens, Yeats (after 1910 or so), and 
Auden, to name a few. Warren speaks of"resistallces," of"the tension between the rhythm 
of the poem and the rhythm of speech ... ; between the formality of the rhythm and the 
informality of the language; between the pat·ticular and the general, the concrete and the 
· abstract; ..• between the beautiful and the ugly; between ideas . ., Other "New Critics" 
speak of irony, paradox, complexity, polysomy, ambiguity. 
· No one ... considers Shakespeare, and few consider even Eliot, inredor to Tennyson. 
They are merely different. And it is a difference echoed in judicial opinions. Most judicial 
opinions are carefully drafted to emphasize the difference between their diction and that of 
ordinary speech, which is just the sort of difference that poet~ like Shakespeare, Byron, and 
• 
Eliot like to blur. Yet no ca.-eful reader, making due allowance for· differences in linguistic 
conventions between th~ nineteenth century and today, will fail to note Lhc pel"sonal, direct, 
and .conve t-sationaltone ofj udges I ike Holmes and Lea•·ncd Hand, which 'is so d i ffe rent from 
the usual tone of judicial opinions. 
/d. at 1428 .. 29 {citations omitted). · 
, . 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
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cost in stilted .diction. The familiarity of the pure style makes it 
invisible to practitioners of the style and to the intended audience of · 
lawyers. But it is not at all a plain or transparent scyle. Its artificiality 
is revealed by a comparison with the. prose of a nonlawyer de:aling 
with a similar issue for example; a philosopher writing about 
intention compared to a judge in a criminal case writing about 
intention as well as by a comparison with the· less common 
"impure" style of judicial opinions. 51 
• 
In contrast to ''pure style'' judicial opinions, Posner obseiVes that: 
Impure stylists like to pretend that what they are doing when they 
write a judicial opinion is explaining to a hypothetical audience of 
laypersons why the case is being decided in the way that it is. These 
judges eschew the "professionalizing" devices of the purist writer · the 
jargon, the solemnitY, the high sheen, the impersonality, the piled-up 
oetails conveying an attitude of scrupulous exactness; the fondness for 
truisms, the unembarrassed repetition of obvious propositions, the 
long quotations from. previous case-s to demonstrate fidelity to 
precedent, the euphemisms, and the exaggerated CQnfidence 
corresponding to the declamatory mode of"pure" poetry.58 
While Judge Posner is candid enough to admit that his contrast 
between the "pure".and "~mpure" styles ofjudicial opinion writing is 
• 
57. /d. at 1429-30. • • • 
• • 
58.. /d. at 1430 (footnote omitted). Posner continues his description ·~f the "impure style" of judicial 
opinion writing as follows: . 
The handful of impure judiCial stylists prefer the bolder approach (to critics, brazen) 
• 
of trying to persuade without using stylistic devices intended to overawe, impress, and 
intimidate the t"eader. They like to be conversational, to write as ifit were for the ear rather 
than for the eye. They like to avoid quoting previous decisions so that they can speak with 
• 
their own· tongue make it new, make it fresh. (Avoidance of the ready•made was an 
important element of the "wit, that Eliot admired in the metaphysical poets.) They like to 
be candid and not pretend to know more than they do or to spea_k with greater confidence 
than they feel. They eschew unnecessary details, however impressive the piling on of them 
might be. They like to shun cliches, to be concrete, to entertain; to seem to enjoy writing; 
· to imitate the movement of thought unfriendly critics call their style ''stream of 
consciousness." Of the impure stylists we may say, as Warren did of Eliot and other 
moderns, "they have tried, within th~ limits of their gifts, to remain faithful to the: 
complexities of the problems with which they are dealing ... they have refused to take the-
easy statement as solution". 
,. 
Paradoxically, the impure judicial stylists generally take mo~ pains over style than the 
pure stylists do. Unless one is a pat·ticulaa·ly gifted writer, it takes much effort. to make an 
opinion seem effortless! The pure style, despite its artificiality, tomes mo•·e easily to a legally 
trained pe .. son than the impun: style. For one of the things that law school and leg-dl ' 
practice teach, aU unconsciously but not the less effectively for that,_ is to forget how one 
wrote before one became a lawyer. 
Id. at 1430-31 (footnotes omitted). 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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"overdone,"59 and that many judges for stylistic as · well as rhetorical 
purposes mix the approaches, · he confidently offer~ a thumbnail 
· taxonomy of judicial writing styles by noting: 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
The pure tendency is illustrated in the opinions of Cardozo, Brandeis 
(especially his majority opinions), Frankf~rter, Brennan, and the 
second Harlan, and is characteristic of the vast majority of opinions 
written by law clerks, which means most opinions in all Am~rican 
courts today. The pure style is the inveterate style of law review 
editors, from whose ranks most of the clerks are drawn . . On the 
impure side can be found most opinions of Holmes, Douglas, Black, 
Jackson, and Learned Hand. In the middle, the most notable 
opinions may be those of Henry Friendly. Inclusion ofDouglas in the 
list of impure judicial writers should make clear that impure judicial 
opinion writing is not always superior to pure, any more than all 
impure poetry is superior to all pure poetry. Cardozo, mostly a purist; 
was one ofthe finestjudicial writers in our history.60 
The third important contribution ofPosner's article is his elaboration 
on how the two styles of judicial opinion writing the impure style and 
• 
the pure style relate to what he describes as "two jurisprudential 
stances": the "formalist" stance on the one hand, and the "pragmatic" 
stance on the other.61 Posner argues that pure writing style strongly 
correlates with formalist content, although he notes, there are exceptions 
such as justice Hugo Black who wrote in an impure judicial opinion 
style in support of formalist-reasoned results and Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo who wrote in a pure judicial opinion style to justify pragmatic-
reasoned outcomes. 62 Yet, because of such analomies in interrelations 
• 
59. ld. at 1431. 
60. ld. at 1432 (footnote omitted). 
61. ld. According to Posnea·'s conception: . 
The forrnalist firmly believes in right and wrong, truth and falsehood, and believes that the 
fun~tion of a judicial opinion is to demonstrate that the decision is right and true. The 
pragmatist, while not doubting that right and wrong and true and false· have useful roles to 
play in a variety of "language games,, is inclined to doubt that the decision of cases 
sufficiently finely balanced, or at least non routine, to have been appealed to and to require 
decision by means of a published opinion is consistently one of those g-ames. 'The pragmatist 
thinks that what the judge is doing in deciding the non routine case is trying to come up with 
the most reasonable result in the circumstances, with due regard for such systemic 
constraints on the freewheeling employment of" reason" as the need to maintain continuity 
with previous decisions and respect the limitations that the language and discernable 
purposes of constitutional and statutory texts impose on the interpreter. 
ld. at 1432-33 . 
• 
'62. Said. at 1433: Posner sarcastically observes, in this regard, that "the pure style is an excellent 
disguise for the shy pa-agmatist or, for that matter, the willful or partisan judge." /d. He also goes on to 
acidly distinguish a real impure judicial writing style (which is mediated by tangible legal constraints) and 
an "arch-sentimentalist•~ or "arch-egoist" judicial writing style, exemplified in Posner,s analysis by the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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between judicial opinion style and substantive jurisprudential stances, 
and because '' [ s] tyle is artifice"63 and can ·be. feigned to convey what 
a particular judge "thinks an admirable character for a judge to 
have"64 Posner cautions against automatic inference of "a judge's 
jurisprudential stance from the judge's style without a consideration of 
both the content and form of the judge's opinions, "65 · 
An arguably mean-spirited confrontational, and largely unhelpful 
aspect of judge Posner's article is his deconstruction of a criminal law 
opinion written by J u·dge Wald an~ his unflattering comparison of that. 
opinion which he views as written in a pure style that uses formalist 
reasoning with an opinion written by Justice Holmes while he was on 
·the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which Posner views as. 
written in an impure style that uses pragmatic reasoning.66 Judge 
Wald's reply to Posner67 is, likewise, largely unhelpful and obviously 
defensive. 68 Perhaps the redeeming value of this academic spat between 
two of our most distinguished federal app~llate judges is to demonstrate 
that judicial writing style· of whatever stripe 1 comes freighted with an 
enormous amount of judicial ego. This insight is both surprising and 
unsurprising. It is. surprising to those of us who might abstractly hope 
that our life-tenured federal judges would learn how to depersonalize 
their opinions from their self-identity and self-worth. It is unsurprising, 
however, in the larger cultural context ofMillennial America, standing 
betwixt the Age of Narcissism and Anxiety and the Age of Celebrity-at-
any-Cost. Yet, we should not throw out the wheat with the chaff of the 
honorable judges.' valuable insights on the nature. and role of judicial 
• 
writing style. · . 
• 
opinions ofj ustice Harry Blackmun, which while dcpartiog from professional norms of a pure style judicial 
opinion, is an "embarrassing" performance consistingof"the unmediat(!d expression of self.'~ /d. at 1433-
34. CJ Resolutions in Tribute lo Justice Hany A. 8/atkmun, 120 S. Ct. No. 4 Ct. R-1-17 (Dec. 15, 1999). 
63. ld. at 1436. 
64. /d. 
65 .. /d. • 
66. See id. a~ 1437-46, where Posner compares and contrasts judge Wald's opinjon in UnikdSJaUs 
. . 
v. Morris,. 977 ·F. 2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992),. with justice Holmes'' opinion in SlaCk v. New r()fk, N.H. & H.R . 
• 
Co., 58 N.E. 686 (Mass. 1900), written before Holmes was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. 
67. Su Rep!J, supra note 15 at 1451. 
68. Sec id. at 1451-52, in which judge Wald expresses her surprise and dismay at the manner in 
' 
which Judge Posner u~s her written opinion: 
(This single opinion], apparently consigns me to the fearful rhetorical hell reserved for lazy 
and untalented "pure' judges whose:opinions are notorious for '~argon/' "solemnity," "high 
. . 
sheen," "impersonality,"' "piled-up details/' "fondness for truisms," "unembarrassed 
repetition of obvious propositions,'• "long quotations from previous ca5es,t, "e~phemisms,t' 
and "exaggerated confidence., 
Wow! What has happened to the vaunted Seventh Circuit civility? 
ld. {footnote omitted). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. 
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• 
B. The Proftssors' Accounts 
I. Professor Schauer's View 
• 
• 
Professor Frederick Schauer claims that "in law, as in life, dull may 
sometimes have its uses."69 Accordingly, in a contrarian approach, 
Schauer challenges the conventional wisdom that the contemporary 
ju~icial opinion should be viewed as "a legal performance of a special 
• 
sort, one in which the features expected in statutes should largely be 
absent, and in which the features often detrimental to the effective 
operation of a statute or administrative regulation literary flare [or 
literary style], for example are generally to be encouraged. "70 Scha~er · 
suggests in his article, entitled Opinions As Rules, that appellate judicial 
opinions are not, and should not be viewed, "as consumption items for 
law professors, as evidence of the creative intellig~nce of their authors, 
or as objects of aesthetic pleasure."71 
The analytical foundation of Professor Schauer's assessment of 
appellate judicial opinions is that the limited functions of judicial 
opinions are articulating. applicable legal rules, clearly and accurately 
applying the rules to the facts oflitigated cases, and in so doing, deciding 
the merits of the .litigants' legal rights while justifying the result in the 
case to a limited ''reading audience" consisting of other judges, lawyers, 
law professors and law students.72 Thus, according to Schauer, Hthe 
judicial opinion ... should serve a function within law quite different 
from ... be [ing] accurate reflections of the reasol)ing processes of their 
authors, or literary performances to be appreciated like we appreciate 
a novel, a poem, or even an elegantly written work of nonfiction."73 In 
Professor Schauer's worldview, therefore, it is okay for judicial opinions 
to be like statutes (the Securities Act of 1933 or the Internal Revenue 
Code, for instance) or like administrative regulations (such as Rules of 
the Occupational Health . and Safety Administration published in the 
Code qf Federal Regulations). Commentators should not expect fulsome or 
scintillating or stylistically competent literary performances of legal 
materials; boring but clear · pronouncements of the law is quite 
appropriate in his view.74 
69. Schauer, supra note 18, at 1475 . 
• 
70. /fl. at 1455. • 
• 
71. Ill. at 1456. 
72. See id. at 1456-66. 
73. /d. at 1456. 
74. See ill. Schauer contends that "the formal an~ alitea-ary style of many contemporary judicial 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
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Schauer conceptualizes the writing of appellate judicial opinions as 
at least part of "a conscious process of rule making"75 that can be 
expected to va-ry, depending on the case. He writes in support of this 
contention as follows: 
• 
At times it may be appropriate for a court, as with the exact 
specification in Miranda v. A~ona, to delineate exactly what primary 
actors should do. At other times it may be appropriate to set out only 
broad standards, either as· a way of delegating further specification to 
other bodies, or as a means of delaying further specification· until 
additional c~ses arise. And at still other times ~t may be appropriate . 
to set out neither crisp rules nor open-ended standards, delaying, in 
classic common law fashion, the entire rule-making process until a 
richer stock of experience is developed. But my point here is not one 
about just what kinds of rules the courts should make. It is about the 
importance of recognizing that judicial rule making is no less 
important than rule making by other bodies, and no less likely to be 
constrained and informe4 by the kinds of considerations we would 
employ with respect _to any ~ther rule-making enterprise.76 
Schauer concludes his article by arguing that when an appellate 
judicial opinion is viewed as a rulemaking vehicle, rather than a 
· tea~hing/scholarship vehicle for legal academics, "[t]his mode · of . 
evaluation may often find the. literary and _the aesthetic distracting, and 
the imaginative and stylish cou·nt~rproductive."77 By linking up this 
conclusion with an earlier portion of his text, which discusses his 
prognosis that "the number of people who actually read judicial 
opinions is likely decreasing,"78 and of those who do "read" the opinions 
they increasingly use computer:..assisted search techniques to read 
• 
• 
• 
opinions may be less an object of scorn and mol'e of an indication .. . of the functions that judicial opinions 
might seavc in the actual operation of the law., /d. 
In contrast, Schauer summarizes the criticisms of modern United States Supreme Court 
opinions implicitly .the most impoa·t.ant ~ppellate judicial opinions in Amea~ican s~ciety as focused on 
the court's "employing excess[ive] doctrinal ~nd discu.rsive complexity,, id. at 1459, through such devices 
• 
as multi-part balancing tests, footnotes, prongs, requirements and standa rds, see id. at 1456-59; as masking 
dose "policy and political discretion"' id. at 1458; and as producing stylistically deficient piec~s ofliterature 
lhat are · · 
less memorable, less quotable, less followable, and less teachable than the best work ofa · 
Holmes, a Hand, or a Cardozo, all of whom had the ability to write with great style to 
produce ~he kind of opinion that is a pleasure to read, that is evocative and suggestive at 
• 
numerous layers of subtlety, and that employs phr~s that are at once insightful, persuasive, 
and memorable. 
!d. at 1459. 
75. !d. at 1470. 
76. Itl. at 14 70-71 (footnote omitted). • 
77. Jd.atl475. 
78. ld. at 1471-72. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
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"chunks, of the opinion to find "quotable language,"79 Professor 
Schauer apparendy would prefer appellate judges (and, of course, their 
law clerks the real authors- of most of the judicial opinions) to write 
their opinions in the form of "headnotes-" compiled by law book 
publishers. · 
Professor Schauer's article, however, is unhelpful for a number of 
reasons. First, despite his elaborate attempt to reconceptualize appellate 
judicial opinions as m.ere rule-pronouncements, he still assumes th~t 
style matters in theory. The rub, he argues, is that the public does not 
typically have_ access to or read appellatejudicial opinions, and lawyers 
are more interested in bits and pieces of opinions rather than a ~oherent 
. whole. Second, and related to the first point, Schauer does not define 
judicial style, nor does he provide a·ny clear exampl~s of good style/poor 
substance, poor style/ good substance, or the like. Rather,· he 
implicidy and without elaboration seems to equate ''style" with mere 
unnecessary ornamen~ation as if all judicial opinion. style could be 
characterized by Baroque and Rococo decorative conventions, which 
·are curious, expansive, excessive, extravagant, and irregular.80 1"'hird, 
Schauer's approach fails_ to _appreciate, or underappreciates, stylistic 
variations between different statutes and different administrative 
regulations some of which are better-crafted, more elegant, and 
clearer Cvthan other statutes _and regulations. Fourth, he seemingly 
. ' 
dismi~ses the social value of aesthetically pleasing legal 
materials· ~hether they be appellate judicial opinions, statutes or 
administrative.regulations and the plausible connection between good 
style in legal materials and good legal outcomes. In a word, Professor 
Schauer's discussion is naive. ~n another word, his discussion is 
superficial. 
In contrast to Professor Schauer's unhelpful approach to judicial 
opinion style,. Professor James Boyd White's brief, but ric<h, article, 
·What's An Opinion For?81 is most illuminating. 
]d . 
.. 
• 
79. Id. at 1472. 
80. See, e.g., GERMAIN BAZIN, BAROQUE AND ROCOCO 6 .. 7 (1964). • 
The Baroque artist ..• longs lo enter into the multiplicity of phenomenon, intolhe :flux of 
. . . . 
things in their perpetual becomin~his compositions are dynarnic and open and tend to 
expand outside their boundaries . · ... The Baroque at·tist's instinct for escape drives him to 
prefer 'forms that take flight' to those that are static and dense .... 
81. White, mprit note 17, at 1363. 
• 
• 
,• 
• 
,. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
·2000] PLATING ON WORDS 669 
• 
. 
2. Professor White's View 
.• 
• • 
Professor James Boyd White is no stranger to the powerful linkages 
between. law and language. As the Hartright Professar of Law and 
· Professor of English at the Unive~ity ·of Michigan, he has written 
extensively on law, literature and literary style.82 White makes several 
importa~t points about the overarching question of the Universi~ of 
Chicag~ Lllw Review colloquium: ''whether it matters how judicia~ 
opinions are written, and if so why."83 . 
First, and foremost, Professor White reasons that "[t]h:e judicial 
opinion is a claim of meaning"84 that is vitally importa1:1t to what he 
metaphorically characterizes as "the central conversation that is for us 
the law:"85 White's explanation in this regard is ·worthy of full 
• quotation: 
The judicial opinio·n is a claim of meaning: it describes , the case, 
telling its story in a particular way; it explains or justifies the result;· 
and in the pro,cess it connects the case with earlier cases, the particular focts with 
more general concerns. It translates the experience of the parties, and the 
· language in which they naturally speak of it, into the language of the law, 
which connects cases across time ,and space; ,and it translates the texts of the 
law-the statutes and opinions and constitutional provisions into the 
terms defined by the facts of the present case. The opiniori thus 
engages in the central conversation that is for us the law, a 
conversation that the opinion itself makes possible. In doing these 
thi~gs it makes two claims of authority: for the texts and judgments 
to which it appeals, and for the methods by which it works.86 
Second, White . asserts that judicial performance in opinion 
writing-say, establishing the facts or interpreting authoritative texts or 
. 
in construing legal .meaning .. · "can be done, well or badly in virtually 
·every dimension."87 This, in tum, leads to Prefessor White's third 
important point: bad judicial opinions tend to trivialize the law; well-
crafted judicial opinions have the potential to dignify the law.88 
• 
82. See, e.g., jAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACI..ES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF 
TiiE LAW {l985 );JAMES BOYD WHITEJUSTICE AS TRANSLA noN: AN EsSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL, 
CRITICISM (1990). 
83. White, mpra note 17, at 1363. 
84. /d, at 1367. • 
85. /d.. at 1367-68. 
86. ld. (Emphasis added). 
87. Id. at 1368. 
• 
88. Su id. Indeed, according to White, a well-constructed judicial opinion "may even be touched 
with nobility." /d. · 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . 
• 
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A fourth important argument articulated by Professor White in his 
• 
article is that robust criticism of judicial opinions on multiple levels 
including logic, politics and morals "is an essential part of the activity · . 
oflaw [since] [i]t is crucial to legal practice, for it is on the basis of such 
criticism that one will argue for or against the continued authority of a 
particular opinion or line of opinions. '·'89 
. . 
Professor White ends his short think piece on the significan~e of 
judicial opinion writing by postul~ting that opinion style, or reasoning 
style, is linked with legal results in cases because "the right '.style' or the 
right mode. of reasoning will over time lead to the best results.',90 This 
is ·so, White asserts~ not because there is an automatic connection 
between opinion scyle and case results, but rather "through the ways in 
which the imaginations, minds, and feeli~gs of those who live with the 
law are affected."91 
3. Professor Nussbaum's View 
• 
• 
• 
Professor Martha C. Nussbaum brings to the study oflaw an intimate 
and refined sense of the power ofliterature as a shaping force of human 
culture. In a cornucopia qf recent books she has, by way of illustration, 
explored the relationship between literature and moral philosophy,92 
meditated on the meaning of a liberal educa.tion-with necessary 
perspectives of ethics, race, sexuality and religion melded with a 
"narrative imagination" in understanding the modern meaning oflaw 
within a socially-ordered community,93 and examined how an 
imaginative bent of mind, derived from readi~g literature, is an essential 
ingredient in just public discourse within a democratic society.94 
• 
. 89. ltl As White obsetves in this regard: "The opinion is not merely an epiphenomenon to the law, 
a slight adjunct to the real business of deciding cases and predicting what officials will do, but is central to 
the activities of mind and character of the law as we know and value it". Id. 
I d. 
90. ld. at 1369. 
91. Id. White expands his thought by obsetving: 
[T]he great question of the qay is whether law will move in the direction of trivializing 
human experience, and itself, or in the direction of dignifying itself and that experience. 
This is in large measure a function of the ways in which the minds that work in this field 
manifest themselves. The deepest sources of meaning and · dignity in human life are 
activities oflove and art; ·properly understood, the law cannot only enable them, it can be 
one of them, an activity fully worthy of the human mind and spirit. 
• 
92. Set MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LoVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 
(1990). 
93. Set MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM 
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION (1997). 
94. See_ MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC jUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PuBUC 
LIFE (1995). 
• 
• 
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In the course of her written contribution to the Chicago Law Review 
. 
Colloquium, Professor Nussbaum explores the intuitively unlikely 
metaphor of "poets as ju.dges" in discussing what she terms ''judicial 
rhetoric a~d the literary imagihation."95 She articulates a number of· 
fascinating observations about judicial opinion writing style. 
Initially, deriving insight.from a statement from justice Stephen G. 
Breyer during his United States Senate Confirmation ~earin.gs to be an 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,96 Professor 
Nussbaum sculpts an underlying attitude of a: hypothetical appellate 
court judge who would be inclin~d to write a good opinion: "[t]he 
ability to think ofpeople'slives in the novelist's way is., ... :an important 
part of the equipment of a ju<;lge not the whole, or even the central 
part, but a vital part nonetheless."9~ What Nussbaum means by this 
hypothetical underlying judicial attitude is informed by the discussion, 
earlier in her article, of what she calls "[t]he literary judge/judicious 
spectator,"98 learning to "think like a novel-reader,''99 and her 
conception, borrowed by Walt Whitman, of a "poet-judge," the latter 
being someone with "the ability to imagine vividly and then to assess . 
judicially another person's pain, to participate in it and then to ask. 
about its ·significance . . . Veading] to acquire a motivation to alter 
[it]." 100 Second, aligning herself with the Confirn1ation Hearing 
thoughts of justice Breyer, 101 Professor Nussbaum's model of a judge 
95. Martha C. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1477 (capitalization omitted). As Professor Nussbaum 
notes, her "essay is a version of the final chapter ofPottic]ustice: The literary /maginaJ.um in Public IJ..fl [supra 
.· ~ 
note 94}." !d. at n. t. 
96. See id. (quoting from the Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Senate Committee on thejudiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 
(July 13, 1994)). The quote by, now,Justice Breyer is as follows: 
/d. 
• 
I read something that moved me a lot not very long ago. I was reading something by 
Chesterton, and he was talking about one of the Brontes, : . . or ]fllll Eyre that she wrote. 
He said that if you want to know what that is like, you go and you look out at the city I 
. 
think he was looking at London ---and he said, you know, you see all those houses now, even 
at the. en~ of the 19th century, and they aU look all as if they,re the same. And you think 
all of those people are out there, going to work, and they're all the same. But, he says, what 
Bronte tells you is that they are not the same. Each one of those persons and each one of 
. . 
those houses and each one of those families is di(ferent, and they each have a stoty to tell. 
Each of those stories involves something about human passion. Each or those stories 
involves a man, a woman, cbildren,.families, work, lives. And you get that sense out of the 
book. 
• So sometimes l have found literature very helpful as a ~ay out of the tower. 
97. ld. at 1496 {footnote omitted). 
98. Id. at 1486. 
99. I d. at 1492 . 
100. Id. at 1487-88. 
10 1. See supra note 96 ~nd accompanying text. 
• 
" 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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who is psychologically and emotionally prepared · to write a good 
appellate opinion is one who "stresses the need for technical mastery as 
well as sentiment and imagination, and [who] insists that the latter must 
·continually be informed by and tethered to ~e former." 102 
Third, in examining two appellate court opinions a partial 
concurrence an~ partial dissent by United States Supreme CourtJustice . 
Stevens in the 1984 prisoners' rights case, Hudson v. Palmer, 193 and a 
United States Court of Appeals panel majority opinion by Seventh 
Circuit judge Richard Posner in a 1994 sexual harassment case, Carr v. 
Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp. 104 Professor Nussbaum 
extolls the stylistic virtues qf these opinions. 105 Nussbaum discerns in 
both opinions the use of imagination and appropriate emotion by the 
jurists. 106 In both the Stevens and Posner opinions she uncovers a 
"literary approach [that] is closely connected With sympathetic attention 
to the special plight ·of people who are socially unequal,,, 107 like a . 
prisoner in his cell and a woman in an overwhelmingly male and hostile 
workplace. 
Fourth, Professor Nussbaum explains a negative exemplar of judicial 
style in her stylistic analysis of both the maJority opinion ~nd concurring 
opinion by Chief] ustice Burger in the 1986 sodomy prosecution case of 
Bowers v. Hardwick. 108 In her critique of these opinions she criticizes the 
• 
"distancing strategy" of both opinions, which do not attempt to tell the 
story of the defendant Michael Hardwick's pursuit "to live a fully human 
life" through his expression ofhomosexuality.109 Moreover, Nussbaum 
disagrees with the opinions' "level of generality'' in characterizing the 
. . purported right at bar as '"a right to commit homosexual sodomy,"' 
instead of a more focused "right to determine the course of one's own 
sexual life so ·long as one does not harm others." 110 According to 
Nussbaum, jurists exercising "literary imagination" style in Bowers v. 
Hardwick would have given "[more] .careful attention to history and 
social context, and an empathetic consideration of the situation of the 
homosexual in American socie~."111 . 
• 
• 
102.· Nussbaumt supra note 19, at 1496. 
I 03. 468 U.S. 517, 541 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
104. 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994). 
105. See Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1496-1509. 
106. Stl id. at 1509. 
107. /d. 
108. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
I 09. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1513. 
110. /d. 
lll. ld. at 1514. 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
f • 
• 
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Finally, Professor Nussbaum ends her set of obseiVations on judicial 
. opinion writing style by using the Ame·rican poet Walt Whitman's Song 
qf Myself as a model of the poetic imagination needed for a judge to write 
a go.od judicial ~pinion. 112 According to Nussbaum: "[i] n order to be 
fu~ly ratio_nal a judge must be capable. of literary imagining and 
sympathy. She must educate not only her technical capacities hll:t also . 
her capacity for humanity."113 
• 
III. BEYOND CHICAGO: SOME OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON jUDICIAL 
OPINION S'I'YI.E 
. . 
• 
A. Domnarski's Assessment 
Attorney William Domnarski provides a variety of valuable ideas and 
insights about appellate judicial opinion style in his 1996 book, In the 
Opinion of the Court. 114 Domnarski's analysis is a valuable extension and 
' 
amplifiGation of 1995 Chicago Law Review Colloquium views discussed 
in the previous section. 115 
Initially, Domnarski emphasizes how judicial opinions are ''a forrn of . 
literature" that consists of "communications between [a] court and 
society." 116 In this respect, he emphasizes how judicial opinion style is 
"a function of court business, dominant [judicial] personalities, and the 
influence of law clerks." 117 · 
Second, Domnarski examines the captivating, but varying, judicial 
opinion styles and methods of key United States Supreme Court 
Justices, including ·Oliver Wendell Holmes, 118 Louis Brandeis, 119 
Benjamin Carclozo,120 Hugo Black, 121 William 0. Douglas/22 Felix 
Frankfurter, 123 and Robertjackson. 124 In a related way, he articulates 
an intriguing "canon" of eleven Supreme Court opinions, 125 
chronologically ranging from the 1819 opinion for the Court by Chief 
• 
• 
• 
• 
112. Su id. at 1517-19. 
113. Id. at 1519. 
114. DOMNARSKI, mpra note 14. 
115. Su supra notes 26·113 and accompanying text. 
• 
116. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 2 . 
' . 
• 
117. /d. 
• 
118. See id. at 35-36, 63·64. 
' . . 
119. See id. at 63-66. 
120. See id. at 67. • 
121. See id. at 36-37, 67-69. 
122. See id. at 38, 67-68. 
123. See id. at 66-68. 
124. See id. at 69-70. 
125. See id. at 75-89. 
• 
• 
• 
' . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Justice john Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland126 to th~ 1973 opinion 
for the· Court by Justice Harry Blackmun in Roe v. Wade. 127 In 
constructing his .canon, Domnarski uses style as one of six criteria for 
selection128 and points out that stylistically "[t]he majority of the 
opinions in the canon were written with the average reader in mind 
[with the] rhetorical strategies [ ofthe individual opinions] stress (ing] the 
importance of the issues being considered by highlighting their 
universality and by making them human rather than legal." 129 . 
Third, In the Opinion of the Court compares and contrasts the prevailing 
style of United States Supreme Court opinions with the style in certain 
lower federal court opinions consisting of both the appellate opinions 
of the circuit courts of appeal and the trial level opinions of the district 
courts. 130 As noted by the author of the book: 
The. bland, homogenous style th(lt dominates the judicial opinions of 
the High Court today also dominates the opinions of the lower federal 
courts. At the same time, however, lower federal court judges are 
seeking to distinguish themselves and thei~ opinions with ,a variety of 
stylistic approaches. These draw ·upon and expand the approaches 
that federal judges in earlier decades had used. The difference, 
however, is in the significantly greater number of judges who are 
writing distinctive opinions and in the frequency with which they 
write them. The opinions ofth~ lower federal courts, as a result, are 
now defined by what had been the exception in earlier times. The 
reader, of course, benefits from the variations in style. The readers of 
current Supreme Court opinions wade through bland p-rose. But 
readers of the lower federal court opinions, while they too encounter 
blandness, frequently find prose that, more than merely amusing or 
. 
126. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
127. 410 U.S~ 113 (l973). The other nine. "canon, opinions, in Dornnai'Ski's view, are justice 
. . 
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. Uniud StaUs, 250 U.S. 616~ 624 (1919),Justice Black's opinion in Gluunbers v. 
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940),Justice Black's opinion in Youngstown Shut & Tube Co. v. StlU!Jer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952), Chiefjustice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Chiefjusti~e Warren's 
opinion inMirandav . .Af'kona, -384 U.S. 436 (1966),JusticeJack.~on;sopinion in Wtsl Yu-giniaStau.Bd. ofEduc . 
v. BarntU, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),Justice Black's opinion in GU!ton v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Chief 
Justice Warren's opinion in I.JJuing v. Vtrginin, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and justice Douglas, opinion in Skinnn v. 
OklliJwma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Ste DOMNARSKl, supra oote 14, at 77-89. · · 
128. Domnarski explained his selection method as follows: 
In constructing my canon I have used the following criteria: the judicial opinion ( l) comes 
from the United States Supreme Court, (2) establishes or acts as a harbinger of (3) an 
important rule {4) affecting a fundamental aspect {5) of the AmericaJI democracy o1· the 
American way of life (6) with clarity, conviction, or eloque11ce . 
• 
DOMNARSKI, supril note 14,-at 77. 
129. /d. at 88. 
• 
130. See id. at 90-115. 
• 
. . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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lively, draws the legal issues and the judiciary's response to them·into 
sharper focus. 131 
675 
The difference between Supreme Court opinions and the opinions of 
. the lower federal courts, according to· Domnarski, is due to two key· 
factors: (1) the "greater intimacy with the litig~tion process"132 in the 
le>wer federal courts compared. to the High Court's often rarified view 
• 
of the litigation process, and (2) the large group d}'namics involved with 
Supreme Court writing ~here nine justices ''can have a ·hand in what is 
ultimately written" 133 compared to the court of appeals judges where 
panels typically consist of only three judges, and therefore, ''the judge 
who writes the opinion has more opportunity to write the opinion as he 
or she wants." 134 · 
• 
Fourth, Domnarski briefly examines the evolution of lively ·and 
unique appellate judicial opinion writing ~tyles over the course of the 
last century.l35 In the course of this evolutionary discussion, he cites 
examples of noteworthy and admirable judicial opinion styles including 
·the opinions of the following United States Circuit Judges: Learned 
Hand, 13-6J erome Frank, 137 Henry Friencily, 138 Abner Mikva, 139 Amalya 
Kearse, 14° Frank Easterbrook, 141 and Bruce Selya.142 · 
Finally, In the Opinion of the Court adds to our understanding of stylistic 
de.vises utilize.d by federal appellate court judges who are "interested in 
. 
131. /d. at 90. Lower federal court opinions, according to Domnarski,-h.ave an enormous quantitative 
impac~ on the "flow,; of legal language in American culture. A$ :the author notes in this regard: 
The [federal district and circuit] courts together publish more than ten thousand cases in 
the Federal Suppiemtrit and the Fetkral Reporter each year. In the fifty or so combined volumes 
of the Federal Supplemtnt and the Federal Reporter the West Publishing Company produces 
approximately eighty thousand pages of opinions from the district and circuit courts 
annually. Each volume has about sixteen hundred pages, and approximately twenty five 
of each series comes out in a year. Each page ofe.ithe_r series contains approximately 750 
• 
wotds. 'Put differently, West Publishing publishes approximately 60 million words ofjudicial 
opinions from lower federal courts each year . 
• 
/d. at 92. 
132. Jd. at 94. 
13.3. ld. 
134. /d. • 
135. Domnarski, in a related way, also· alludes to what he. tongue-in-cheek, refers to as the 
"peripheral amusements', oflo~er federal courtopi·nions. Jd. As specific illustrations of these "peripheral 
. . 
amusemen.ts," the author refers to opinions reUecting "the-oflbeat. the controversial, or the juicy~, as well 
as humor in various guises. ld. at 93, 94. · 
136. See it!. at 97 .. 99. 
13 7. Ste id., at 10 J.Q2. 
138. See ul. at 103. 
139. Seeid. at 105. · 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See it/. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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distinguishing their opinion~." 143 Domnarski ~atalogs and discusses 
stylistic techniques in current federal appellate opinions noting the 
following! examples: ~'dramatic introductions, apt or poignant 
introductio.ns, angry introductions, ·and· humorous introductions;" 144 
humor, including "subject matter puns,"145 revelation of "a party's 
stupidity, sometimes with deadpan analysis," 146 "decidedly unjudicial 
subheadings,';147 and mocking of counsel's performance;148 "use (of] 
various fonns of figurative language." 149 like epigrams, 150 hyperbole, 151 
extended metaphors, 152 literary allusion, 153 and "B.ardalotry· through 
reference to Shakespeare."154 
B. Judge Coffin's Approach 
• 
• 
Judge Frank M. Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, has made several interesting 
obsetyations about appellate judicial opinion style~ 155 His most recent 
contribution is encapsulated in the book, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering and 
Judging. 156 Judge Coffin's personal insights on appellate judicial opinion 
style in On Appeal -are illuminating; they can be placed under a number 
of different points, as follows. , 
1. The "construction" of an appellate opinion is "the core of 
appellate judging" since the written opinion reflects a 'judge's unique 
qualities, values, methods, tone, and approaches." 157 
143. /d. at 107. 
144. ld. . 
145. /d. at 112 . 
146. ld. at 1 09~ 
147 . .Jd. at 112. 
148. Suid.atll3.· 
149. /d. 
• 
• • 
150. &4 id. Forexample;Judge Fmnk Easterbrook noted that ')udges are 110t like pigs, hunting for 
. . 
truffies buried in briefs., /d. (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,956 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
15 I. See it/. at 114. 
152. See id. 
153. See id. 
. 
154. /d. at 114-15. For an eloquent and scholarly exercise ofbardalotry and the law see DANIELj. 
KORNSTEIN, KilL ALL TilE LA WYERS?: SHAKESPEARE•s LEGAL AP~EAL (1994). 
• • 
155. See,.e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS. OF AjUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL 
• 
APPElLATE BENCH (1980). 
156. FRANK M. CO FAN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING AND jUDGING ( 1994). In addition to . 
obse1vations on appellate judicial opinion style, Judge Coffin also addresses an assortment of other 
interesting subjects on appellate. practice and advocacy including the following: the English appellate 
tradition; the Am-erican appellate tradition; comparisons between state and federal appellate systems in the 
United States; practical advice to appellate lawyers about briefs and oral arguments . 
157. ld. at 171. 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
" 
• 
• 
• 
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2. A written appellate opinion serves three important jurisprudential 
functions: "it decides a case, ending at least one dispute between .the 
parties; it continues the story by making some law, from a little bit of 
interstitial law to a huge chunk; and it projects the story into the 
future by giving intimations of further directions." 158 
3. Each written appellate opinion should rationally be preceded by 
a "triage" as$essment by the writing judge. This assessment is not a 
willingness to decide some cases incorrectly, but rath~r, a willingness 
to sacrifice "the length, depth and elegance of the reasoning" in 
written form for the sake of keeping current with the appellate 
caseload. 159 
158. ld. • 
• 
• 
159. Id. at 176. Judge Coffin's tripartite "Topography of Cases," from least burdensome, and 
therefore subject to sacrifice in written analysis, to most burdensome requiring a thorough, full-dressed 
written opinion is as follows: 
• 
I. Lighl: Cases in which the disposition, order, or opinion . can ordinarily be expected to 
take from one or two hours to no more than haifa day"[with law-clerk assistance]. 
a. A.ffinn on llze Opinion Below 
b. A Short Order of Several lines 
c. Memorandum Opinion (tT Per Curiam 
2. Motkrt~U: Cases in which an opinion should ordinarily be prepared in from two or three 
days to a week. 
a. A Simple, Fact-Intm.rWe Unpuhli.Jhed Opinion. 
b. A Straighlforward Application l!f lAw to Facts. 
c. I..iJu Drawing. 
d. Statutory Constnlction. 
3. He~tht Blockbusters~ Cases in which, for various reasons, the expected time investment 
is substantial. By "substantial" I mean from two to six weeks. The advent of such a case in 
a chambers requires careful planning and readjustment of work schedules so that the 
remaining work goes forward as the "biggien slowly moves forward. 
a. 11zt Multi-issue, Mulli-tkftntltml Case. The paradigm of this kind of case is the 
criminal prosecution of a drug conspiracy, involving many defendants, wiretaps, 
one or more searches and seizures, incriminating conversations with 
codefendants, exclusion of some evidence and admission of some, rulings on 
. expert witnesses, alleged prosecutor overreaching in argument, refusal to sever 
trials of various defendants, challenges to sufficiency of evidence as to some, and 
claimed errors in the instructions to the jury. The very magnitude of the trial 
record and the multiplicity of issues assure me that a very large piece of work is 
· involved, requiring up to four weeks of a lawclerk's time and from a day or so to 
several days of my time. . 
b. An Overarching Legal Issue. The facts may be relatively few, uncomplicated, and 
undisputed. But the task of legal analysis is a heavy one. It may take a number 
· of forms: a crucial, threshold decision (is a municipal ordinance content-based? 
Is a suspect "in custody"?); a delicate balancing act (do institutional interests 
outweigh individual rights?); a deep policy analysis (should sectarian high · 
schools be more immune to church·state establishment clause scrutiny than 
sectarian universities? ... ); study of a cluster of diametrically opposed cases to 
decide which group is to be followed; or a microscopic study of an enigmatic 
Supreme Court decision. 
c. An Overarching Factual Qjuslion. This typ~ of case requires the opinion writer to 
master a lengthy transcript and many exhibits. Examples are an antitrust case 
• 
• 
• 
• 
, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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4. In "[d]oing an [o)pinion,-" an appellate judge like Coffin 
~'imm~rse[s himself) in [a] case totally, ~rawing first upon everyt~ing 
the parties and the judge below have said:" 160 . 
. 
The case at this point is like a tidal pool, recently stirred by the tide. 
Everything is cloudy and in motion. My faith is that if I just wait long 
enough and observe closely enough, the water will clear~ So I begin 
my re·reading and note-taking. I start with my very brief and 
impressionistic argument notes,just to refresh my memory as to li.vely 
issues. Then I look at my very· skeletal notes of our Uudges'] 
conference to see if either o~ my colleagues [on the panel] had voiced 
some idea that I should keep in Plind. Then I pick up the briefs 
[again]. 161 
. 
5. Following an immersion phas~, an appellate judge, adhering to 
Frank Coffin's methods, would "[p]ause for (b]earings" and then 
"summon (his] troops, (his] ·clerks, and . .' . have a wide-ranging 
discussion'' about a variety of key stylistic and substantive issues. 
_described as follows: 
• 
tuaning on market share, a case involving a decision by the ·Food and Drug 
ActministrAtion not to approve n new dl'ug for use, and a challenge to the 
sufficiency of an environmental impact statement issued in connection with the 
proposed construction of a major air terminal. .• 
d. Court Policy. A ca.;e may not tum on any casclaw, statute, regulation, or 
constitution, but on the court's supervisory powc.r over courts within the 
appellate court's jurisdiction. Matters of pr.1ctice and standards of behavior 
affectingjudges and lawyers are frequenl subjects. Because any decision dealing 
with such issue~ must be clear, fair, and practicable, great care in phrasing is. 
· rcquil-ed and usually illl mcmbet-s of the cou.-t aa·c invited tQ comment. 
/d. at 177 .. 80. 
160. Id. at 183~ 
• 
• 
• 
. . 161. /d. Judge Coffin's "immel'sion'• phase of opinion Wl'iting also. involves a -check ofthc~lppeUatc 
record and b.-owsing, on occasion, into collateral legal materials like law review atticlcs and treatises. A'i 
poignantly expressed by Coffin: . 
• 
The briefs having been read, I realize that I shall. no.t &l:ally "know'' the case until I 
have gone tht'ough the-recot-d. But I know that I can spend several entr'ancing hours. with 
a l·cco•·d and retain only generJI ifllpressions unless I can I"Ctt~cc my trctcks. So I emulate 
Theseus when he entered the Minotaur's maze and leave a thread behind me as I go 
forward. This thread, in the form of a crude index of major facts and the page,s on which 
• • 
they are found, is my assurance that I can retrace. my steps and, when I am in danger of 
being overwhelmed by detail, see \\'ith some pe1-spcctive the relation ofevent.s. I have no 
doubt that today a judge with greater word·processing sophistication than I possess could 
make a computer progrdm that does for judges what the thread did for Theseus. 
Sometime~, if fancy suggests and tim~ allows, I shall go beyond the ba·icfs and recor~, 
and b .. owse. J shall look into law l'eview articles that have 'long lain on my· desk <?r I shall 
open·a treatise or two and "read around', the issues. Once in a while I find some ore worth 
mining. What this kind of experience teaches me is that when one sets forth to work on 
what could be a signifi'cant opinion, It is a pearl of gt·eat price not to be harassed by tight 
· deadlines. 
/d. at 184. • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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In this kind of case,just exactly what ir the standard of review? Even 
if there was a waiver .of this objection, should .we neverthele.ss reach 
the merits? If one issue proves dispositive, should we deal with any of 
the:.other? Should we decide on a narrow ora broader ground? Do 
we ~ant to make a ringing pre.cedent, or should we minimize the 
preGedent by affirming on ~lternate grounds? lnvariably I leave such 
a conference refreshed and inspired. 162 
6. On "[t]he. [r]oad to U]ustification" moving well beyond the 
decision on the merits. in a case to the explicit rationale for th·e 
decision judge. Coffin suggests a twofold preliminary process: 
·outlining a draft opinion and writing the first draft of the opinion. As 
explained by Judge Coffin: . . 
Outlining is not a·task that I per~orm all at once. I do my outlining 
not only in sequential stages, but in different layers of detail. I first 
concern myself with outlining the preliminaries?everythin,g leading up 
to my analysis and discussion of the merits. I do not attempt an 
oudirie of the merits at this point. Also, in outlining both the 
preliminaries and the merits, I act again like the cross-country 
traveler: when I come to a big city like Chicago (or a complex section 
of an opinion), I need a more detailed road map on a larger scale. So 
I make sub•outlines. • 
• • • • 
I am now ready to outline my treatment of the merits. Of course, the 
first decision will be to determine the order in which the issues,_ if -
there. are more· than onel should be discussed. I ·suspect that generally 
the most important issue should lead off. But not necessa~ly. It may 
be that disposing ofless important issues Will clear out the underbrush 
and lead logically ~o the final and dispositive issue. As priority of 
issues is considered, I also am thinking of grouping issues, some 
deserving very summary treatment, ~nd some· desemng no treatment 
at all. 
I am now ready to begjn writing. I realize that I still shall have to stop 
along the way to make a more detaile·d sub-outline if an issue warrants 
it. At this point, I usually sense a welling of enthusiasm as I begin to 
express the fruits 'of more creativity. 163 
· 7. The culmination of Coffin's opinion writing ·p.rocess consists ofthe 
"[f]inal [t]ouches" of editing the draft opinion, and then, 
" [ c] irculating the [ d] raft" to his colleagues on the appellate panel. 164 
The "pro~f of the pudding'' is the fe~ling of satisfaction that comes in 
"working up an opinion". As explained by Judge Coffin: 
' 
162. ld. at 184 .. 85. (Original emphasis). 
163. ltl at 186, 188·89. 
164. It/. at 190.· · 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
'• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Sometimes, often enough to make me aware of the privilege of being 
an appellate judge, the process of working up an opinion from the raw 
materials of the cold record, the contesting briefs, the existing law, 
history, logic, custom, arid such considerations of policy and social 
justice as the case permits, becomes an intense, all-engulfing, and 
fulfilling experience. 165 · · 
• 
• 
• 
C. Miscellaneous Vzewpoints 
• 
In ending my discussion on appellate judicial opinion writing style, it 
is appropriate to briefly mention some other, antecedent, viewpoints . 
1. Judge Edward Re. In his brief pamphlet published by the Federal 
Judicial Center, Judge Re opines that, "[t]here is no such thing as an 
exclusive style .. We each have ou·r own particular style. There is, 
·however, good writing as distinguished from poor writing. For each of 
us the questio11 is whether the writing represents our best effort.,' 166 
The "A, B, C" of good appellate opinion writing,· forJudge Re, boils 
down to "Accu.racy, Brevity and Clarity."167 
2. Dean John H WWnore. According to Wigmore: 
• 
[T]here can be no one and exclusive style, appropriate for a judicial 
opinion. It may begin by rehearsing the facts, or it may begin by 
stating the question of law; it may notice the arguments pro and con, 
or it may merely state the conclusions reached; it may pay attention 
to precedents distinguished, or it may not; and so on. But there is 
one thing that it must do, viz., it must state plain!J the rule upon which the 
decision proceeds. This is required, in theory, because the (Appellate] 
Court's function is to declare the law; · and in practice, because the 
Bar is entitled to know exactly what rule they can follow in advising 
clients and in trying cases. 168 
. 
• 
3. Professor Robert ujlar. In a law review article published in Columbia 
Law Review, Leflar obseiVed: 
Some judges argue that literary style has little or nothing to do with 
the quality of opinions, that style is "dressing" merely, and that the 
functions of opinions are served wholly by their substantive content. 
This simply does ·not make sense .. For one thing, every judge has a 
writing ·style, whether he knows it or not. It may be semi-literate, 
graceless, obscure, opaque. It may be simple, clear, plain. It may be 
• 
florid, subtle, or fancified, repetitious, elf:lborate, or sketchy, garrulous, 
• 
• 
• 
. . 
165. ComN,supra note 155, at 155. 
166. EDWARD D. RE, APPELLATE OPINION WRmNG 1 (1975). 
· 167. Id. at3. . 
168. APPElJATEjUDICIAL OPINIONS 155 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974) (quoting 1 WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE 253-54 (3rd ed. 1940}. . . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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·or meticulous. There may be emphasis on policy and theory, on 
practical socio-economic effects, on pre'cedents, or on counsels' briefs. 
Whatever it is, it determines how effectively the· substantive content of 
opinions is conveyed; in fact, it detennines whether there really is a 
usable substantive content, and what that content is. 169 
• 
4.Justice James D. Hopkins. Justice Hopkins, a former judge of New 
York's intermediate appellate court; ~rote a pithy law journal article . 
about appellate judicial opinion style, articulating several incisive points. 
Among the most interesting points in his article are the following: 
. . 
Judges write opinions for an audience. The audience varies as the 
• 
case vanes . 
The opinion, as an expression of judgment, is an essay in persuasion. 
The value of the opinion is measured by its ability to induce the· 
audience to accept the judgment. · 
The nature of the audience is defined by ~he case. When the issue is 
essentially factual, the audience usually consists of the parties and 
their attorneys. When the issue is essentially legal, the ·audience 
usually consists of the parties, their attorneys, and the bench and bar. 
When the issue has public implications, the audience includes the 
• 
legislature, public officials, the news media, and the community . 
• 
• • • • 
The style of an opinio~ has two aspects the organization of the 
discussion, and the composition of the language. 
The organization of the discussion means first, the approach of the 
author to the issue, and second, the method employed to make the 
discussion clear and concise. 
The approach should always be measured, temperate, ·and objective. 
Rhetoric is best suited for the advocate; an opinion expresses a 
decision above the individual passio·ns in the case. 
The method of the discussion is not bound by any one rule. An 
opinion considering several issues may be divided into branches. 
Footnotes are useful when they inforrn ~he reader as to relevant 
citations and material not crucial to the decision or contain quotations 
at length of statutory provisions and pivotal testimony. Footnotes 
breed irritation when their number and proximity interrupt the flow 
of the discussion. 
The operative facts should be stated in depth preceding the discussion 
· in the opinion concerning their effect and the operative law. This is · 
not an absolute: sometimes disparate issues arise from unrelated facts, 
and divisions of the discussion as to both fact and law pertinent to 
each issue assist understanding. 
• 
• 
169. ld. at 161 (quoting Robert A. LeOar, Some Observalitms Concnning]udicial Opinions, 61 COLUM: L. 
REv~ 810, 816 (1961)) . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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One cardinal rule: do not omit the facts which are stressed by the 
unsuccessful party or a doctrine which may be at war with the 
ultimate disposition. Otherwise the standing. of the case both as to 
persuasivene~s and as a precedent is impaired. 
• • • • 
Metaphors illuminate, yet may also be delusive. Be sure that they 
·truly fit the pattern illustrated, an<;l are not so remote in their bearing 
that the reader loses his way in underbrush . 
• • • • 
• 
Humor has a dubious place in an opinion. · It is not an universal 
commodity and the decision of the rights of th·e parties is a serious 
matter. Irony may be an effective tool of expression, when sparingly 
• 
used, but sarcasm directed toward the parties is seldom in good taste . 
• • • • 
. 
At some point in the opinion .appears its .fulcrum. That is where the 
author ends his discussion of the operative facts and law and begins 
his explanation of the decision. The value of the opinion largely 
hinges on this section. Make sure that it expresses the intent of the 
decision fully and clearly. 
• • • • 
Put the decision on a major ground. Recall that the opinion loses 
worth as a precedent if the ·decision rests on alternative grounds. 
Sometimes this cannot be helped: the 'grounds are equally significant 
and each is necessary to the proper disposition of the case. But 
generally the opinion should determine the issue on one major 
ground. 
• • • • 
• 
Brevity is the soul of wisdom. Yet, do not be so brief as to be cryptic. 
The audience may not alw·ays appreciate the author's desire to 
shorten the opinion to the irreducible minimum. 170 . 
. . . 
. 
5. Profissor Walker .Gibson. As a poet and professor of English, Walker 
Gibson had some salient advice for melding literary style with judicial 
opinions. Specifically, he wrote: 
• 
• 
The problem of composing good judicial writing cannot finally be so 
very different from the problem of composing any kind of good 
writing. The issues to. be faced are the same, and ... they come down 
pretty simply to a recognition of the virtues of one's reader. If I can 
recogn~e my reader, if I can see in him a person of discretion and taste, 
one who shares with me a sense of the world's multiplicity and a sense 
• 
· of the tenuous relation between language and experience, then I am 
170~ ld. at 164-67 (quotingjames D. Hopkins, Now on S!Jie in Judicial Opinions, 8 TRIALjUDGES'J. 49 
(1969) (numbers before paragraphs omitted)). · 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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all right. By recognizing him, I define him, and we. may hope to 
communicate across the guarded boundaries that divide us. 
The.writer oflegal documents, of whatever sort, may be doing himself 
an injustice if he f3:ils to accept such an ambitious and high-minded 
notion of his art, choosing instead to .think .of himself as a relatively 
mechanical and lowly worker in words . 
. . . But the situation is surely· quite otherwise. The poet or novelist, 
the historian, t~e physicist, the appellate judge are all deeply involved 
in one essential responsibility: the expression of life's complexities in 
mere man-made words. Wherever he starts, whatever trivial item of . 
• 
human experience he initially confronts, the legal writer can make.his 
stab at eloquence. 171 · 
• 
. . 
IV. jUDGEPOSNER'SAPPELLATEOPINIONS, 1981-82: AS'IUDYIN 
jUDICIAL OPINION S'fYI .. E DURING HIS ROOKIE SEASON ON THE .. 
BENCH 
• 
. 
A. The "Kul" as Heavy-Hitter 
At the moment in late 1981 . when Richard A. Posner assumed the 
. . 
duties of the United States Court of Appeals Judge for the Seventh 
• 
Circuit, he possessed extraordinary ac~demic prowess, and considerable 
potential to be an outstanding federal judge. In this regard, he had 
helped to develop and refine the important interdisciplinary approach 
to law called law and econol)'lics.172 As .no~ed by Professor George Priest 
of the Yale Law School, Posner's 1973 book entitled Ecot:tomic Ana!Jsis of 
Law "put forth (the] proposition that the· common law is efficient, that 
it had some characteristics which achieved economically efficient ends. 
This was at the same time an extremely simple and extremely ambitious 
attempt at explaining the common law system.''173 In the years 
17 L ld. at 185-86 (quoting Walker Gibson, literary Minds and Judicial S9le, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 915, 
930 (1961 )). 
172. Set DOMNARSKI, supra note ·14, at 116-17. 
173. /d. at 118. Professor Priest elaborates on Posner's law and economics theoretical contributions 
as follows: 
Posner's law and economics approach is a heightened, intensified form of functionalism. 
It asks about the effects of the law and what effects will one legal rule have on one another. 
That approach has been pursued for a long period of time. It wasn't always called law and 
economics, but it was part oflegal realism in a way. What Posner did was to really intensify 
the focus of effects of legal rules and legal institutions and then to show how important 
economic analysis was for evaluating those effects. To say that he changed the way people 
saw the law may well be right, but it was a change that caused the legal scholars to have to 
address in much more serious form what the effects of the law were. 
Id. (quotation marks in original) . 
. 
• 
•. 
• 
.• 
• 
• 
• 
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~allowing his Phi Beta Kappa honors as a Yale undergraduate in 1959, 
graduating first in his class in 1962 at HaiVard Law Sch-ool (preceded by 
service as president of the law review), service as a law clerk to United 
. . 
States Supreme Courtjustice William Brennan, and work as assistant 
to two Solicitor Generals of the United States. (Thurgood Marshall and 
EIWin Griswold), Posner held law teaching positions at Stanford in 1968 
and at Chicago beginning in 1969 · becoming the youngest tenured 
professor in the school's history.174 . 
As pointed out by William Domnarski, ''[a]s a working intellectual he 
wrote nine books and ninety-three articles [on law] in twelve years 
before going onto the [federal appellate] bench" in 1981.175 During this 
time, he also "found time to teach and to found and edit for .nine years 
the Journal of ugal Studies, which consistendy published law and 
economics articles.,' 176 Ac.cording to University of Chicago professor, 
Gary Becker, who won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1992, the 
quantity and quality ofPosner's law and economics scholarly production 
during this time is without parallel. 177 
Beginning with his first batch of written opinions for the Seyenth 
Circuit. in late 1981, Posner "took to the. . . ~ diet of cases with 
enthusiasm, taking particular delight in divers,ity cases, which gave 'him 
the chance to work in common law areas such as torts and contracts." 178 
Moreover, right from the start of his judicial career, Judge Posner 
exhibited a free-flowing literary style, which drew upon his 
extraordinary store of eclectic knowledge and was characterized by a 
stellar combination of breadth and depth in many of ~is judicial 
opinions. 179 · . 
B. First Innings~· Posner's Initial Hundred Days as a Federal Appellate Judge 
• 
1. First Opinions: His December 1981 Trilogy 
Posner wrote his first three opinions as a. fe-deral appellate judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in late· 
174. Su id~ at 119 .. 20 . 
17 5. /d. at 116. Amazingly, in lhe fifteen year period, beginning with his joining of the fede.-al bench 
in 1981 through 1995, Posner wrote anotlter thirteen books and ninety-five articles. Su id. 
176. Id at 119. 
177. Steid. at 117. 
17 8. ld. at 121. 
' 
179. For a concise and general discussion ofPosner'sjudicial opinion style over the first thirteen or 
so years as a federal judge see id. at 122-55. This analysis by Domnarski has substantially influenced my 
own thinking about Posner's "rookie year" on the bench in 1981-82 . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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December of 1981, publishing these opinions within three weeks of 
having heard oral argument. His first·9pinion, in the case of Dower v. 
United States, 180 dealt with a rather simple issue involving a taxp,ayer's 
appeal of the district C<?urt's summary judgment in favor of the 
Government in a suit for refund of his federal income taxes. In a three 
page opinion for the court, without subheadings or footnotes, Judge 
·Posner cited only five ·cases in addition to a single citation to both the . 
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations. 181 This opinion 
dealt with a single issue that hinged on a perusal of the record of past 
shareholder lawsuits and a d,etertnination of "the origin and character 
of the claim that was litigated"182 to determine whether or not the 
taxpayer's financial setdement of these suits w~s a deductible business 
expense. Posner's tone consists of an "inquiring, expository voice,'' 183 his 
prose ·usage is active, fluid and brisk. 184 The chief portion of the 
opinion in an_ undivided, unsectionalized, unified essay is his 
discussion of the facts wherein it can be said that he "r~duce [ s] them to 
their essentials, and carries the reader along with the developing story 
as ifhe were writing fiction or goodjoum~ism,"185 while "[m]otives are 
exposed and occasionally commented upon."1.86 F~r example: 
However unartfully drafted, the 1952 and 1965 agreements evidently 
were designed to make provision for·the Key Men in the event that 
the b,usiness was wound up or Dower, the dominant figure in it, 
departed. . · 
•• • • • 
. 
Dower also points to certain recitals in the settlement agreement to 
the effect that his int~ntion in settling was .to preserve his position in 
[the successor corporation] and avoid the derivative suit. These 
recitals could have had no purpose other than to throw the Internal 
Revenue Service off the scent; they have no probative yalue in this 
litigation. 187 · 
Posner's se,cond opinion for the Seventh Circuit, in the case of United. 
States v. Carlone, 188 was a criminal. case involving the Government's 
appeal of the trial judge's order dismissing the indictment for failure to 
• 
'' 
180. 668 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981). 
181. "Each page of federal Reporter text contains approximately 7 50 W<?'rds." Domnarski, supra note 
14, at 144. Therefore, this opinion was approximately 2,250 words in length. . 
182. 668 F.2d at 266. 
183. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 125. 
184. Seeid.atl29. 
185. ld. 
186. [d. • 
187. 668 F.2d at 267-68. 
188. 666 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1981) . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
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comply with the Speedy Trial Act. 189 In a three and one-half page 
opinion for th~ court, without subheadings or footnotes, Posner 
reasoned that the Speedy Trial Act did not require that a con~nuance, 
which was valid when granted (which upon hindsight the trial court 
thought should not have been· granted to the ·Government) 
automatically compelled dismissal of the indictment. Posner cited no 
caselaw in his opinion; his only citations were to su·bsections of the 
Speedy Trial Act, the Federal Rules of.Crimi~al Procedure, and The Seventh 
Circuit Rules. The opinion in Carlone addressed a single issue, which 
focused on the course of the pretrial proceedings in the case and 
whether the Government's continuance of the trial was in bad faith or 
• 
caused any prejudice to the defendant. Posner's tone was sarcastic and 
angry; his prose deployment was brisk~ Again, the major part of the 
opinion was · an insightful exploration of the facts in this case, 
. 
procedural facts. Hinting at a disporportionately severe sanction against 
the Government by the trial court's dismissal of the indictment in 
juxtaposition with the trial judge's misinterpretation of the conduct of 
the Government in trying to obtain the testimony of essential European 
witnesses, Posner is also .witty. For example: 
. 
There is nothing in the Speedy Trial Act which says that a 
continuance valid when granted becomes invalid ab initio if the reasons 
f~r which the continuance was granted turn out not to be the actual 
causes of the delay that the continuance allows. Contingencies not 
foreseen when the continuance was asked for and granted may arise 
that prevent the government from using the continuance. for the 
purposes for which it was granted. If so, the court can refuse to grant 
further continuances; it can revoke or shorten the continuance; but 
it is not required to revoke the continuance with effect back to the 
original trial date. We are unwilling to read so inflexible a mandate 
into the Act. 
An alternative reading of the district judge's opinion is that pe was 
revoking the continuance with effect back to the original trial date as 
a discretionary sanction for the government's misuse of the time 
allowed it by the continuance. Courts do have broad and flexible 
powers to prevent the abuse of their processes; bl:Jt where, as here, the 
exercise of those powers results in forever precluding the government 
from trying defendants accused of serious crimes, there is a danger 
that it is the powers themselves that are being abused. To dismiss an 
indictment with prejudice, as the court in effect did here, is to p1.:1nish 
not only the prosecutor but the entire law-abiding public. Alternative 
189. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994) . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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sanctions are available that do not involve such windfalls for law 
breakers. 
•• •• •• • 
• 
. 
We therefore reverse; and because we think that relations between the 
. 
trial cqurt and the prosecutor may have become frayed beyond repair 
by the events leading up to the court's order . .. we remand the case 
to a different judge for further proceedings in the matter. 190 
687 
Completing his December tour deforce of opinion writing,] udge Posner 
wrote the opinion for his Court of Appeals panel in United States. v. 
()McAnal!J 191 another criminal case, resulting in another reversal. The 
case involved the conviction below of James McAnally for violating a 
federal statute, which provides that any ''officer, director, agent .or 
employee of any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or 
insured bank who makes· any false entry in any book, report, or 
statement of such bank with intent to injure or defraud the bank" is 
"guilty of a felony punishable by up to five years' imprisonment.''192 In 
a three page opinion, without subheadings or footnotes, Judge Posn~r 
quickly affirmed th.e trial court's denial of McAnally's motion for 
acquittal because of alleged insufficiency of the evidence. 193 Posner 
concentrated his analysis and exposition on the persuasiveness of 
McAnally's motion for a new trial because of alleged error in the jury 
instructions. Posner's tone is sarcastic, biting and compassionate~ He 
cited five case~, two scholarly treatises, and pertinent s~ctions of the 
federal criminal statute at bar. He also used a hypothetical to illustrate 
a point. Posner's key concern in the case was the trial court's confusing . 
~ . jury instructions below: ''[a] reckless disregard by a bank official of his 
bank's interest is sufficient to establish the requisite intent to defraud" 
under the federal statute.194 Posner enlists colloquial and figurative 
language, while, also employing law and economic insights to make his 
opinion for the Court in McAnal!J, in. which he explained that intent and 
not carelessness was an element of a false-entry offense, the vivid, 
memorable, and nuanced: 
The term ''reckless" covers a broad range of meanings to lawyers, and 
probably an even broader one to laymen. In law it is sometimes used 
interchangeably with gr<?ss negligence and in the absence of a 
190. Carwne, 666 F.2d at 1115-16. 
191. 666 F.2d 1116 (7th Cir. 1981). 
192. ]d. at 1117 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1994) (the imprisionment pe1iod was increased to twenty 
. . 
years in Pub. L. 101-73 (1989), and then to thirty years in Pub. L. 101-647 §§ 2504(d), .2595(a)(3)(A), (B), 
2597(h) (1990))}. 
193. See McAnaJJy, 666 F.2d at 1117. 
194. ld. at 1118. 
,. 
• • 
• 
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• 
clarifying instruction the jury might have so understood it here. If so, 
the jury might have seriously misunderstood the false-entry offense. 
That offense has two elements (so far as relevant here): a false entry, 
and an intent to injure or defraud. The first is satisfied by showing 
that the entry was inaccurate. If the second could be satisfied by 
showing that the inaccuracy was the result of gross negligence, then 
section 1005 would make gross negligence by bank employees in 
making entries on the books of the bank a felony~ It is unlikely that 
the statute was intended to go so far to protect banks and their 
customers from the misconduct ofbank employees. There must be at 
least a hundred thousand bank officers in thiS. country, many of them, 
· like McAnally, young and inexperienced employees of small and 
unsophisticated banks. These officers make in the aggregate millions 
of entries in the books of their banks every day; no doubt many of 
those entries· are inaccurate; and many of the inaccuracies are 
probably due to negligence, some of it gross~ We do not think 
Congress meant to expose all of these bank employees to felony 
prosecutions; [there is] the danger that the heavy penalties prescribed 
in section 1005 would over-deter, with resulting social costs .... 195 
2. The First Three Months of 1982 • 
• 
• 
The ·first quarter of 1982 completed Posner's first hundred days as a 
federal appellate judge. During. this time frame,Judge Posner authored 
anothe.r sixteen opinions for the Court of Appeals, 196 for a total of 
nineteen published opinions during his first hundred days. This 
expeditious and prolific pace was a portent of his future productivity as 
an appellate judge. 197 
The sixteen ·court opinions written by Posner during the first quarter 
of 1982 covered a broad spectru-m of issues: two opinions on labor 
• 
195. /d. at 1119 (citations omitted). . 
196. See Donovan v~ Ill. Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982); Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big 
Ten) Conf. Athletic Ass'n., 668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 
956 (7th Cir. 1982); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982);- Cummin~ v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 
• 
81 (7th Cit-. 1982); Ruck~r v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Coca-Cola. 
Co. Foods Div., 670 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1982); Arias v. Rogers,_ 676 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982); Hixon v. 
Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lewis, 671 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 
1982}; Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Franzen, 671 F.2d 
JOS6 (7th Ci.-. 1982); Sutton v. CityofMilwaukee, 672 F~2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982); Evra Corp. v.. Swiss Bank 
Corp., 673 F.2d951 (7th Cir. 1982); Cuttiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand~ 687 F.2d 171 (7th Cit\ 1982); 
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman &·Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982). 
197. William Domnarski, assessing Posner's (irst thirteen years on the federal bench, observed that 
during .this timeframejudge Posner "wr[ote] more than thirteen hundred opinions,, DOMNARSKI, supra 
note 14, at 122, or an average ofa hundred opinions a yea-r, twenty-five per quarter, or eight per month. 
; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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law, 198 two opinions on federal jurisdiction/99 two opinions on 
c.onstitutionallaw,200 one opinion on social security and public welfare 
law,201 one opinion on employment discrimination law·,202 one opinion 
on immigration law,203 two diversity case opinions on state tort law,204 
two opinions on federal criminal law an.d procedure,205 one opinion on 
federal contracts law,206 and two opinions on federal securities law.207 
In the course of these sixteen opinions Judge Posner continued to define 
.and elaborate his judicial opinion style. In a general sense, he persisted 
in writing relatively short opinions with no footnotes or subdivisions, 
continued a pattern ofsparse and focused citation to authoritative cases 
and statutes, sustained an informal and colloquial tone, and pursued a 
contingent, exploratory approach in reasoning (rather than writing in a 
mechanical way, as if legal conclusions w~re obvious).-208 
ln several specific ways Posner -employed vivid, fresh, and relatively 
rare stylistic devices in these judicial opinions that seiVed to heighten the 
interest level of the reader while achieving a fact-sensitive, doctrinally~ 
focused, economically-justified, policy-based reasoning gestalt. Several 
examples from these sixteen opinions illustrate the specific qualities of 
the inchoate, seminal Posnerian opinion style. · 
a. Context Awareness of ugal Issues of First Impression 
Remarkably, in half of the sixteen Posner opinions for the ·Seventh 
Circuit written during the first quarter of 1982,Judge Posn~r obseiVed 
that· --either directly or obliquely an issue was novel or was a matter 
of first impression.209 For example, in NLRB v. Coca Cola Co. Foods Div., 
Posner wrote: . "We are pres~nted with a question apparendy of-first 
impression regarding the power of the National Labor Relations Board 
198. See Donovan, 667 F.2d 638; Coca-Cola, 670 F.2d 84. 
199. See Wtlron, 668 F.2d 962; By-Prod Corp., 668.F.2d 956. 
200. See Ellis, 669 F.2d 51 0; Sutton, 672 F.2d 644. 
201. See Cummins, 670 F.2d at 81. 
202. See Rucker, 669 F.2d 1179. 
203. See Arias, 676 F.2,d 1139. 
204. See Hi~on, 671 F.'2d 1 005; Evra Corp., 673 F.2d 951. 
205. See Lnvi.r, 671 F.2d 1025 (Internal Revenue); Davis, 67·1 F.2d 1056 (habeus corpus petition). 
206. See Powers, 671 F.2d 1041. 
207. See Cenco, 686 F.2d 449; Curtiss-Wright Corp., 687 F.2d 171. 
208. See supra notes 198-207 . 
. 209. See NLRB v. Coca-Cola Co. Foods Div., 670 F.2d 84, 85 {7th Cir. 1982); Arias v. Rogers, 676 
F.2d 1139, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982); Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(oblique reference); Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d I 041, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982); Sutton 
v. City of Milwaukee~ 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 
952 (7th Cir. 1982); Genco 686 F.2d at 452 (oblique reference); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand, 687 
F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1982) (oblique reference). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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to prohibit interference with conc~rted activities before they ·-
materialize. ''210 · 
Moreover, by way of further illustration, in Arias v. Rogers Judge 
Posner observed: 
This appeal from the denial of a petition .for a_ writ of habeas corpus 
requires us to consider a question of first impression in this circuit: 
whether someone who is in custody because the government is trying 
to deport him may test t~e.legality ofhis detention in a habeas corpus 
proceeding after formal deportation ·proceedings have begun but 
before a final order of deportation has issued.211 
. ' 
h. Penetrating _Policy-Based Ana!J'sis 
Posner's first flush of opinions for the ~ourt, in early 1982, during his 
first hundred days as a judge, exhibit an overarching attention to policy 
concerns: what might be viewed as the purpose of rules, the pragmatic 
functioning of relevant legal doctrine, or the advisability of choosing one 
body of potentially applicable principles over. another body of applicable 
principles. Indeed, in Don.ovan v. Illinois Education Ass'n,212 Judge Posner, 
writing an opinion that reversed the U.S. District Court, captured the 
precise policy spirit of the dispute. He examined union bylaws, which 
guaranteed board seats and "[r]epresentative (a]ssembly'' positions to 
. four minority groups blacks, Asians, persons of Hispanic background 
and American Indians but noted: "our concern is not the racial 
• 
incidence of the restrictions~ but with their impact on freedom of 
candidacy and voting (as mandated by federal labor statutes]."213 In 
210. Coct~-Coltl Co., 670 F.2d at 85. 
' 
' 
•' 
211. Arilu , 676 F.2d at 1141. Other examples of dil'cct and ·oblique references to an issue of first 
impression incl'udc Powers v. United Seaus /Willi Seroict, f>71 F.2d at 1041 ("The question we are called upon 
to decide in this case one of first irnpression in this circuit is whether state law or federal common law 
is to be used to decide a dispute between the United States Postal Seavice, as tenant, ~nd a private landlord, 
concerning the landlord's right to termin;ate the lease for nonpayment of rent."); Suu.on v. Cig tif Milwllukt, 
·· 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Ci• .. 1982) ("Thus the preciSe questio~ we must decide is whetoer it is a denial or 
due process lO tow a person's illegally parked car without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before the car is towed. The question is one offit"St impression at the federal appellate leveL,); Evra CorjJ. 
v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 952 (7th Cir. 1982) (''The question ? one of first impression ? in this 
diversity case is the extent of a bank's liability for failure to make a transfer of funds when requested by wire 
to do so.'?:,· Ctnco Inc. v. &Ulman & StU/man, 686 F.2d 44.9, 453 (7th Ci1 .. 1982) ("In any event, creating a new 
Illinois tort is something for the Illinois courls or legislature to do rclthcr than the federal courts."); Curtiss-
Wright CorjJ. v. Hd/and, 687 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1982) ("There is a surprising dearth ofauthority on what 
one might have expected to be a recurrent issue in class actions, the vast majol"ity of which are settled rather 
than. litigated."}. 
212. 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1,982). 
213. Id~ at 641. 
• 
•. 
• 
• 
• 
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·Wilson v, Intercollegiate (Big Ten) ConferenteAthlet~cAss'n,214 Posner's opinion 
reversed the lower court's rather rigid application of the . case law 
exception to the Federal Judicial Code's thirty day time limit for a 
defendant's r.emoving federally-cognizable claims filed by the plaintiff 
in state court,. 215 Posner paused in his analysis to probe the policy of the 
thirty day limit and its judicially-created exception by writing: 
The purpose of the 30-day limitation is twofold: to deprive the 
defendant of the undeserved tactical advantage that he would have if 
he could wait and see how he was faring in state court before deciding 
whether to remove the case to another court system; and to prevent 
the delay and waste of resources involve.d in starting a case_ over in a 
second court after significant proceedings, extending over months o~ 
even years, may have , taken place in the first court. These 
considerations might be overborne in a case where ·a plaintiff, seeking 
to mislead the defendant about the true nature of his suit and thereby 
dissuade _him_ from removing it, included in his initial complaint filed 
in state court an inconsequential but remoyable federal count unlikely 
to induce removal and then, after the time for removal had passed 
without action by the: defendant, amended the complaint to add the 
true and weighty federargrounds that he had been holding back.216 
Powers v. United States Postal Servicr 17 is another promi~ent example of 
Judge Posner's interest in discerning the policy basis of applicable rules, 
in this batch <?f sixteen 1982 opinions. Specifically, in Powers, Posner was 
interested if! the reasons why it might, or might not be, appropriate_for 
a federal c:ourt to develop a federal common law of landlord-tenant 
principles, when a federal agency, like the United States Postal Service, 
is a party to a lease .with a private landlord. In inimitable style, Posner 
wrote: 
the fact that federal courts have the power to create federal common 
law applicable to Postal Service leases does not mean that they have 
to exercise that power. If state l~w w~uld provide as good or better 
rules of decision, a federal court can apply state law instead of creating 
its own rules. This is a frequent choice, especially in real ·property 
law, of which landlord-tenant law is a part. 
, 
• • • • 
Since we have found no persuasive reason for using federal common 
law rather than state law to decide the Postal Service's rights under 
the lease, since considerations of uniformity (really simplicity) of legal 
214. 
215. 
216. 
217. 
668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982). 
See.ul. at 965 (the relevant statute is 28 U.S.C. §§1446(b) (1994)). 
. 
I d. 
671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982). 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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obligations seem rather to favor state th~ federal law, and since in 
the absence of strong reasons one way or the other we would be 
inclined to defer to state law merely because federal lawmaking takes 
place against a background of state law that the federal courts should 
try to disturb as little as possible, perhaps we need say no more. But 
·a powerful argument against applying federal common law in this 
case has yet to be mentioned: a federal common law in this case has 
yet to be mentioned: a federal common law of landlord and tenant 
does not exist. The (ederal courts could of course create that law, 
picking and choosing among existing state laws and proposed reforms 
in accordance with the recommendations of eminent scholars and 
practitioners. It is not to be expected that the federal courts would do 
a very good job of devising a model code oflandlord-tenant law, since 
they have very little experience in landlord·tenant matters; and. 
though eventually some body of law would emerge it would not in all 
likelihood be a uniform body, because there are. twelve federal circuits 
and the Supreme Court could be expected to intervene only 
sporadically. In any event, during the protracted transition to settled 
law the uncertainties attending the rights and obligations of the Postal 
Service as tenant would be profound, and this would have several 
effects: the Postal Service's negotiations with prospective landlords 
would be more elaborate; its leases would be more detailed; and 
extensive research would be undertaken to predict the mature shape 
of emerging federal common law. 
This discussion shows that we do not have to balance competing 
federal and state interests in this case after all. The overriding federal 
. interest here is in certainty of right and obligation flowing from 
conformity to known law; the state interest is in offering its landlords 
a like certainty. These interests converge in favor of adopting, as the 
rule of decision to govern disputes under Postal Service leases, state 
law rather than federal common law.218 
• 
• 
• 
218. /d. at 1045-46 {citation omitted). For other noteworthy instances of Posner's opinion style of 
· policy·based concerns ~ontained in opinions he wrote for the Seventh Circuit during the first quarter of 
1982, sec DIWis v. FranQn, 671 F.2d I 056, I 058 (7th Cir. 1982) (policy considerations of rule that violation 
of the hearsay rule is not a pet· se violation of the Sixth Amendment); SuUon v. Ci9 of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 
. . 
644,646--47 (7th Cir. 1982) (policy considerations regarding the impracticality of adopting a pre-towing 
non .. emergency notice and hearing procedure); Cmco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 689 F.2d 449,455 .. 57 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (policy considerations in predicting how Illinois courts might decide a n'?vel issue of tort law by 
examining tott law objectives of compensating victims and deterring wrongdoing in a case involving 
corporate fraud); and Curtis.r·Wrighl Corp. v. Helfand, 687 .F.2d 171, 174-75 {7th Cir. 1982) (policy analysis 
of the equity of the district court judge's denial of one class action member's full proportionate share of 
settlement proceeds without a trial-like proceeding). · 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
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c. Extraordinary Narrative Skill 
Posner's first quarter 1982 opinions are exemplars of narrative skill 
and fact-sensitivity.219 In an easy, colloquial, informal manner, Posner's 
rendition of the facts in his early judicial opinions tells compelling stories 
without getting bogged down in prolix procedural history or irr~levant 
factoids so common in other appellate opinions. . His factual narratives 
serve to naturally lead to the pivotal legal issues in the case. Of the 
sixteen opinions judge Posner authored for the Seventh Circuit during 
the . first quarter of 1982, three examples of his narrative brilliance and 
dexterity are instructive. 
The first example involved a contorted and pathetic chain of events 
involving government ineptness in responding to the welfare of Indiana 
children who were buffeted in the conflicting cl~ms of dys(unctional 
family members. Posner tells a poignant story in the process of framing 
the legal questions presented: 
• 
This is a suit under42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief and damages 
against several welfare and judicial officers (includ~ng a judge) in 
Putnam County, Indiana·. The plaintiffs claim that their rights under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated 
by these officers: in connection with procee_dings· that led to the 
plaintiffs'' grandchildren (as we shall call them without meaning 
• 
• 
• 
219. This characteristic ofj udge Posner's opinior:as has been described by one commentator as being . 
reader-friendly in the fQilowing way: "Posner presents the entire case, from its facts to its analysis, in a way 
· that teaches and informs. In an age in which the Socratic method still finds significant pocke_ts of support 
in legal education, Posner in his opinions accomplishes more by -relying on narrative skill and sheer 
exposition." DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 143. 
For a theoretical literary explanation of the recent scholarly concem witb. the power and structure of 
narrative seeM. H. ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS, 123-24 (1993). As_ explained, in part, 
by Abrams: · 
A narrative is a story, whether in prose or verse, involving events, characters, and what the 
characters say and do. Some literary fonns such as the novel and short story in prose, and 
the epic and romance in verse, are explicit narratives that are told by a narrator. In drama, 
the narrative is not told, but evolves in tea·ms of the direct presentation on stage of the 
actions and speeches of the characters. · . 
Narratology denotes a recent cqncem with narrative in ger-eraL It deals·especially with the 
identification of structural elements and their diverse modes of combination, with recurrent 
narrative devices, and with the analysis of the kinds of discourse by which a narrative gets 
told. This theory picks up and elaborates upon many topics in traditional treatments of 
fictional narratives, from Aristotle's Poetics to Wayne Booth's TheRketori&ofFtftWn (1961); but 
applies to them concepts and analytic procedures which detive from recent developments· 
in Russian formalism and especially in French structuralism. Narratologists treat a narrative 
not in the traditional way, as a fictional representation of life, but as a systemic fortnal 
construction. A primary interest of structural narra~ologists is in the way that narrative 
discourse fashions a "story,?the mere sequence of events in time Into the organized 
structure of a literary plot. · 
ld. (emphasis.omitted). 
• 
• 
• 
.• 
• 
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thereby to prejudge their status, which is contested) being removed 
· from the plaintiffs' homes ·and adopted by strangers. The district 
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 
The plaintiffs are Amy Ellis, her sister Zelia Frazier, and Zelia's 
husband Cyril Frazier. Mrs. Fra~ier is th~ natural mother, and Amy 
Ellis the aunt, of Larry Ellis. In 1952 Mrs. Ellis adopted Larry with 
the consent ofMrs. Frazier. The adoption extinguished Mrs. Frazier's 
parental rights and vested the~ in her sister. Mr. Frazier is:-.not · 
Larry's father or otherwise related to him. He married Zelia long 
after she had given up Larry for a~option. · 
Larry grew up and got ·married. Between ·1969 and 197 4 four 
children were born to the marriage. Larry and his wife were 
unsatisfactory parents, however, and the children lived for .long 
stretches of time with Mrs. Ellis and Mrs. Frazier. In 1975 Mrs. Ellis 
complained to the defendants that Larry and his wife were mistreating 
the children. Her complaint led to criminal charges being lodged 
against Larry and his wife . for cruelty and neglect. An ·order was 
. . 
entered removing the children from their parents' custody and placing 
them in a foster home, but the parents later regained custody, and 
were living with the children in Mrs. Ellis' home when, in july 1977, 
the mother decamped. Larry thereupon told the defendants that he 
wanted· two of the children to remain with Mrs. Ellis and the other 
. 
two to live with Mrs. Frazier. Larry took the two children to Mrs. 
Frazier's house and then disappeared. 
• • • • 
The plaintiffs say that the defendants initially acquiesced in Larry's 
proposal to place. the children in the homes of Mrs. Ellis and Mrs. 
Frazier, and that the plaintiffs thereby acquired legal cus.tody of the 
children. One month later the defendant welfare officers ordered the 
plaintiffs, on two days': notice and without any explanation, to 
surrender the children to them. They placed the children in a totally 
unsuitable in fact, notorious group foster home where the female 
· children were subjected to sexual abuse. When the plaintiffs 
complained, the welfare officers took the children out of the group 
home and placed them with fost~r parents but refused· to tell the 
plaintiffs who the foster parents were or where they lived. The 
children were heartbroken at the separation from their grandparents 
and would have-preferred to live with them. 
The plaintiffs eventually · retained a lawyer, who in May of the 
following year inquired of the defendant welfare officers about the 
children. The welfare officers, fearing that the lawyer would begin 
proceedings for the adoption of the children by Mrs. Ellis. and Mrs. 
. Frazier, filed injune a petition with the defendant judge to terminate 
the parental rights of Larry Ellis and his wife. Because their 
whereabouts were unknown, notice of the proceeding was by 
publication in the local newspaper. No effort was made to notify the 
• 
. . 
• 
• 
• 
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plaintiffs specifically, but their lawyer knew about the proceeding. A 
hearing was held on June· 25, 1978, and the judge ordered the 
parental rights of Larry and his wife terminated. Neither the 
plaintiffs' lawyer nor any of the pl~intiffs was at the hearipg. 
' . ' ' 
The termination cleared the way for the children to be adopted, and 
the plaintiffs set about trying to adopt them. But their lawyer was 
given the runaround by the defendant court officers, who offered 
niggli~g ·and specious objections to the fonnal adequacy of the 
petition for adoption. As a result she was forced to file a second, and 
on Au,gust 24 a third, petition. A few days later the defendants 
informed her that the children had already been adopted by others. 
The adoptions (each child was ·adopted by a different couple) had 
taken place after ·~he plaintiffs' ·lawyer filed the first petition~ and 
neither she nor the plaintiffs had actual or constructive kpowledge of 
the adoption proceedings. The adoptions robbed the plaintiffs not 
. .  
only of their hopes of adopting the children themselves but also, it 
seemed; of al).y right ever to see them again, for the defendants told 
the plaintiffs that it would be up to the adoptive parents to decide 
whether to permit the plaintiffs to ·visit with the children.220 
• • 
• 
Posner's narratology in this fa~ily-govemment dispute tells a tale of w<?e 
and pervasive.· but random interconnectedness in the tradition of the 
novels of Charles Dickens. Like the mud and the fog, the Chancery, 
and the Old Curiosity ·shop of Dickens' London, Posner 
conveys through his narration of the facts told from the standpoint of 
• 0 
the plaintiffs because.ofthe procedural posture of the case involving an 
appeal from the summary judgment dis~issal of the compl,~.int ·-similar 
images of random interconnectedness, in late twentieth century, rural 
Indiana. Posner's, narration brings to mind ·faceless local courthouse 
bureaucrats, absentee parents, and anonymous adoptive parents. Yet, 
considering these facts "in the light most favorable" to the plaintiffs, 
Posner's opinion for the court found no due process violatio,n because, 
as he reasoned, "[i]f due process were denied every time local officials 
• 
blundered, then any plaintiffin state, court who was asserting a right 
within the broadly defined categories ofliberty or property and who lost 
his case because the judge made an error coUld attack the judgment 
indirecdy by suing the judge under section 1983."221 According to 
Posner'· while the factual narrative "deepen [ s] [the court's] sympathy for 
this unfortunate family and bolster[s] -the plaintiffs' contention that the 
defendants have mishandled the whole business [the facts] also show 
• 
220. Ellisv. Hamilton, 669F.2d 510, 511·12 (7th Cir .. l982) . 
221. /d.at514. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
that the plaintiffs really did, and still do, have remedies under Indiana 
law."222 
A second example of Posner's narrative prowess in his opinions 
during this nascent·period in his judicial career is ·extracted from an 
employment discrimination suit brought by a black man, which involves 
• 
interesting issues. of reverse racial disc~mination and . sexual 
discrimination.223 Presenting the narrative from the standpoint of 
plaintiffs' evidence at trial, because of the trial court's conclusocy .non-
foundational dismissal order in the ben.ch trial,224 Judge Posner set the 
stage for his subsequent legal analysis for the court, which reversed and 
remanded the case for a new trial.225 In prose. that suggests the 
Dickensian random interc<?nnectedness of multiple chara~ters, and also . 
hi~ts at Kafkaesque alienation and injustice in the face of meaningless 
· procedures. Judge Posner wrote,: 
,, 
The plaintiff, Carl Rucker, was a supeiVisor for the defendant, the 
Higher Educational Aids Board, a Wisconsin state·. agency that 
provides counseling services to disadvantaged youths. Rucker, who 
is black, contends that the Board fired him because he opposed the 
efforts of his supervisors to discriminate on racial and sexual grounds 
against a white woman who worked for the Board, Mary Phillips. 
'Thus he invokes 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which so far as relevant here 
• 
. forbids an employer to discriminate against an employee because "he 
has opp.osed any practice made an unlawful employment practice" .by 
Title VII, including, of course, racial and sexual discrim'ination. · 
At trial Rucker presented evidence in support of the following facts. 
He had been hired by the Board in 1973, had been rapidly promoted, 
and. in 1976 had received an Exceptional Performance Award from 
the Board's chief executive officer. Also in 1976 Miss Phillips who 
had been working as a typist at the Board, applied for a professional 
position as a counselor it:t an office wher~ Rucker would be her 
supervisor. Rucker's immediate supervisor, Spraggins, ·also a bla~k 
man, told Rucker that he wanted to prevent Miss Phillips from getting 
the job as cou~selor because she had not been "·cooperating," ~hich 
Rucker interpreted as referring to the fact that Spraggins in his 
presence had orice placed a hand on Miss Phillips' breast and she had 
pushed it away. Spraggins asked Rucker to write a memorandum to 
him stating that the local black community did not want a white 
en:tployee to serve them as a counselor. Rucker refused. Spraggins 
then had Rucker attend ~ meeting that Spraggins had arranged with 
• 
222. ld. at 515: 
• • 
223. Su Rucker v: Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982). 
224. Set id,. at 1183. 
225. See id. at 1184. 
• 
.. 
• 
, 
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two black ministers, who told Rucker: "You're going to have to get 
a black woman and put her on that job. It's as simple as that.'~ On 
the way out of the meeting one of the ministers said to Spraggins that 
he had better get rid of that "nigger," meaning Rucker. After this 
Spraggins repeated his request to Rucker. to write the memorandum 
about community feeling, and Rucker again refused. . 
Shortly afte-rward, Miss Phillips was appointed to the counselor's 
positien, initially on a six-month probationary basis. During this 
period she claimed to be having further problems with Spraggins and 
wrote him complaining about his hostile ~ttitude toward her, which 
she summarized in the phrase "vile crap." He wrote back accusing 
her of lying and other misbehavior, and she responded by filing with 
the Board a written. grievance protesting Spraggins' co-nduct toward 
her. Rucker then wrote a memorandum to Spraggins in which he 
defended Miss Phillips and in addition stated, ''I have good reason to 
believe that the charges ... forwarded to you from Mary Phillips .. 
. are true.;' This was on December 28, 1976. Shortly afterward, in 
a meeting with the-Board's chief executive officer, Rucker was given 
to understand that he should give Miss Phillips a poor evaluation so 
that she would not receive permanent statu~ at the end of her 
probationary period. He refused and instead, onjanuary 18, 1977, 
sub~itted ~written evaluation in which he found her to· be qualified 
for a permanent appointment. Three weeks later Rucker was . 
suspended_ from his job on a variety of charges, and the next day he 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a 
complaint that his suspension was in retaliation for his refusal to be a 
• • 
party to proposed discrimination. A month later he was fired; Miss 
Phillips had meanwhile received her permanent appointment.226 
A third illustration of Posner's facility in writing compelling, 
interesting and pithy narrative in his early judicial opinions during 1982 
, is contained in Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co. 227 a diversity suit involving 
principles of state tort law ~manating from a comedy of errors involving 
attempts to ftx the linoleum kitchen floor owned by a married couple. 
In vivid, forceful, simple and elegant language, Judge Posner wrote: 
• 
Mr. and Mrs. Chess, who are not parties to this litigation, sustained 
several hundred dollars in water damage to the kitchen floor of their 
home in Indiana. Their homeowner's insurer, American States 
Insurance· Company, a nonresident corporation,· hired a local 
' 
· ~on tractor, Marv Hixon, to install a new linoleum floor in the kitchen. 
Too busy to attend to the ,contract himself, Hixon subcontracted the 
job to the Sherwin-Williams Company, another nonresident 
226. /d. at 1180·81. 
227. 671 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1982). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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corporation. Sherwin-Williams is! a manufacturer of linoleum and 
other products rather than a building contractor, but it undertook to 
install its linoleum in the Chesses' kitchen rather than just sell the 
linoleum to Hixon for installation. The local office of Sherwin-
• 
Williams hired. Louis Benkovich to do the installation. Benkovich had . 
been in the linoleum installation business for. many years and had 
done previous jobs for Sherwin-Williams. His reputation. was good; 
people said, "Louie puts in a nice. floor.'' He had never been known 
to have an ~ccident or otherwise fail to render adequate service. He 
was self-employed, and was retained by Sherwin-Williams as an 
independent contractor rather than an employee. Sherwin-Williams 
did ·not supervise his work and knew nothing about the particulars of 
the Chessjob beyond the fact that Hixon wanted a new linoleum floor 
installed . 
The new linoleum could not be attached directly to the cement floor 
beneath it because of dampness; a plywood layer was required 
between the cement and the linoleum. Benkovich used a glue that 
happened to be extremely flammable to fasten the plywood to the 
cement. The label on_ the can contained explicit and ~mphatic 
warnings concerning the flammability of the glue and the importance 
of good ventilation. Benkovich had ·never used this brand of glue 
before; in fact, he had never in- his many years as a linoleum 
contractor fastened a plywood layer to a cement floor. He proceeded 
to ignore the warnings on the can; he may not even h~ve read them. 
· Instead of opening the windows and turning off the pilot light in the 
hot water heater in the Chesses' kitchen, _he closed the windows and 
left the pilot light on. The . . glue exploded; and pursuant to its 
homeowner's policy American States found itselfhaving to indemnify· 
the Qhesses for some $27,000 in additional damage to their house.228 
0 
Posner's narrative. structure in this story of comical carelessness 
suggests a plot theme of how seemingly -small acts and omissions can 
lead. to catastrophic losses. A close reading of Posner's account of the. 
facts of the case is remarkable in two respects. First, he cuts to the quick 
of the dispute by a straightforward, informal recitation of the relevant 
evidence. Unlike many-appellate opinions, Posner ~oes not provide an 
excessively detailed chronology; does ~ot quote at length from 
documentary evidence (insurance policies for example); and passes on 
the easy temptatio-n to comment at length o.n the entire corpus of 
evidence. Second, Posner's narrative is memorable and imaginatively-
crafted; his story reminds the reader of the analogous universal plot 0 
themes of "Wretched Excess'' (whereby "life sometimes throws us a 
·' 
228. ld. at 1006. 
• 
' . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•. 
• 
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cuiVe that we can't hanClle" that leads to an unraveling)229 .and 
"Metamorphosis;' (all about "change" both physical and emotional)"230 
. 
( 
d. Intense Doctrinal Scrutiny 
. 
Right from the start of his service on the federal appellate bench, 
Judge Posner wrote opinions that are unusual and noteworthy for their· 
penetrating analysis and ~riticism of prevailing legal·doctrines.231 By 
way of illustration, his ·early 1982 opinio~s provide rich; clarifying, and 
fact-sensitive insights on a panoply oflegal doctrines ~ncluding pendent 
jurisdiction and pendent party jurisdiction in federal diversity suits;232 
due process notice and hearing procedures in government property 
deprivations;233 Hadlf:y v~ Baxenda~ limitations on consequential damages 
in contract actions;234 avoidable consequences limits in tort actions;235 
the foreseeal?le consequences rule in negligence suits;236 the concept of 
ancillary jurisdiction;~37 the ·equitable nat~re of class actions;238 and 
affirmative action by employers. 239 
' 
229. RONAlD B. T_OBIAS, 20 MASTER PLoTS 209 (1993). 
230. /d. at 146. 
231. As explained by one commentator in· ~onsidering the corpus ofPosncrian opinions during the 
Eighties and early Nineties: 
• 
He asks why ·certain, doctrines exist, what function they serve, whether· they still setve that 
. 
function, and what might be gained by discarding the doctrine for something else. He 
explains and reveals the reasoning undergirding whatever doctrine he is looking at and only 
at the end cites cases to support his position. Wilh each case he reasons tht'Ough the 
doctrine and then applys facts, always questioni~g the usefulness of the doctrine. This isnot 
t 
· to say that he is quick to discard precedent when he disagrees with it. Firm principles 
dictate the extent to which a lower court can igno•·e Supreme Court precede1,1t, and Posner 
. . 
adheres strictly to them . 
DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at ·134. 
232. See 'Hi~on; 671 F.2d at 1007-09. · 
2.33. See Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d .644, 645-47 (7th Cir. 1982). 
234. St~t Evra Corp. v~ Swis5 Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-57 (7th Cir. 1982). 
235. See id. at 95 7-58. 
' 
236. See id. at 958. A slice of Posner's analysis on this doctrinal issue stands out from the run-of ... the~ 
mill standard of appellate opinion writing: 
/d. 
. . 
These were circumstances too remote from· Swiss Bank's P.ractical range of knowledge to 
' 
have . affected its decisions· as to who should man the telex machines in' the foreign 
department or whether it should have more intelligent machines or should install more 
machines in the cable depa•·tment, any more than the falling of a platform scale· because a 
conductor jostled a passenger:who was carrying fireworks was a· prospect that could have 
influenced the amount of care taken by the Long Island Railroad. See Palrgrcif v. Long Island 
R.R., 24.8 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); if. N9 v. f'eliow Cab Co., 2 111.2d 74, 80-84, 117 
N.E.2d 74~ 78-80 (1954). 
237. Sa Cenco Inc. v. Seidman&. Seidman, 686 F.2d 449; 452 (7th Cir. 1982). 
2.38. Sa Curtiss-Wright Corp. v~ Helfand, 687' F~2~ 171, 174 (7th Cir. 1982). 
239. Su Donovan v. Ill. Educ. Ass,n, 667 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1982). 
... , 
' 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•. 
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e. Illuminating Economic Insights 
Given Richard A. Posner's remarkable quantitative background and 
prior scholarly predilection to employ eco~omic analysis in solving legal . 
problems, 240 it was not surprising forJudge Posner to use ".the language 
of economics"241 in his early judicial opinion$. 
Three striking instances of his extraordinary economic reasoning 
contained in his first quarter 1982 judicial opinions are instructive. In 
the first instance · in a case examining whether an explosion occurring 
from glue vapors in the course of a contractor's laying of a linoleum 
kitchen flootwas an "inherently hazardous activity," thereby; being an 
exception to the independent contractor rule of no vicarious 
liability Posner deployed the. following economic prose: 
• 
This· case is not within the exception to the rule for inherently 
. hazardous activities. The more hazardous an activity is, the higher is 
the cost-justified level of care; and if it is hazardous enough, the . 
principal should take· his own precautions even though he does not 
supervise the details of the independent contractor's work. But there 
is nothing hazardous about laying a linoleum floor. It becomes so 
only if the installer misuses one of the inputs, the glue. This kind of 
hazard is present in almost all construction work and does not make· 
construction a hazardous ~ctivity. If the presence of a hazardous 
input made the principal liable for the torts of his independent 
contractors,_ then if the employee of a building contractor saw~d off 
his finger while repairing a house the owner of the house would be 
liable, at least if it ,turned out that the accident had been due to 
ne.gligence by the contractor. The exception would swallow the 
rule.242 
• 
• 
• 
240. Set general!J DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 129-3_3. 
241. ld. at 131. 
242. Hixon v. SheiWin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) . 
• 
•. 
... 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• : 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
Postal] Service will lose the benefit of the low rent fixed in 1964. But 
the advantage would be transitory. Knowing that they would have 
fewer rights under federal leases than state law (if applicable) would 
have given them, Indiana landlords would in the future drive harder .. · 
bargains with the Postal Service. Concretely, the more difficult a lease 
is to terminate, the higher will be the rent demanded by the landlord; 
there will be no net saving to the tenant in the long run. And even if 
the Postal Service could somehow gain a perrnanent advantage by 
having its leases in Indiana governed by federal common law rather 
than by state law, this would merely shift so~e of the cost of postal 
service from the users of the mails and from the federal tax payer to 
Indiana landlords. No net increase in the nation's welfare can be 
assumed from so random a change in the distribution of.the costs of 
postal service. 243 · 
• • 
In my final illustration of judge Posner's dynamic and piercing use of 
economic analysis in the course of his early 1982 opinions, we see how 
. 
he is able to lucidly even for non-economists apply cost-benefit 
analysis to decide "whether due process requires notice and hearing 
before government may deprive a persori ofproperty"244 in the ~ontext 
of police towing of illegally parked cars. Posner wrote: 
• 
[fhe cost benefit test mandated by the Supreme Court] require[s] 
com·paring the benefit of the procedural safeguard sought, which is a 
function of the value of the property interest at stake and the · 
probability of erroneous deprivations if the safeguard is not provided, 
with the cost of the safeguard. The benefit of the safeguard can be 
thought of as the product of multiplying the .value of the property 
interest by the probability that that value will be destroyed by a 
gov~rnment error if the safeguard is not provided. Quantification will · 
rarely be possible but expressing mathematically the relationship 
between the value of the interest and the probability of its erroneous 
destruction may assist in thinking· about the tests which, being 
general, are as applicable to the towing of autombiles as to the 
termination or reduction of social security benefits .... 
On the benefit side of the ledger in this case, the first thing to be noted 
is that the property interest is a slight one. It is not the car itself but 
the use of the car for a short period, usually a few hours, that is at 
stake. 
Second, the additional safeguard ofpretowing notic~ and opportunity 
to be heard is not required in this case to prevent frequent errors . 
• 
243. Powers v. U.S. Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 1982). 
244. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The starting point for- our 
analysis is Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U .S. 319, 335 ... (1976), where the Supreme Court announced a 
simple cost-benefit test of general applicability ... !,). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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. The determination that a car is illegally parked is pretty cut and dried .. 
Police officers make mistakes, of course, but in giving out parking 
tickets not very many far fewer than in the case of moving 
violations. . Rarely would a car's owner be able to convince an 
impartial arbiter that his car really was not illegally parked and so 
· should not be towed; few would be the occasions, therefore, when 
notice and an opportunity to be heard in advance of towing would · 
·prevent an unjust . deprivation of a property interest ·SinGe the 
procedural safeguard sought here would avert few .errors, and those. 
of small magnitude in terms of cost to the car's owner, the benefits of 
the safeguard would be very small. 
We turn to the costs of the safeguard. They are not in this case 
limited, as one might expect, to the expense of notice and hearing. · 
. The~e is no way that the city or state can notify the owners of illegally. 
parked cars that their cars will be towed and provide them then and 
there ·with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of the towing. 
To require noti.ce and hearing in advance is, as the appellees concede, 
to prevent all towing of illegally parked cars. · 
The cost of notice and hearjng is therefore the cost of abandoning 
towing as a method of dealing with illegal parking. It is clearly 
prohibitive, as the districtjudge recognized, when the illegally parked 
car is blocking traffic or otherwise causing an emergency, for in that 
case there is no feasible alternative to towing. When the illegally 
parked car is not creating an 'emergency in this sense, the benefits of 
towing are less. This i~ ·by definition: the term '"emergency" is a 
shorthand expression for situations where towing is the only solution 
t<? the problem created by an illegally parked car. But we are not 
prepared to say that the benefits· of towing are negligible in the· 
nonemergency case. Parking regulations have a valid purpose; and 
. . . 
not only does towing implement the regulations djrectly, by removing 
cars parked in violation of them, but the threat of towing deters 
violations, as every driver knows~ Of course there are alternative 
methods of deterrence, such as heavy fines for illegal parking. But 
that is equally true with regard to ·parking violations that create 
emergencies: they too could be punished more heavily than they are, 
and there would then be less need for towing. State and municipal 
traffic officials, who know much more about these matters than 
federal judges do, have decided that towing is more effective in 
dealing with parking violations of all kinds than just jacking up the 
fines further would he; and we cannot say that this judgment is not a 
reasonable one. · 
We conclude that the benefits of towing illegally parked cars even 
. . 
when they are not creating an emergency benefits that would be 
sacrificed by requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
advance of towing-outweigh the very modest costs entailed by 
forgoing procedural safeguards that would be merely ,additive to the 
• 
• 
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post~towing procedural safeguards to which the parties have · 
stipulated. We hold, therefore, that it is not a violation of the due 
process clause to tow an illegally parked car without first givin·g the 
owner notice and an opportunity to be heard wi~h .respect to the 
lawfulness of the tow.245 
f. Miscellaneous S~listic Virtues 
• 
Posner's· early opinions are impressive . fo~ possessing several 
additional vigorous qualities having to do with his budding, inform·al, 
personalized judicial opinion style~ Specimens ofhis emerging opinion 
style embedded i~ his sixteen opinions, penned for the Court of Appeals 
during th.e first three months of 1982, are easy to find, although less 
pronounced than in his later judicial opinions.246 Consider some of· 
these examples. First, an analogy: 
• 
• • 
' [In a Ninth Circui~ case] a heli~opterwas seized to coerce payment of 
a debt to the government. The helicopter was not illegally ",'parked," 
· a menace to public safety, or otherWise "in the way" of some valid 
government project; it really was a hostag~. The Milwaukee police 
do not seize a person's legally parked car in order to make him pay off 
. his prior unpaid parking tickets ..• ,. 247 
. 
' 
Second, an ·epigram:. "Cenco's evidence te.nded to show that in the 
early stages. of the fraud Seidman had been careless in checking Cenco' s 
inventory figure.s and its carelessne·ss had prevented the fraud from being 
nipped in the bud. "248 Finally, an historical allusion,: '' [b] ecause of the 
confusing Watergate aura that the counterclaim would have cast over 
the antitrust suit if tried with it, the district judge would, he said in his 
opinion dismissing the complaint, have ordered separate trials. "249 
A poignant instance of ·Posner's. ·pench~nt for hypotheticals in his 
opinions is found in a case about a batde between councy officials~ and 
relatives'· claims over the adoption· of children. Posner opined: 
We have no doubt that if welfare caseworkers, acting so precipitately 
as to prevent any recourse to the protective legal machinery of the 
state, barged into a· couple's home, seized their children, sequestered· 
them in a ·secret place, and put them up for adoption without 
• 
245. 672 F.2d 6.44 at 645-46 (citations omitted). . 
246. Cf. DOMNARSKI, supra note 14, at 127-29. . 
24 7. 672 F~'2d 644 at 648. Set also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand, 687 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir . 
• 
1982) ("For this is not a case where a district judge tries to rip open a settlement that, has become final.''). 
248. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1982). 
249. By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 1982} . 
. 
• 
. 
• 
t 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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. 
notifying the parents, they would be guilty 9f violating 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, no matter how regular the adoption proceeding on its face. We 
do not think any exotic constitutio~al ·doctrine not even the 
ubiquitous oxymoron "substantive due process" would be necessary 
in order to reach that result. It is plain to us that the "liberty" 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes the right to the custody of one's minor children and that it 
would be a deprivation of that liberty without due process of law for 
persons acting under color of state law-permanently to separate the 
children from their parents without notice and hearing~ We have to 
decide how close this case is to that one. 250 . 
• 
Moreover, in the adoption case,just mentioned, we can discernjudge 
Posner's noteworthy use of simile: ''on this appeal we must ... accept 
as true that Mrs. Ellis was in loco parentis -to these childre~ when the · 
defendants took them away from her; and we are reluctant to conclude 
that a great-aunt, an adoptive grandmother, and a de focto mother and 
' 
father all rolled up into one does not have a liberty interest sufficiently 
like that efa p,arent to support an action under section 1983."251 Judge 
Posner's early judicial opinions also reflect a love for colorful slang as 
exemplified in an employment discriminatio.n case involving possible 
conspiracy between a state public agency superVisor and members of the 
local religious community giving input on the agency's mission: "[a] s a 
detail, we note the preference afthe local black community for a, black 
counselor was not ... conceded by [the plaintifl] . . . [since h]is 
evidence· was that the ministers were not speaking for the community 
but were in cahoots with [the supeiVisor]."252 For an early Posnerian 
aphorism: "the business of the courts is to do justice rather than to 
spread good fe~ling.''253 For an instance of Posner's focus on human 
motivation and the law: 
• 
We understand, of course why the [aliens 1 sought habeus corpus after 
they were arrested and put in jail they wanted their freedom. The 
motive for this appeal is less easily understood since the petitioners are 
now free on bond .... From the briefs and oral' argument on this · 
appeal, however, it appears that the petitioners are after bigger game 
than being relieved from what may well be the trivial burdens 
associated with their bond status. What they principally want is for 
the district court to enter an order barring the INS from using in the 
• 
• 
250. 'Ellis v ~ - Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982). For another striking example' of Posncr,s 
use of hypotheticals in his early opinions see Arias v. Rogers, 616 F.2d ll39, 1143 (7th Cit\ l982) (various 
hypothetical extremes of INS detention of suspected illegal aliens). 
251. See id. at 513. · 
252. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982). 
25-3~ Id. at 1182 . 
• 
, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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deportation proceedings any admissions or other evidence (perhaps 
even their identity) tr~ceable to their arrests-.... 254 · 
g. Some ('Dark Side" S!Jlistics 
' 
Even in Posner's very first batch of judicial opinionS; there are subde 
hints of prose qualities that some critics might label as being 
undesirable.255 By way of an explicit hint, the concurring opinion of 
Judge Harlington Wood, in Rucker v. Higher educational Aids Board, 256 is 
instructive. Judge Wood, obviously upset at the way Judg~ P<?sner's 
• 
opinion for the court personally slammed the trial court judge, stated: 
"I believe that [the trial court judge's] findings need some clarification, 
but they need only be repaired,_ notjunked.''257 
On an implicit level, some of the stylistic qualities that make Posner's 
early appellat~ opinions praiseworthy can, when viewed from other 
perspectives, be considered undesirable. Thus, some of Posner's free-
wheeling economics analysis258 might appear to be speculative and 
· untethered to the facts of~e case;-instances ofPosner's reference to th.e 
issues of ''first impression''259 could appear to be egotistical and 
gratuitous; cases of Posner's intense scrutiny of the underpinnings of 
setded legal doctrine260 might be intetpreted as being presumptuous and 
out of line. 
• 
C. Runs Batted In: The Rest of Posner's 1982 Opinionsfor the 
Court Thoughts on the ('Beautifol'~.and the "Ug!J'' 
• 
During the remaining nine months of 1982,Judge Posner's judicial 
opinion style continued to evolve along the trajectory established during 
his first hundred days as a federal judge.261 Of the fifty-nine opinions 
that he authored fo"r the Seventh Circuit during the remaining nine 
months of what I have c~led his rookie season, there are fiye opinions 
• 
• 
• 
• 
254. Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, •141-42 {7th Cir. 1982)., For another incisive instance, in the 
early Posner opinions, of probing human motivation sec UniledSto«.sv. LewiJ, 671 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 
1982) (examining motive of taxpayer in not filing tax return). 
255. CJ. Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 20 and accompanying text (criticism by members 
~ of the Seventh Circuit Bar). 
256. See 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982). 
257. Jd. at 1184 (Wood,J., concurring). 
258. Su supra notes 240 ... 45 and accompanying text. • 
259. See ~pra notes ·209 .. 11 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra notes 178-260 and accompanying text. 
• 
• 
• 
•. 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
that desetve extended favorable. commentary.262 These are-
· 262. See injrtl notes 268-326 and accompanying text. For ''honorable mentions, ofbeautifuljudicial 
opinion style practiced by Posner during lhe_last three quartet-s of 1982 see; for example, United Statts ex rei. 
SteVens v. Cirt;Uit Court,-675-F.2d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 1982) (mastetful synthesis of criminal law on double. 
jeopardy, followed by a focused "comparison ofinconvcniences" between a state criminal defendant seeking 
habeus corpus relief after a guilty plea as to some counts and the state in trying him on the remaining 
counts); United States v. Boulalumir, 677 F.2d 58.6, 587 (7th Cir. 1982) (vivid; concise, and humorous narrative 
of FBI sound recording of criminal defendants which yielded a tape of defendants using "language free from 
any shade of ambiguity that if he did not pay them ... for allowing gambling ... they would shut it down, 
while if he did pay they would not only 'terroriz~ nobody more in here' but would beat up anyone else who 
was trying to extort money from (him].''); Hamilton v. Nu!lsen, 618 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1982) (eloqu~nt and 
succi~ct exposition of facts, federn.l su~ject matter jurisdiction in tort action against executors for alleged 
' 
negligence, prediction of Illinois tort principles in federal diversity suit against estate executors); Bart v. 
Telfordt 677 F~2d 622, 623, 625 (7th Cir. 198'2) {insightful discussion of "questions relating to the First 
Amendment rights of publicemployees who run for public office" in the context of a civil rights case against 
the Mayor of Springfield, Illinois; judicious policy ... focused assessment, involving "the court's weighing [of] 
. general considerations rather than by its listening to witnesses" in deciding that a required leave of absence 
• (or the candidate-employee wasjustified; wry comment on allegation that the Mayor held the plaintiff"up 
to ridicule for bringing a birthday cake to the office on the occasion of [ another·employee's birthday]", with 
Posner noting that "a certain air of the ridiculous hangs over the harassment allegations, in particular ... 
regarding the birthday cake."); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41·42 (7th Cir. 1982) {trenchant pragmatic 
analysis of the efficacy of a civil rights action brought against police officers and a bank alleging wrongful 
arrest~ with Posne r,s opinion for the court noting: "We resist the tern ptation to reach [the] conclusion [that 
there is no Fourth Amendment violation] by the casuistic route of deeming a warr~nt to be valid on its face 
even if it contains discrepancieS/' rather "[w]e pla~e our decision on (the] more practical ground [that) 
[t]he execution of a warrant by an officer who if he were more careful might have noticed that the warrant 
had been issued by mistake is not the stuff out of which a proper federal case is made."); Illinoir v. General 
• 
Ekctric Co., 683 F.2d 206, 216 (7th Cir. 1982) (elegant and nuanced ·St:atutory analysis of_ a federal 
environmental statute, the Clean Air Act, which while giving states the power to promulgate dean air 
measures more stringent than federal standards di~ not allow a state to ban the importation of radioactive 
wastes from another state since "while one effect of the (state statute) ~ay be to reduce [aitj emissions by 
eliminating interstate shipments to the facility, that is no.t enough to make [the state statute] a rational 
pollution .. control ~easure, especially when, for aught that appears, the facility emits no radioactivity into 
the air" and ended by stating, "[w]e cannot believe that Congress in promulgating the Clean Air Act 
Amendments meant the states to have carte blanche to enact any statutes ... that migh~ as a side-effect 
• • 
reduce theJevel.of radioactive emissions in the state, regardless of how much the statute ... disrupted the 
federal atomic energy program ... [Including] disposing ofnuclear wastes.,,); C~ of Peoria v. General Electric 
Cableuision Corp., 690 F.2d 116, 119 (7t~ Cir. 1982) (Incisive analysis, based on creative use ofhypotheticals, 
of error of lower court in allowing the City to bring an action against a cable television company alleging 
breach of a franchise contract while seeking a declaration that the Federal Communications Commission 
regulation was invalid, noting "Peoria•s action ... to declare the Fcc•s rul«: invalid was brought in the 
wrong court at the wrong·time against the wrong party."); Sulu v. Duckwoith, 689 F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 
1982) (magnificent use of sarcasm and deep analysis of human nature in rejecting criminal defendant's 
habeus corpus petition alleging ttlat his constitutional righ~ to remain silent was infringed by allowing a 
police officer to testify that the petitioner's sanity was partially proven by the fact that he asked to speak to 
a lawyer when arrested,. without having Miranda rights read to him, Posner's opinion for the court noting: 
"In deciding whether to apply this enforcement device in the present case, we have to consider first how 
much the exercise~ of the tight to remain silent would be deterred if a suspect knew that a r~quest for a 
lawyer could be used as evic:Jeqce of his sanity. Not much, in our opinion."}; MentJTa v. Illinois High Sclwol 
Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 19~2) (extraordinary and particularized use ofeconomic analysis in 
examining the constitutionality, under First Amendment free ex~rdse principles) of an athletic association's 
rule fo1·bidding basketball players to wear hats or other headgear while playing, ·noting that·" [ij ree exercise 
of religion does not mean costless exercise of religion, but the state may not make the exercise of religion 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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plain and simple my stylistic favorites during this time segment.. These 
Posnerian opinions for the court embody remarkable opinion style: they 
are riveting; they fairly, efficiently, and accurately discuss the relevant 
facts and law; and they sparkle in different stylistic ways with 
erudition, wisdom, wit and clear reasoning.. They are from my 
standpoint as a judicial opinion aesthete objects of beauty. In 
discussing why I think these opinions are beautiful I will not dissect each 
case or seek to describe every ~ttractive stylistic feature. Rather, my 
review will be synaptical, providing a divers.ified, balanced, 
evolutionary, big-picture view of the '-lnique, seminal Posnerian opinion 
style. ·· . 
On the other 4and, of ~e nearly five dozen opinions for the court 
written by judge Posner during the last three quarters of 1982, there is 
only one opinion that I believe deserve-s extended unfavorable 
commentary because of significant stylistic. flaws. This opinion is a 
prominent example of what' I call Posner's ugly opinionsl! 263 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
unreasonably costly," thus Orthodoxjewish basketball players are not necessarily entitled to wear a pinned 
. . 
yarmulke while playing, in light oflegitim~te safety concerns c)f preventing wearing of headgear that might 
fall off in the heat of play, when other, safer, foa·1ns ofheadcovering may reasonably be available that would 
conforrn to Orthodoxjewish religious beliefs); Products liab~ lnsuranuAgtn9, Inc. v. Crum & Fursttr /nmranu 
Cos., 682 F~2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982) (masterful, clear, scholarly and concise explanation of basic anti-trust 
• 
legal principles involvingsuitallegingviolations_ofthe_Sherman Act); Muscarev. (}Jlinn,680.F.2d 42,44 (7th 
Cir. 198_2) (seasoned, practical, trenchant, eloquent and _legal factual ana1ysisofproponionality limitations 
in setting limits to the endless litigation of attorneys, fees awards in civil rights litigation with a classic 
Posnerian use ofa metaphor that cut to the quick of the controve..Sy: "For rather obvious practical reaSQns 
we are loath to disturb a ruling by a district judge on a request for second.round attorneys, fees. The 
consequence if we should reverse and remand for an award of additional fees is all too predictable: however 
little the plaintiff is awarded on remand he will move the district court to award him attorneys• fees for the 
time spent in prosecuting this appeal, and if the district coun denies his motion he will be back up here. 
Every civil rights litigation will be like a nest of Chinese boxes. The -outside box is the litigation of the civil 
rights issue itself. Within it is the litigation. over the fees incurred in the litigation over the 
merits ordinarily a lesser litigation, as our metaphor implies, though in this case the stakes in each of the 
two rounds of fee litigation have been greater, at least in monetary tertns, than the stakes of the original civil 
rights litigation.''); Dragan v. Mdler, 679 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1982) (masterful,scholarly and concise analysis 
or the probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction in an action by residea,ts of Rumania against Illinois 
• 
defendants for imposition of a constructive esta.te, with Posner pbscrving that "[t]he probate exception is 
one of the most mysterious and esoteric_ branches of the_ law of federal ju.risdiction. ,, /d. at 713.); HZ W. 
Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 55 7, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1982) (concise, jugular analysis of human motivation 
in conjunction with intea·preting labor warning policies c;>f NLR.B, with Posner reasoning that after an 
employee had been dischar~d and his forrner supervisors) with the company lawyer, attempted to 
interview the ex-employee for an upcoming hearing, the em.ployee "had no incentive to ingratiate himself 
with the inteJViewers. So there was no carrot. Neither was there stick. Nothing ... could have intimidated 
Jaske .... Ifjaske had been intimidated, he would have consented to be interviewed; he would not have 
fobbed off his questioners with a lie"). 
. 
263. See in.fra notes 327-38 and accompanying text. For "dishonorable mentions,, _of ugly opinion 
style exhibited by Posner during the last quarter of 1982~ his rookie season on the bench, see, for example, 
CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton, 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (in a securities law civil suit against one corporate 
director for recovery of short-swing profits allegedly realized by the director, Posner's use of economic 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Before undertaking this discussion of ~'beautiful" and "ugly" 
Posnerian opinions fo.r the Seventh Circuit, I need to briefly mention the 
structure of the rest of this article. In the · final portion of this 
article before offering some overarching conclusions and a call for a 
more robust aesthetic theory and praxis of judicial opinions based on a 
richer appreciation of judicial style264 I discuss th.is style of Judge 
:Posner's isolated dissenting, concurring and chamber opinions during· 
his rookie season as a federal judge.265 I shall admit to something in 
advance ofthi$ discussion; like Wendy Steiner, Professor of English at 
the University ofPennsylvania and the Director of the Penn Humanities 
Forum, writing in a recent article in The American Scholail66 about literary. 
criticism, in general, I .offer my "subjective preference" on. matters of 
judicial opinion style and "have -given up on being ... . a scientist" (if I 
ever was one) of the aesthetics ofjudicial opinions. I, therefore, heartily 
concur with Professor Steiner's admission: 
• 
. 
It has taken me a long time to admit that the thrust of criticism is the 
"I like," and whatever expertise I have accumulated conspires in this 
admission. The authority of one's institution. of higher learning, one's 
. . 
analysis is hypertechnical, overly-intellectual, confusing and gratuitous,_ for example Posner's .dicta that 
. . ' 
"[t]hough some economists believe that emotional relationships within the family can be expressed in 
economic terms and, presumably, monetized, we doubt thatthe framers of section 16(b) wo~ld have wanted 
., 
to complicate enforcement of the statute to this degree merely to make an already Dt:aconian strict liability 
statute still more Draconian.,,-{citation omitted)); Wuunl' Transptn1lil.iD~ Co. v. Wwon & Co., 682 F.2d 1227 
(7th Cir. ! 982) (in bankrupt common carrier suit against a former shipper seeking recovely of alleged 
undercha.-ges ofapproxima,tely S 124,000, Posner's rev~rsal of the district court summ~ry judgment in favot• 
of a shipper, based on his i.nsistence that despite an identical tariff with the same common carrier and 
another shipper which the ICC had declared as unreasonable in an ICC decision thereby allowing 
judicial notice of the decision a separate administrative action be brought before the ICC by the shipper 
was hyper-.technical,.and surprisingly unrealistic); WW.VConlinmlol Bro.ati;Casting Co. v~ United Vuleo, Inc., 693 
F.2d 62'2 (7th Cir. 1982) (in complex copyright and intellectual property case involving action by television 
broadcasting company to enjoin telecommunications common carrier from retransmitting its copyrighted 
television program into cable television system customers after stripping the vertical blanking intetval of 
Teletext information, Posner's opinion for the court was sloppy and confusing, using impt~ecise language-
. . 
that had to later be defended in a statement-- probably also authored by Posner rejecting a petition for 
rehearing with suggestion for rehearing·en bane); Fedtral.Dtposillnsurance. Corp~ v. Bromwor Assocs., 686 F.2d 
550 (7th Cir. 1982) (prolix and overly-intellectual discussion of subject. matter jurisdiction before analysis 
of the meaits of the dispute); Bowers:v. DeVw, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (short-shrift factual analysis in 
Posnea~'s opinion affirming the dismissal. ora federal civil rights-based, wrongful death suit on summary 
judgment agains~ private physicians and a state mental hospital; Posner's analysis did not give a balanced 
rendition. of the facts of the case as persuasively argued by .the dissenting opini<;>n of Circuit Judge 
Hartington Wood; Posner's analysis also failed to distinguish that prior Supreme Court precedent in a case 
~as "narrowly written to apply to a parole release," riot a state mental hospital release, as pointed out by 
Judge WoocJ•s dissent); Grip-Pak, Inc. v.Illinois Tool Wotks, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982) (a prolix, overly· 
intellectual, dicta-l~den case wh~re Posner t~nnecessarily "shows ofl'' his knowledge of anti .. u·ust law). 
264. See itJfra notes 390•407 and. accompanying text. 
265. Sel in.fta notes 339 ... 89 and accompanying text. 
266. Wendy Steiner, Prll&.li&e Wlllwul Principk, 68 AM .. SCHOLAR,' Summer 1999, at 7 7 . 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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academic credentials, one's ever-increasing experience may establish 
"objectively" one's claim to being an expert, but at the heart of any critical 
act is subjective preference. To lilce, to find important, at this time and in such-
.and-such a situatioTL~ tlzis if .tlze essence of the critical act. 267 
• 
• • 
• 
1. Posner'·s Beautiful Opinions 
. ' 
709 
Of the fifty-nine opinions written by Posner for the'court during the 
. ' 
. last nine months of his rookie s~ason, five opinions are what I deem to 
be, from a holistic perspec~ve., s~listically beautiful. · 
a. Tne Tale of the Injured Tugboat Cook 
• 
In O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co.,268 J1:1dge Posner·melds a compelling 
narrative with pertinent economic insights in resolving the key issue 
relating to the computation of the plaintiff's lost wages. At the outset of 
the opinion he succincdy frames the questions presented: " [ t]his is a; tort 
case under the federal .admiralty jurisdiction. We are called upon to 
decide questions of contributory negligence an.d damage assessment, in 
particular the question one of first impression in this circuit whether, 
and if so how, to account for inflation in computing lost future 
wages .. "2.69 
Posner devotes over one full page of the Federal .Reporter to the sorry 
story of Margaret O'Shea "a 57 ~year-old woman who weighs 200. 
pounds (she is five foot seven)"270-who "was coming off duty as a cook 
on a towboat plying the Mississippi River.n271 As described in the 
opinion for the court, Mrs. O'Shea was forced to use a catwalk, in lieu · 
of climbing a seawall without a ladder, ~'the top of which was several 
feet above the boat's deck,''272· in disembarking from a harbor boat 
bringing her . ashore from. the tug. After climbing a ladder to the 
·catwalk, she was told by a deckhand to ')ump [down three feet from the 
catwalk to the top of the seawall] and that the men who had already 
disembarked would help her land safely."273 Mrs. o~Shea "did as told, 
•. 
• 
267. ld. at 81 (emphasis added) . 
• • 
26.8. 677 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1982). • 
269. ld. at 1196. 
270. ld. 
• 
271. ld. 
272. ld. 
273. ld. 
I •• 
• 
• • 
• 
, 
• 
•. 
• 
710 UNIVERSITY OF CLNCLNNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
. . . 
. but fell in" landing, carrying the assisting seamen down with her, and 
broke her leg. "274 · · 
Judge Posner's initial analysis of the facts in O'Shea, as a prelude to his 
legal discussion, advanced wh~t Professor james Boyd White referred to 
in the Chicago Law Revie.w Colloquium as a "claim ofmeaning."275 In 
·this regard, Posner framed the pivotal legal issue of the case as what the 
• 
law expected Mrs. O'Shea to do, in seeking possible further· 
employment, afte~ her serious leg injury. Posner opined that "[t]he · 
question is ·not whether Mrs. O'Shea is totally disabled in the .sense~ 
relevant to social security. disability cases but not tort cases, that there is 
no job in th~ American economy for which she i.s medically fit~"276 
Rather, "[I]t is whether she can by reasonable diligenc~ ·find gainful 
employment, given the physical· condition in which the accident left 
her."277 Then, Posner's opinion tells the story of Mrs. O'Shea in such 
a way that it, in Professor White's parlance, ''connects · the case with 
· earlier cases [and] the particular facts with more general concerns."278 
Posner's rendering of this claim to meaning is ~ttractive ~nd forceful. 
He states: 
• 
Here is a middl~·aged woman, very overweight, badly scarred on one 
arm and one leg, unsteady on her feet, in constant and serious pain 
from the accident, with no education beyond high school and no work 
skills other than cooking, a job that happens to require .standing for 
long periods which she· is incapable of doing. It seems unlikely that 
someone in this condition could find gainful wo~k at the minimum 
wage. True, the probability is not zero; and a better procedure, 
therefore, might have been to subtract from Mrs. O'Shea's lost future 
wages as a boat's cook the wages in some other job, discounted (i.e., 
• 
multiplied) by the probability very low-that she would in fact be 
able to get another job. But the district judge cannot be criticized for 
having failed to use a procedure not suggested by either party. The 
question put to him was the dichotomous one, would she or would she 
not get another job if -she ~ade reasonable efforts 'to d<? so? This 
required him to decide whether there was a more than 50 percent 
probability that she would. We cannot say that the negative answer 
he gave to that question was clearly erroneous. 279 
Mter resolving th~ linchpin issue in favor of Mrs. O'Shea, Judge 
Posner engaged in nearly four pages of closely-reasoned law and 
274. /d. 
• 
275. White, supra note 17, at 1367; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
276. 677 F.2d at 1197. 
277. /d. 
278. White. supr11 note. 17, at 1367~38; see supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
279. 677 F.2d at 1197. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
economics analysis to resolve the tricky questio~ of how to account for 
inflation in computing l~st future wages.280 The way ·that Posner 
accomplished this task was to weave a seamless web oflogic and analysis 
utilizing the following stylistic techniques: analogy,281 computational 
example,282 case comparison, 283 aphorism~ 284 and gende admonition. 285 
• 
. 
• 
b. The Case of the Crafty Under 
. 
• • 
Judge Posner's opinion for the c~urt ·in In re Holding Co.,286 is a 
splendid example ofstatutory construction in the face of scant legislative 
history and caselaw. .His reason~ng process~~~.: ... gracefully and succint?dy 
contained i11 only two and a half printed p.ages ... ···started by stating· the 
re'levant facts involving a bankruptcy case. The district court judge had 
dismissed as moot an appeal by . the creditors' committee from the 
bankruptcy judge's approval of a loan to the debto·r which involved a 
grant of special post-petition priority to C.hase Manhattan Bank. 
. . . 
. Posner's rendition of the facts established below portrayed· the efforts of 
Chase, after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, to grab· as much of the 
bankruptcy .estate as it co.uld, in. spite of the competing pre-petition 
claims of other creditors: 
• 
. . ~ . 
B-efore Wisconsin Steel (a~ we shall refer jointly to ·the affiliated 
corporations that are th~ bankrupt~ in this case) went bankrupt, the 
Chase Manhat~an Bank had loaned it money secured by a lien on 
in\:entory and by a bank ~ccount that the company maintained with. 
Chase. Wisconsin Steel defaulted, and Chase set off against these 
defaults the funds in the account. Wisconsin Steel was accustomed to 
' paying its employees with checks drawn on this account. Chase's set-
off caused those checks to bounce, which induced Wisconsin Steel to , 
petition for protection under Chapter ll of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The union representing Wisconsin Steel's workers filed 3: complai~t 
in the bankruptcy court seeking payment to i~s members of their 
• 280. See id. at 1198-120 1. . · 
·281. Stt it/. at 1198 ("If a man who had never worked in his life graduated from law school, began 
;working at a law firm at an annual salary ofS35,000, and was killed the second day on the job, his lack of 
· a past wage history would be irrelevant to computing his lost future wages."). 
·282. See id. at 1199-1201 (applying· past wages earned to e~amplc oqnvesting money in federal bonds 
accounting for impact of inflation). 
283. See id. at 1200 (comparing different circuit court approaches). 
284. See id. at 120 l ("Unlike many other·damage items in a pet'SOnal injury case, notably pain and 
suffering, the calculation of damages for lost earnings can and should be an analytical rather than an 
intuitive undertaking."). 
285. See id. ("[F]or the future we ask the district judges in this circuit to indicate the steps by which 
they arrive at damage awards for lost future earnings.,') . 
. 
286. 676 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1982). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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unpaid wages. · Chase was named as a defendant along with 
Wisconsin Steel. The union claimed that it had a lien on the same 
. inventory on which Chase claimed a lien. Although the bankruptcy 
court authorized Chase to take possession of~he inventory, the·union, 
by picketing Wisconsin Steel, prevented Chase from· doing so. 
Eventually a settlement was reached by which Chase agreed to lend 
Wisconsin Steel some $1.7 million in exchange for the union's 
dropping its suit and · allowing the inventory to be removed. The 
agreement stated that Wisconsin Steel would pay out of the proceeds 
of the loan $77,000 to the union to reimburse it for attorneys' fees and 
other legal expenses incurred in its suit, and the rest (except for some 
small amounts for various taxes) to the company's employees in 
settlement of their claims. The agreement further provided that the 
entire loan was to receive the priority that .I l U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) gives 
wage claims.287 
• 
Next, Posner framed th~ question on appeal as follows: 
[I]f in lending Wisconsin Steel $77,000 to pay the union's · legal 
expenses Chase was acting in good faith, its priority could not be 
affected ... and the issue of validity is therefore moot . . . . [b] ut if 
Chase was not acting in good _faith, the Committee was entitled to 
have the merits of its objection to the grant of priority adjudicated.288 
. 
Then, the opinion identified th~ relevant provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code that governed the appeal section 364(e), which provides that a 
bankruptcy court's post-petition grant of priority does not affect the 
validity of the priority if it was granted "to a~ entity that ext~nded such· 
[post-petition] credit in good faith."289 Posner thoughtfully and lucidly 
offered the following policy rationale underlying the statutory provision: 
• 
• [fhis type of] provision[ ] seeks to overcome people's natural 
reluctance to deal with a bankrupt firm ... . as ... [a] lender by 
assuring them that so long as they are relying in good faith on a 
bankruptcy judge's approval of the transaction they need not worry 
about their priority merely because some creditor is objecting to the 
transaction and is trying to ... reverse the bankruptcy judge. The 
proper recourse for the objecting creditor is to get the transaction 
stayed pending appeal.290 
Typical of his skill in going for the jugular issue in a cas~, Judge 
Posner wryly noted that the relevant legal standard contained in the· 
• 
287. ltl. , at 946. 
288. ld. at 94 7 (citation omitted). 
289. ld. 
290. /d . • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Bankruptcy Code "presupposes good faith."291 In the face of"find(ing] 
neither cases nor legislative history, pertaining either to good faith. 
lenders to bankrupts or to good faith purchasers fro~ bankrupts,"292 . 
Posner brilliandy reasone.d fro~ the Structure and ostensible purpose of 
the "good faith" Bankruptcy Code Standard: · 
·· Chase argues that so long as the terms of the transaction are not 
misrepresented to the bankruptcy judge, as they were not here, the 
creditor may rely on the bankruptcy judge's order unless it is stayed, 
no matter how obviously erroneous the order is~ But if this is what · 
. . 
Congress· intended, the words "in good faith" could have been 
deleted, as it would be perfectly clear even without them that an order 
obtained from a bankruptcy judge by fraud was ineffective to put the 
lender who procured the order ahead of other creditors. We assume . 
th.e statute was intended to protect not the lender who seeks to take 
advantage of a lapse in oversight by the bankruptcy judge but the 
lender who believes his priority.is valid but cannot be certain that it 
• 
is, because of objections that might be upheld on appeal. If the lender 
~ows his priority is invalid but proceeds-anyway in the hope that a 
stay. will not be sought or if sought will not be_ granted, we cannot see 
how he can be thought to be acting in good faith.293 . 
. Viewing the union's claim, underlying Chase's post-petition loan, 
''realistically," Judge Posner cut to the quick, .noting that the "claim by· 
the union's attorneys for time and expenses incurred in prosecuting the 
union members' claims for unpaid wages ... was not entitled to priority 
. ' . 
over the claims of the general creditors [and, indeed] could not be paid 
out of the bankrupt's estate· at ~1."'294 This was_ so, Posner reasoned, 
because the pertinent blackletter bankruptcy rule '.'is that no allowance 
will be made to a creditor's attorney for proving his client's claim.''295 
Wrapping up the do~trinal discussion of good faith lending to a 
bankruptcy debtor, Judge Posner ended the opinion for the-Seventh 
Circuit with a hypothetical flourish, which he then turned into a 
penetrating syllogism that correcdy resolved the case and reversed the. 
district court below: 
• 
• 
• 
Where it is evident from the loan agreement itself that the transaction 
has an intended effect that is_ improper under the Bankruptcy Code, 
the lender is not in good faith; and it is irrelevant what the improper 
purpose is. If the loan agreement had- stated that Wisconsin Steel 
291. !d. 
292. /d. I 
293. /d. 
294. /d. at 947-48. 
295. /d. at 948: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . 
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would use the proceeds to buy one-way airplane tickets to Brazil for 
its officers, we do not think Chase would be arguing to us that it had 
extended credit to the compa~y in good faith and therefore had an 
untouchable priority. Ofcourse in such a case the general creditors 
should be able to obtain a stay but we do not think their failure to do 
so would place. Chase's priority bey~nd the power· of judicial 
.correction; otherwise the good faith requirement would be read out 
of the statute. The pre·sent case is less extreme but no different in 
principle. Just as Chase would pot have been a purchas'er in goo·d 
faith if it had bought from Wisconsin Steel property to which it knew 
. the company did not have good title, ·so it could not 'be' a lender in 
good faith in. extending ~redit in exchange for a priority that it kne.w 
· the company could not properly give it since the transaction 
. . 
amounted to taking money out of the pockets of the general creditors 
to pay lawye'rs whose claims were not allowable under bankruptcy law 
at all. 
• • • • ·, 
As. all this must have been as obvious to Chase as it is to · 
us · . probably more so we do not think . that the context 
(settlement of litig~tion) in which .the loan was made and the 
special priority received casts enough doubt on the forbidden 
nature of the transaction to.rebut an inference. of bad faith that 
is, knowledge of improper purpose. Nor, finally, are we 
persuaded by Chase's argument that the priority.it received on 
the $77,000 was a sine qua non of the entire loan transaction a 
transaction beneficial to the bankrupt and ·hence to the general 
creditors of the bankrupt as we·ll as to Chase· .. -·because the union 
would not have called off its pickets. unless it was given its legal 
• 
fees and unless the union did call off its pickets and thereby 
allowed Chase to remove the inventory on which it had a lien 
Chase would not have made the loan to cover the ~npaid wage 
• 
claims. Chase ·could have paid the union's legal fees out of its 
own pocket if that was what was required to get the inventory out., 
Instead it claims a right to force the company's general creditors 
to pay the union's legal expenses out of their pockets. That is an 
improper use of the bankrupt's ·estate, to which the general 
creditors are the residual claimants..  The fact that Chas.e was a 
. . . . 
defendant in the suit by the union actually strengthens the 
inference of bad faith. Chase was not a disinterested lender but 
a settling litigant that saw an opportunity to reduce the cost ofthe 
. . . 
settlement by putting the union's lawyers ahead of the general 
creditors of Wisconsin Steel. An extension of credit having such 
• 
• 
• 
• . .. 
' 
• 
' 
\ 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
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• 
an ulterior purpose is not in good faith within the meaning of 
sectio·n 364(e). 296 . · · . 
. 
c. The Perils qf t~e Greedy Railroad 
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (C&NW) v. United States297 is 
a high prototype of Posnerian economic analysis through creative and 
persuasive use ofhypotheticals. The case, in essence, boiled down to the 
appeal by a railroad of the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) 
order establishing the price for sale of a railroad line between northern 
Illinois and southern Wisconsin, which the railroad wanted to abandon. 
Posner opened his opinion for the court by observing that "(t]his case of 
first impression under the .1980 Staggers Rail Act ~mendments to 49 
U.S.C. § 10905 requires us to decide both statutory and constitutional 
questions relating to the meaning of the term 'fair market value' applied 
to an abandoned railroad line."298 · 
The dispute aro~e because, as Posner incisively observe~, C&NW 
"valued the (proposed abandoned] property as a rail line, as . . . the 
(Geneva Lake Area Joint Transit Commission (GLA) a consortium 
dedicated to the preseiVation of commuter rail service] intended to use · 
it [but] GLA maintained and the_ [ICC] agreed that the relevant value 
was the value of the property for nonrail use the use to which it would 
have been put had it been abandoned."299 · 
Mter examining the text of the statute ( detertnining that Congress had 
not defineq the dispositive term "fair market value")300 and the 
legislative history of the Staggers Rail Act amendments (concluding that 
the pre-enactment jurisprudence on the subject as well as unenacted 
• 
bills and subcommittee hearings provided "obscure and conflicting clues 
[that] do not help us to decide whether Congress would have wanted the 
[ICC] to consider the value of the Lake Geneva line to GLA in setting 
the terms of sale"),301 Judge Posner looked at what he called "history in 
a broader sense. "302 In this regard, he canvassed the "legisprudence" of 
railroad abandonment proceedings since the mid-1970s that often 
worked to the detriment of shippers and commuters. 303 Posner 
insightfully grasped that Congress had made the policy judgment to 
• • 
• 
• • 
296. Itl. at 94 7-48. 
297. 678 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1982). 
298. /d. at 666. 
299. Id. 
• 
300. ltl. at 667. 
301. Id. 
302. /d. 
. . 
303. See id. at667-68. • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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partially subsidize "public transit authorities and other entities willing 
either to support or to acquire and operate branch lines after they were 
~ban cloned [by railroad co.mpanies] ."304 Moreover, according to his 
reasoning for the court, "Congress did not want the railroads to have 
any hold-out power in negotiating with entities planning to continue 
passenger rail seiVice on a subsidized basis" and- ''[t]hat is ~hy it 
amended section I 0905 in 1980 to allow indeed require the [ICC] 
to fix the price of the sale if the parties could not agree~''305 Posner, 
therefore, concluded: "The purpose of the amendment would be 
frustrated if the [ICC] were required to consider the value of the line to 
the offeror, for tpat would give the-railroad an approximation to what 
it was able to get .0 •• under the previous statute."306 · 
Turning to a series of colorful hypotheticals to test the 
constitutionality of his interpretation under the takings clause of the 
Fifth Amendment,Judge.Posner provided vivid and helpful perspective 
on theointerpretational question. In his first hypothetical, Posner noted: 
l'r 
The government may notcf~rce a railroad to operate a line at a -loss 
for an indefinite period of tim~ and it would seem to follow that if, as 
here, the right to abandon is conditioned on the railroad's willingne·ss 
to sell the abandoned line at a price fixed by the [ICC], that price 
must not fall short ofjus_t compensation. If the line had a scrap value 
of $1 million, it would not do for the [ICC] to tell the railroad, "we 
are going to force you to sell the line for $100,000, and if you don't 
0 
like that price we will refuse to let you abandon the line until you have 
lost another $900,000, at which point you'll cry 'uncle. '"307. 
In his second hypothetical, designed to test the takings clause, Posner 
wrote: · 
. 
Setting aside measurement problems, we think it irrelevant whether 
private property is taken for a new use or to continue an old one, and 
even question whether this is a meaningful distinction. If C&NW 
owned a hospital that w:as losing money and had no prospects for 
~ profitable operation, and the State ofWisconsin condemned it for a 
public hospital, C&NW would not be entitled to the value of its 
property as a hospital. It would have value to the state only because 
the state could use its taxing powers to force state residents to defray 
the losses. In theose circumstances the change from private to public 
• 
304. ld. at 667. 
305. /d. at 668. • 
306. /d. 
307. /d. (citations omitted) . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
ownership would be as distinctive a change in the economic character 
of the hos:pital as if it had been taken for use as_ an artillery range.3°8 · 
Finally, Posner replied to his hospital hypotheticall?y articulating, and 
analyzing, a counter-hypothetical: 
But to all this it may be replied that GI.A, whatever its source ~f 
funds, was a potential purchaser of the Lake Geneva line and this 
shows that the line had a market value which the statute prevented 
C&NW from realizing. We agree that a buyer's willingness to pay a 
high price is not an invalid indication of market value just because he 
is subsidized. The government could not refuse to pay the market 
value of western farrnland that it condemned, merely because the 
value had been enhanced by govemmef1.tally subsiclized water projects 
in the area. · 
.. ~ . . 
. 
This res_ult is required if for no. other reaso.~ simply to keep the 
valuation process manag~able. But it is not clear that GI.A really was 
a potential purchaser, at least at any price higher than the salvage 
value of the Lake Geneva line. It is a public entity that has or could 
easily be given the power of eminent domain, and if it exercised that 
power the price it would have to pay would be l~mited to what 
C&NW could get from other prospective purchas_ers who did not have 
eminent-domain -power, none of whom would continue the line in rail 
use.sog 
• 
Distilling the wisdom .from his law and economics analysis, freighted. 
with hypothetic:als_,Judge: Posner in Chicago & North Western Transportation 
Co. concluded h:is opinion with a legal insight that joined political theory 
· with economic thought: 
(The Staggers Rail .Act] amendments have given the railroads a faster 
abandonment procedure than the Fifth Amendment entitles them to 
and it is reasonable that they should be asked.to give up something in 
return t}?.e opportunity to engross values created by a political 
process that weights the preferences of railroad passengers [as 
reflected in federal subsidy legislation] more heavily than the market 
does.310 · 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
3:08. Id. at 66'9. 
309. ld. at 670 (citations omitted). • 
310. ld. at 771. 
. . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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d. The Case qfthe Fired HUD Employee "Slumlord" 
Wild v. United States Department qf Housing and Urban Developmenf11 arose 
. 
on a set of unusual facts'; an employee who was disciplined and 
ultimately fired by HUD for moonlighting as the manager of his wife's 
. 
slum properties. and letting the properties deteriorate so badly that it 
became a focus of gang activity. 312 The legal basis asserted by HUD in 
firing Mr. Wild was the HUD Code qf Conduct, which provided in 
pertinent part, as quoted inJudge Posner's opinion for the court, that a 
HUD employee · · 
can never have a right of tenure that transcends [sic] the public good. 
He can properly be a Government employe'e only as long as it 
remains in. the public interest for him to be one. Public trust and .. 
confidence in the integrity of the Government are paramount.313 . 
Judge Posner's controversial and frank opinion for the Seventh Circuit 
· upheld the legal basis ofHUD's discharge of its employee. 
In the view ofjudge Patricia Wald, discussed earlier as part of tlle 
synthesis of the Chicago Law Review Colloquium, the gist of Judge 
Posner's opinion for the court in Wild might be cynically interpreted. as 
an exercise in ''personal gratification;' or an effort to attract attention in 
"hopes of' promotion to higher judicial office.',~ 14 Wald's realistic 
insights about the internal wo,rkings of ap.pellate courts are -also useful in 
understanding Posner's acerbic opinion; one could not help concluding 
that Posner was using, in part, caustic prose in order to debunk the views 
or perceptions of a disfavored colleague or doctrinal foe,315 or otherwise 
attempting to imitate the combative and sarcastic stylistic posture. of 
jurists like U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Scalia.316 · 
In the Chicago Law Review Colloquium view ofProfessor Nussbaum, 
however, the nub ofjudge Posner's opinion in Wild might be seen as an 
opinion reflecting ''the literary judge/judicious spectator'' who is able 
to "think like a novel reader."317 Professor Leflar might label Pos.ner's 
• 
opinion in Wild as primarily concerned about the ironic and "practical . 
~~ . 
• 
• 
31 L 692 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1982). 
312. Set id. at 113J . 
313. /d. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 0. 735-201 (a)). 
314. Wald, RketorU:, supra note 15, at 1372. 
315. Su supra note 36 and accompanying text. Compare the dissent.ng opinion of judge Decker in 
the case at bar criticizing Posner for his characterization of the HUD employee as a "slumlord,'' without 
substantial evidential support. See Wtld; 692 F.2d at 1134!1'35 (Decker, SJ., dissenting). 
316. ·See supra notes 3,9-40 and accompanying text. 
'31 7. Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 1486, 1492. 
,, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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socio-economic effects"318 of allowin.g a federal HUD employee-
charged with helping to adequately house the poor · to continue in his 
job after public revelations that he was a: "slumlord" of property that he 
managed; on his own time, for the benefit of his wife. Professor Gibson 
might even be inclined to applaud Posner's opinion in Wild as (orcefully 
engaging in "the expression of life's complexities ·in mere man-made 
words"319 verging on the eloque.nt. · 
What I have been referring to as the nub or essence of Posner's 
opinion in Wild- (text that I find breathtakingly delightful with the 
• 
deployment of creative and vivid language, examples, metaphor and 
precedent) is as follows: 
• 
. 
. 
But where an employee's off-duty behavior is blatll:ntly inconsistent 
with the mission of the employer and is known or likely to become 
known, most any employer, public or privat~, however broadminded, 
would want to fire the employee and would be reasonable in wanting 
to do so; and we find. no evidence that Congress intended to deny this 
right to federal agencies. If an employee of a manufacturer bf safes 
moonlighted as a safe cracker, his_ days as an employee of that 
manufacturer would be numbered, even if he scrupulously avoided 
cracking safes manufactured by his employer. If an officer of a 
musicians' union owned a nightclub that employed non-union 
·musicians, because their wages were lower, .his days· as an employee 
of the union would be numbered. A customs officer caught 
smuggling, an immigration officer caught employing illegal aliens, an 
IRS employee who files false income tax returns, a .HUD apprais~r 
moonlig4ting as a "slumlord"--·,-these are merely the public 
counterparts of a form of conflict of interest that is not less serious for 
~ot being financial, that would not be tolerated in the private sector, 
. . . 
and that we do not believe Con.gress meant to sanctify in the public 
sector. · 
It may be replied that all Wild is asking is that the agency be forced 
to prove a reduction of its efficiency due to an off-duty misconduct, 
rather than bein.g allowed to infer it from the relation between the 
misconduct and the agency's mission~ But proof of that relation is the 
substan~ial evidence that the statute requires; to require more proof 
would be unnecessary and unrealistic. Without judicial precedent, 
without persuasive evidence of congressional intent, a~d in the face of 
our own contrary precedent ... we will not force HUD to continue 
employing a "slumlord" in a responsible position. until it can prove, by 
the cumbersome methods of litigation, what ought to be 
318. Robert A. Leflart Soml Observations Concenling]udicial Opinion.r,-61 COLUM. L. REv. 810, 816 
(1961 ). See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
. 
319. WalkerGibson,LiteraryMindrand]udicialStJk, 36 N~Y~U. L. REV.915, 930(1961}. SeesujJra note 
. 1 71 and accompanying text. 
• 
• 
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obvious . that the credibility and effectiveness of the department are 
undermined. by such ·discordance between public ·duty and private 
conduct.320 
e. The Strange Case of the Longshoreman Who Fell to His Death in the 
• 
·Darkened Hold 
• 
Judge _Posner's opinion for the court in U.S. fidelity Guarantee Co. -v. 
Plovidba,321 rounds out my favorite cases of Posnerian judicial opinion 
style during the latter pa~t of his rookie season on the federal appellate 
judiciary. The procedural co11text on appeal was one. of factual review: 
whether the evidence supporte~ the jury's finding that t~e. ship<?wner 
was not negligent and was therefore not liable for the death of a 
longshoreman.who fell through an o·pen l1atch in a darkened hold where 
. loading and unloading -actiVities were not being conducted at the time. 
Posner's stylistic strengths in Plqv-idha include his concise and masterful 
factual and legal analysis, coupled with his penetrating assess~ent and . 
judgment of human motivation. First, Posner starts his opinion with a 
simple schematic cross-section diagram· of the Yugoslavian ship .. ---the 
M/V Makarska where Patrick .Huck fell to his death inside a darkened · 
hold. 322 This simple embellishment aids immeasurably to the clarity of 
· his opinion. Second, in the course of on~ page of the Federal Reporter, 
Judge Posner referring in his discussion to the cross-sectional diagram 
of the ship described the r~levant .evidence that the jury heard below 
about the circumstances surround~ng Huck's death. A subtle stylistic 
sample of his fluid factual account is as follows: · 
Holds 2 through 5 are identical, so far as we can glean from the 
record .... Each has three decks. From top to bottom they are the 
weather deck, the upper 'tween deck, and the lower 'tween deGk. 
Below the lower 'tween deck is the main cargo area of the hold. Each 
deck contains a hatch roughly 30 feet across. When all three hatches 
in a hold are open, cargo can be loaded into (or unloaded from) the 
. . 
main cargo area. Hatchways of the typical Jllaritime type (smaller 
than regular doorways, and with high thresholds) connect the holds 
laterally at each deck. 323 
· A third stylistic virtue of Posner's Plovidha opinion is· the succinct, 
scholarly, and balanced discussion of federal statuto-ry and ca~elaw 
governing the ability of longshoremen, injured while working on a ship, 
320. 692 F.2d at 1133. 
321. 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). 
322. See id. at 1023. 
323. /d. at 1023-24. 
• 
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to recover damages from the ship owner under principles parallel to 
traditional tort law.324 . 
Finally, analogizing the federal admiralty law dealing with injuries to 
longshoremen to the famous Learned Hand formula in United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.,_325 Posner undertook an insightful,_ astute ancl detailed 
review of what the jucy below could have reaso~ed in reaching its 
verdict in favor of th~ shipowner, A_ selective portion of his elegant 
analysis for the court strikes me as unusually allurin,g and is worthy of 
· full quotation,. to wit: 
• 
The plaintiff also contends that even if the instructions were 
satisfactory, the undisputed facts showed negligence by the shipowner 
as a matter of law. We again use the Hand formula to frame this 
issue. ·L, the loss if the accident occurred, was lt:trge. There was ~ 25 
foot drop from the upper 'tween det;:k of hold number 1 to the bottom 
of the hold, and a fall from that height was very likely to cause serious 
injury or, as in this case, death. As to B, the burden of precautions, 
there ·were vari<?us ways the shipowner could have prevented the 
accident. He could have lit the hold, locked the hatchway leading t~ 
it from the weather deck ofhold number 2, roped off the open hatch, 
or placed a sign at the hatchway (though the effectiveness of this last 
· precaution may be doubted)~ Probably the cheapest way ofavoiding 
the accident, however, would have been for the s~ip's crew not to 
open the hatches until all the longshoremen had left .the ship. This 
would have meant either the crew's working after norrnal working 
hours, or, if the opening of the hatches. was postponed till the 
following ·morning, delay in beginning stevedoring operations at the 
next port of call. We doubt that either alternative would be very 
costly so we judge B in this case to have been, at most, moderate, and 
possibly small. 
If P, the probability of an accident if the precautions that would 
avert it were n~t taken, was high, then it would appear, in light of 
our discussion of L and B, that the shipowner was negligent in 
failing to take one of the precautions that we have mentioned. 
But probably P was low. There was no reason for a 
longshoreman to reenter a hold after he had completed his work 
there and moved on to another part of the ship. The plaintiff 
speculates that Huck may have left a piece of clothing in hold 
. number 1 and gone back to retrieve it. It does not seem very 
likely that anyone would enter a pitch-black hold to retrieve a 
gl<;>ve or a sock or. a jacket, when he could easily ask for light. It 
is far more likely that Huck entered for an illicit purpose. This 
• 
324. Seeid.at 1024-27. 
325. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Ci ... 1947). • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
·. 
• 
• 
< 
722 UNIVERS!TrOFCINCINNATILAW REVIEW [Vol. 68_ 
would not defeat a recovery if the . shipowner were negligent; 
neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence is a defense 
to liability in a negligence action under [the relevant federal 
. . 
statute]. But Huck's motive in entering hold number 1 bears on 
the probability of the accident and hence on the cost-justified 
level of precautions_ by the shipowner. Unless it is common for 
longshoremen to try to pilfer from darkened holds and it was · 
the plaintifi's burden to show that it is the shipowner would 
have no reason to think it so likely that a longshoreman would be 
in a darkened hold ~s to require precautions against his falling 
through an open hatch. 
Moreover, the relevant probability, so far as the Hand formula is 
concerned, is not the probability that a longshoreman would 
· enter a darkened hold but the probability that he would fall into 
an open hatch in such a hold. The probability was small. The 
darkness was as. effective a w~rning of danger as a sign would 
have been. Any longshoreman would know that ~here was a 
hatch on the floor and he could not rationally assume that it was 
closed. Only a reckless person wbuld walk about in the hold in 
these circumstances, especially ifhe had no flashlight; Huck had 
none. There are reckless people as there are dishonest people; 
but the plaintiff did not try to prove that there are so ~any 
reckless dishonest longshoremen as to require the precautions that 
the defendant in this case would have had to take to avert injury 
to them. 
We do not know whether Huck was aware of the custom of 
• 
op.eningthe hatches after the longshoremen left the hold, and for 
the reasons just suggested. it is not critical whether he was or riot. 
But probably he was. His body was found well forward of where 
he would have fallen had he walked straight into the hold. , No 
doubt he was trying to skirt what he kne_w to be an open hatch. 
The shipowner :was riot required to anticipate that a 
longshoreman knowing of the open shaft would not be able to 
avoid it; this was possible happened but the probability was 
too remote t9 warrant precautions beyond the implicit warning 
of darkness· itself. 
Another factor bearing on the probability of an accident is that 
Huck was under the general supervision of the stevedore 
company, that employed him. Even if the defendant should have 
regarded Huck as no better than a sheep wandering about the 
ship with no rational concern for his ow.n safety, it was entitled to 
regard the stevedore as his principal shepherd. The stevedore 
had a work rule forbidding lon_gshoremen to be anywhere on the 
ship except ·where stevedoring · operations were actually in 
progress. The shipowner was entitled to rely on the stevedore to 
enforce this rule, if not 100 percent at least enough to make it 
. 
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. . 
highly improbable, in light of the other circumstances that we 
have discussed, that one of the longshoremen would stray away 
from the rest and fall into a darkened hold.326 · 
2. Posner's Ugly Opinions 
723 
• •
Of the nearly five dozen court opinions authored by Judge Posner 
during the latter part of 1982, one opinion strikes me, from a holistic 
perspective, as substantially stylistically ugly.327 
• 
a. ''Professor" Pomer Goes Bonkers 
In probably the most unusual stylistic court opinion written during his 
entire 1981-82 rookie season on the Seventh Circuit, Posner seemingly 
• 
forgot that his daytime job .had shifted from being a law professor to 
·being a federal appellate judge. By way of.an overarching preliminary 
. 
comment, the medical antitrust case against a priv~te medical 
association, Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,328 came to 
be decided by an unusual panel of three Seventh Ci~cuitJudges in an 
odd way. The panel of three includedjudge Posner the, author of the 
court opinion Circuit judge Pelland retired Supreme Court justice 
Potter Stewart.329 Posner was a fill-in for circuit judge Sprecher, who 
· "was originally the- third member of the panel; but [whose] untimely 
death prevented his participation in_ the decision of this case.''330 The 
ev~r intrepid ':Judge Posner took his place and~ .. read the briefs and 
pertinent portions of the record -and ... listened to the tape recording 
• 
of the oral argument,331 in the case . 
The remarkable opinion of the panel, writte,n by Judge Posner, 
consumes over ten pages in the Federal Reporter-an unusually long 
Posnerian opinion, over twice his average opinion length.332 While it 
exhibits Posner's trademark intellectual dexterity and brilliance on a 
• 
• 
326. 683 F.2d at 1027·28 (citations .. oinitted). · 
327. See supra note 263 (where I briefly describe certain rather minor unattractive features ofPosner's 
court opinions during this timeframe). 
328. ·692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982). 
329. See id. at 1086. 
330. See id. at 1086, n* (the footnote was inserted prior to the court•s opinion to signify the change 
of panel members and was not denoted by a number). 
331. /d. 
332~ See DOMNARSKI~ supra note 14, at 143-44. In a random sample of Posner ~pinions over 
approximately the first ~ecade of his tenure as a federal appellate judge Domnarski concluded that"[e]ach 
Posner opinion averaged 4.14 pages [and] is app.roximately three thousand one hundred words long." !d. 
at 144. 
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wide assortment of topics, it .is aesthetically disagreeable for three 
0 
principal reasons. First,Judge Posner, like a precocious, but obnoxious, 
child showing off for his parents' friends at a cocktail party in his home, 
is oblivious to what, aesthetically, might be called a sense of occasion and, 
legally, is referred to as the procedural context of the case. As 
persuasively expressed in this regard by Justice Stewart in his dissent: 
0 
In this case our mission is no more than to review a criminal contempt 
citation [made by the court on the defendant medical association J for 
refusing to comply with a discovery order [by the district court judge, 
under a protective order, to produce ten years' worth· of 
correspondence and other documents relating to plaintiffs; application 
for membership in the association and other membership denials]. 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion wrestles with difficult questions 
concerning, first, the doctrine of res judicata, and, second, the 
application of the Sherman Act to a denial of a membership in a 
professional organization. 333 
0 
Second, Posner's opinion violates, without good reason, the cardinal 
jurisdictional convention and collegial rule of judicial etiquette, that ap-
pellate courts should not pontificate on abstract .questions of law based· 
on speculation of what the relevant facts of a case might, or might not, 
he- In stylistic terms we might say that written appellate opinions should 
avoid engaging in too much "gossiping" .334 Again, Justice Stewart's · 
dissent in th.e case aptly expresses this criticism of Posner's opinion: 
.. 
• 
It forges new ground, despite the absence of a factual record in this 
0 
case and despite the existence of contrary precedent in other Circuits. 
Because I believe that neither of these questions is ·properly presented 
for review by this Court, that the substance of the discussion 
concerning the doctrine of res judicata is extremely dubious, and that 
the contempt citation was proper, I respectfully dissent.335· 
0 ' 
Finally and related to the first criticism336 while Posner's opinion 
in Marrese, reversing the contempt citation against the medical 
association for refusal to conduct ordered discovery is ·scholarly, and 
exhibits certain literary flourishes, such as his references to Aristotle and 
• 
333. Marrese, 692 F2d at 1096 (Stewart,J., dissenting). 
334. The definition of "gossip" is "rumor or report of an intimate nature;'' 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 504 {Merriam· Webster, Inc. ed., I Oth ed. 1998). 
335. 692 F.2d at 1096 (Ste\vart,J., dissenting). , 
336. See suprtl note 332 and accompanying text. 
''a chatty talk., 
' • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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de Tocqueville337 and to Don Quixote,338 on balance, his gingerbread 
embellishments are stylistically out of place and, therefore, like "pigs_ in 
a parlor." 
• 
• 
• 
D. Free Agent: Posner)s Dissenting, Concurring and Chamber Opinions .. . 
Judge Posner also wrote a handful of other opinions during his 1981-
~2 rookie season: · one ''in chambers" opinion,339 two concurring 
opinions,340 and six dissenting opinions.3·41 Brief stylistic comments are 
in order for each of these three types of separate opinions . 
• 
1. In Chambers 
Taking the opportunity to create precedent and correct what he 
viewed as past judicial "laxity" and lawyerly frivolity in filing motions 
for extensions of time for the filing of appellate briefs, P-osner wrote a 
one page opinion in Conne~ticut General Lift Insurance Co. v~ Chicago Tttle & 
Trust Co. 342 on the topic. Denying the motions in ~e case,Judge Posner 
was chiefly concerned about the integrity of the Seventh Circuit Rules 
· and the waste of judicial resources. 343 Yet, he chose to drive th~se 
judicial policy considerations home by quoting from Shakespeare's 
classic play on law and justic~, Measure for Measure: "'[O]ur 
decrees,/Dead to infliction; to themselves ~re dead,/ And liberty plucks 
justice· by the nose. '"344 
• 
• 
3 37. See 692 F. 2.d at 1 089 (" [ o] ne does not have to raise the ghosts of Aa·istotle and de T oq ueville to 
be reminded that voluntat-y associations are important to many people, Americans in particular, and that 
voluntary professional associations are impol:tant.to American professionals") . 
. 
338.. ld. (quoting an epigram from a disttict court opinion, "[ijederal courts do noLstage academic 
tournaments merely for Dpn Quixotes to practice knightho.od") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
339. Ste Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title & Trus,t Co., 690 F.2d 115 (7th Cit-. 1982). 
340. See United States v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261,267 (7th Cir. 1982); Treckerv. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 
7 I 0 (7th Cir. 1982). 
341. See United States. v. Bd. ofSch. Comm'l's, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 1982); Sur v. Glidden-Durkee, Div. ofS.C.M-. Corp., 681 F.2d 
490, 499 (7th Cir. 1982); Brotherhood ofR .. R. Signahnen v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 688 F.2d 535, 
545 (7th Cir. 1982); Allison v., Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982). 
342. See 690 F.2d at 115 .. 16. 
343. See id. at 116 . 
,• 
344. ld. (quoting WIU..IAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act I, sc. iii) . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
2. Concurring Opinions3~5 
.~.In a habeus corpus petitio,-t appeal, United States v. F~anzen,346 Judge 
P~sner filed an uri usual concurring opinion,joining in th.e reversal of the 
d,istrict court's dismissal ~f a state prisoner's petition for habeas 
~qrpus. 347 According to Posner, he went t<? the trouble to .. write his 
• c~ncurrence ·''in the hope that Congress will consider ref~rms in the 
1\abe:as corpus. statute. "348 As a matter of style, federa~ judges rarely 
write such gratuitous law and policy opinions. Ot:t one level, Posner 
could be criticized for, agai.n, trying too hard to look smart and trying 
to impress his peers. Query, whether he also had in mind the notion of 
trying to impress President Reagan to consider appointing P·osner to the 
next available vacancy ·.on the High· Court.349 On another level, 
however, Posner's style in broaching a legal-policy subject th-at he, in 
good faith, might have thought Congress (er a Committee or · 
' . . 
Subcommittee of Congress) might be interested in addtessing .was 
judicious, scholarly and frank. Indeed, he posited legitimate reasons 
why Congress might be interested in reforming federal habeas corpus 
procedure including ''principles both of federalism and of rational 
criminal procedure," "th·e responsibility and morale of state judges,'' the 
"reasonable finality to criminal proceedings ·and . · ... the legitimacy of 
the criminal-justice system," imposition "on the time of our busy district 
judges," arousal of"false hopes in state prisoners" and the "accuracy of 
constitutional determinations. "3.50 Moreover,Judge Posner's concurring 
opinion provided an insightful and concise historical analysis of habeas 
corpus proceedings in the Nation.351 . 
In the other concurring opinion written by Judge Posner during 1981-
82,35~ he agair:t filed his.concurrence to plead normative policy matters 
to Congress this time of federal ·securities law and tG, no doubt~ 
attempt to impress conservative allies ~o push his appointment for a seat 
on the Supreme Court.353 Posner, inappropriately and imprudently in 
· my judgment, impljcidy takes the Supreme Court to task for its past 
. 
345. In comparison with the general discussion ofjudicial opinion style focusing on opinions written 
for a majority of an appellate court; thet·e is a body of scpaa-:-ale; and generally o'der; literature on 
concuaTing and dissenting judicial opinion style. See, for example, the materials collected in APPELLATE 
jUDICIAL OPINIONS, suJnt• note 168, at 203·14. . ~ 
· 346. 676 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982). 
34 7. See it/. at 267. 
348. /d. . 
' 349. ·see general[, suprtz note 26 and accompanying text. 
' ' 
350. 676 F.2d at 268 . 
351. 
352. 
353 . 
• 
See id. 
See Treckcr v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982). 
' CJ supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text ... 
• 
.• 
• 
• 
• 
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jurisprudence in t)lis area354 and even has the gall to injttdiciously 
comm~nt on a pending grant of certiorari in the High Court.355 
Moreover, on the subject of what he sarcastically refers to earlier in his · 
.opinion as ''the unintended federalization of corporation law by Rule 
lO(b)-5,"356 he takes the low road of pure judicial subjectivity ana 
pandering by quibbling with what he thought, "Congress intended 'fo 
happen w.hen it enacted section 1 O(b) in 1934,"357 because of his 
• 
subjective view that the case Qefore· the Seventh Circuit panel was·'a 
• 
mere "garden-variety squabble among shareholders irt a closely held 
corporation, whic.h could not even be maintained as a diversity action 
because of the lack of complete· diversity among the parties. "358 
. I 
• 
. 3. Dissenting Opinions · • 
What about] udge ~osner's dissenting opinion style?359 In examining 
some points of Posner's dissenting opinions during 1981-82, it is 
illuminating to start with the truism of former Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun that "[i]t is much easie·r to write a biting dissent than a 
constructive majority opinion. "360 While a complete analysis of the 
judicial opinion style, both comparative and normative, of Judge 
Posner's dissenting opinions is a subject worthy of a separate law review 
article, the following stylistic comments, addressed to the most striking 
• 
features of his six dissenting opinions during 1981-82, indubitably 
belong in this article. · . . 
First, in his first -ever dissenting opinion as a judge, in the Indianapolis 
school desegregation case of United States v. J!oard qf School Comm'rs,361 
Posner exhibited what might ·be called an outwardly respectful tone to 
his colleagues in the majority, with a subtle slam of outrage at his 
brethren's lack of economic and practical common sense. Thus, while 
Judge Posner begins his dissent using language ofob~isance " [ w] ith all 
due regard for the forcefully articulated contrary view of my 
brethren"362 the essence of his contrarian opini9n uses· words that 
cot1vey ridicule of the majority "[t]hese are fascinating questions for 
economists, [dealing with where a defendant will "get the money'' to 
See 619 F.2d at 710-11. I 354. 
355. 
356. 
See id. at 711 (referring to Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, ·I 02. S. Ct. 1766 ( 1982)). 
/d. 
35 7. !d. at 712. 
358. ltl. at 711. 
359. See supra note 345. · ' 
360. APPElLATEjUDICIAL OPINIONS, suprlz note 168; at 203 (quoting unacknowledged source). 
361. 677 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1982). 
362. !d. at 1190 . • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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pay for its legal liability] but too difficult and tangential to engage the 
attention of courts."363 Yet, at least at the end of his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Posner offers up a succinct, helpful and non-pejorative alternative 
remedial approach that has the virtue of acting as a beacon for future 
federal judges who might be called upon to fashion equitable relief in 
school desegrega.tion cas~s. Posner wrote: 
[R]ather than get into the tangled and recriminatory business of who 
shall pay for this court-ordered busing, we should say: "1.,his litigation 
ended, at long last, when the district court's busing order was u.pheld 
by this court and certiorari was denied. Let the State of Indiana 
Worry about who shall bear the costs of complying with the order. It 
is not a matter for the federal courts unless the state should devise a 
method of financing that discriminates against the black people who 
are . the intended beneficiaries of the order. Other than in a purely 
technical sense there is no federal question before us today.''364 . 
• 
Judge Posner's second dissenting opinion, in the case of United States 
v. Anton, 365 was in an immigration case involving the interpretation ~fa 
federal statute that made it a crime for a once-deported alien to re-enter 
the United ·States "unless ... the Attorney General has expressly 
consented to such alien's reapplying for ·admission."366 Posner's 
dissentingjudicial opinion style in this case was uniformly respectful and 
measured. Moreover, during the entire course of his dissent, Posner 
elegantly and persuasively deployed traditional techniques of ~tatutory 
construction, such. as textual analysis of the language ofthe'legislation,367 
examination of the possible purposes of Congress in passing the. law, 368 
• 
363. I d. at 1192. Other language of ridicule could be found in Posner's dissent: " [a] II this is a vast 
oversimplification," and "I am thus willing to indulge the heroic assumption .... " ld. 
364. ld. at 1194. 
• 
365. 683 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1982). 
366. ld. at 1012 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(A) (1994)). 
367. Seeidat 1019. 
368. See id. at 1019-20. Posner's use of the analogy of statutory t·ape to probe the possible purposes 
of Congress in passing the Alien Re-entry Felony Statute is striking. As reasoned by Posner: 
A statute that does not allow a defense of reasonable mistake as to the girPs age will deter 
some men from having intercourse with young-looking girls who in fact are over the age of 
consent. Socially permitted activity is thereby deterred; but.since ~here is no strongly felt 
social interest in encouraging the activity, overdeterrence is seen as a small price to pay for 
. 
having a statute that is easier to enforce than it would be if a defense inevitably rather 
porous of reasonable mistake were allowed. Similarly, Co'ngress would not I think have 
thought it a high price to pay for a strict prohibition against the illegal return of previously 
deported aliens that some deported aliens who would have gotten the Attorney General's . 
express consent to reenter this country if they had applied for it would be discouraged from 
applying because of the consequences of making a mistake. 
/d. at 1020. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
the "historical evolution" and legislative history of the deportation 
· statute, 369 policy considerations underlying various plausible .. 
interpretations,370 and the force of the precedent of other courts'·. 
interpretation· of the specific statutory issue at bar.371 • I 
Despite his implicit disclaimer to his third dissenting opinion in Sur v;. 
Glidden-Durkee, Division of S. C.M Corp., 372 that he did not want to "cry 
wolf' or "utter prophecies of doom that become self-fulfilling by 
drawing attention to and then exaggerating the scope of the majority 
opinion, "373 that is precisely what] udge Posner did in his overdy vitriolic · 
dissent. Given Posner's demonstrated sense of proportionality in being 
mindful .of assessing the costs and benefits of pursuing a partic~lar 
course of conduct in a specific context coupled with his usual refined 
sensitivity to the equities of human foibles, it is remarkable that he 
bothered to go to the trouble of ~riting such a vigorous dissent, which 
objected to the majority's reversal of a summary judgement against the 
father of a c~ild who was born with· severe and cosdy birth defects. The 
father's previous employer's insurance policy would have substantially 
covered the medical expenses of the father's child. The legal issue at bar 
was one of Indiana law in a diversity case. Here, employers and 
medical benefit insurers were in a better position than the departing 
employe;r to avoid the costs of misunderstanding health insurance policy 
provisions and conversion options. . · 
In Judge Posner's fourth dissenting opinion, Brotherhoo4 of Railroad 
Signalmen v. J;.ouisville & Nashville Rail-Road,314 his concern for the proper 
allocation of legal responsibilities between federal courts and federal 
administrative boards under the Railroad Labor Act was well-taken;375 · 
• howeve~, the .way that he presented his thoughts ·that the court of 
appeals should "direct the district court to remand this case to the board 
for further interpretation provided, of CO\}rse, that the district court has 
· the power to remand'.'376 is confusing, rambling, unstructured and 
ultimately unhelpful.377 · . 
Judge Posner's fifth dissenting opinion in McKeever v. Israel 318 a 
prisoner's civil rights appeal under42 U.S.C. § 1983 comes off as shrill 
369. !d. at I 020-21 . 
See id. at 1 021. 
See id. at 1021-22. 
681 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982): 
!d. at 501. 
688 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1982). 
• 
• 
370. 
371. 
372. 
373. 
374. 
375. 
. 
See id. at 545 (discussing tl:le Federal Railroad Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §153 First (m)) . 
376. Id. at 547. · 
377 . See id. 
378. 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982). 
, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
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and unmeasured.379 His harmless -error objection to the majority's 
reversal of a judgm~nt on the merits in favor of the Wisconsin prison 
officials, and remand of the ~ase back to the district court for 
appointment of counsel, is rational and appropriate.3.80 McKeever's 
· claim of constituti9nal infringement by his jailers, in regulating the 
amount of personal mail that he could take with him when he left the 
confines of the prison for various co·urt hearings, seems to have been 
dubious. . Further, the. panel majority's rema~d order requiring 
appointed counsel to brief and argue issues that had been resolved 
against the prisoner at trial appeared. to have imposed unreasonable · 
costs on the state officials· as well as the practicing bar.381 But, judge 
Posner's rhetoric and use ofinflammatory broadsides was bad form, and 
:an exercise in overkill and judicial whinin~82 in a type of dissent that 
could be viewed by. outside observers as a type of political pandering to 
· consetvative movers and shakers in a position to suggest the elevation of 
Judge Posner to the Supreme Court.383 · 
Before we leave the ~atter of the style of the dissenting opinions of 
Judge Posner during 1981·82, his dissent from denial of rehearing en 
bane in Allison v. Liher9' Savings should be briefly mentioned.384 Posner 
was not a member of the panel that decided Allison. Yet, he chose to 
' 
make the unusual gesture of writing a substanti.al opinion disagreeing 
with the vote of the entire Seventh Circ~it to deny rehearing en banc.385 
First, Point one: Judge Posner acknowledged that the panel opinion, 
which interpreted the federal Real Estate Setdement Procedures Act 
(RESPA) as precluding a private cause of action by .a borrower against 
a lender claiming excessive escrow dep.osit requirements wa.s "lucid and 
well reasoned".and "reacqe[d) an attractive result,"386 he observed that 
he "disagree'[ d) with the decision, and believe[d] that the case should be 
reheard en banc,"387 because "the panel's opinion both sets forth an 
. 379. Ste id. at 1323-25. 
·sao. Su id. at 1324. 
381. See id. at 1324-25. 
. . . 
382. See; e.g., id. at 1323 ("However dubious ••. it might seem ..• to allow lawfully imprisoned 
convicts·to spend their time bringing damage suits against their jailers, so that instead of reflecting on the 
wrongs they have done to society our convicts ... prosecute an endless series of mostly imaginary 
grievances against society, this ... is too well established for me to question.',); id. at 1324 ("This seems 
rather a routine prisoner's rights case: a scatter shot of implausible charges."); and id. at 1325 ("Perhaps 
this apocalypse is ah·eady. upon us. Our ·criminal pt'Oseclltions are becoming-to use an ugly but apt 
word multiphasic.,). 
• 
383. CJ supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
384. 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982). 
385. See id. 
386. /d. 
387. /d . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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approach potentially of general application to deciding when federal 
statutes may be enforced by private damage actions and creates a 
conflict with another circuit.''388 Second, while Judge Po~ner's motive 
may have been to get the Supreme Court interested in ultimately 
rethinking its private cause of action by statutory implication 
jurisprudence, his style· of doing so was attractive. This is so because 
. . 
Posner makes insightful and plausible arguments of statutory 
construction in the course. ofhis opinion, while. examining) in a scholarly 
fashion, matters of statutory remedies t0 carry out the full· p'urposes of 
Congress.389 
· V. CONCLUSION 
Appellate judicial opinion style can be conceptualized as a subject 
. . 
that addresses different kinds or manners or ways of writing the 
rationales for court judgments and orders. Two major epistemological 
subdivisions exist: ( 1) de.scriptive judicial opinion style 
studies concerned with canvassing. and assessin.g types of judicial 
opinions (for example, long or short; scholarly or barebones; policy-
driven or precedent-based; literary or non-literary; beautiful orugly); (2) 
normative judicial opinion style studies (concerned with articulating the 
ideal w.ay or ways. that appellate judges should writ~ their opinions given 
such jurisprudential concerns as separation of powers, the role of the 
judiciary, the putpose ofjudge-made law, the value ofjudge-interpreted 
law, and the general accessibility of judicial opinions in a free society. 
· Relatively little systematic thought has been ·given to date on the 
subje.ct of appellate judicial opinion style. The 1995 Chicago Law 
Review Colloquium390 is . the most prominent recent scholarly 
effiorescence on th~ subject.391 The Chicago Law Review Colloquium 
brought together the most prominent scholars in the field of literary 
studies of judicial opinions Professors Nussbaum, Schauer and 
White and two of the Nation's most thoughtful and respected federal 
appellate opinion stylists Circuit Judges Posner .and Wald.. In -an 
assortment ofincisive and engaging articles the Colloquium participants 
contribute.d to furthering both descriptiye judicial opinion style studies 
as well as normative judicial opinion style studies. Only a few authors, 
• 
' 
388. !d. 
389. See id. at 1092. 
390. See supra notes 26-113 and accompanying text. 
391. For a sampling of the literature on appellate judicial opinion stylc.antcdating the 1995 Chicago 
Law Review Colloquium, see supra notes .155-171 and accompanying text. 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . 
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• 
however, have bothered to systematically study the judicial opinion 
. styles of specific ·appellate jurists. 392 . 
Judge, professor, prolific author, popular speaker ·and, now, 
settlement ''Czar" of the Microsoft antitrust case, Richard' A. Posn~r is 
a worthy subject of study as .a theorist and practitioner of appellate 
judicial opinion style for four reasons. First, he is probably the most 
famous and influential non-Supreme Court jurist in the United States.3~3 
Second, given his vast, diversified and interesting scholarly input and his · 
background, he is unquestionably one of the brightest persons currently 
sitting on any appellate court in the world. Third, unlike the vast 
majority of appellate judges in the United States, Posner actually writes 
his own opinions . . He uses his law_ clerks solely for research.394 Finally, 
Posner is an omnivorous reader who is inclined to reflect his reading in 
his opinions. 39? . 
. . 
392. For a discussion of the insights contained in one of the best books on the subject of appellate 
judicial opinion style, which examines a variety of styles of different jurists, see supra notes 114 to 154 and 
• 
notes 172 to 186 and accompanying text. See lllso RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN 
REPUTATI<?N (1990) (a pioneering study in both judicial reputation and the literary dimensions of judicial 
writing, collecting and discussing some of the prominent literature on both subjects). 
• 
393. See general!J DOMNARSKI,-supra note 14, at 145. · 
394. As pointed out by William Domnarski: 
Uudge Posner] is one of only three or four federal judges who writes every word of every 
opinion. And while we know that judges and justices in the past, such as Holmes and Hand, 
wrote their own opinions, no other judge has written his opinions in Posner's fashion, 
although one wonders what Holmes, with his promptness and speed, would have done if 
word processing technology had been available to him. 
At oral argument Posner asks pointed questions designed to isolate the key issues and 
• 
occasionally makes notes to be used later. The panel votes on the cases and then opinions 
are assigned by the presiding judge. Sitting on a panel of three, hearing six appeals during 
a day of oral argument, Posner is assigned to write tWo opinions for the panel, as are the 
other two judges sitting that day. His practice,. as astonishing as it sounds, is to write 
complete drafts for both opinions that evening. That he also writes more opinions per year 
than any federal judge in the country by a sizeable margin makes his writing ability even 
more astonishing. He writes not in longhand but on a ... computer. He has three of 
these?onc for his oflice, one for his home in Hyde Park, and one for his vacation house. 
Going through the first draft, he indicates where more research has to be done, although he 
is able to provide most of the research and citations from cases he has already written and 
. . 
which are readily available. Sometimes a first draft will go to the printer virtually 
unchanged. When more work is calle~ for, he directs his law clerks to research points oflaw 
to provid~ authority for various propositions. They assemble the research on a library cart 
for his conveni~nce. The clerks also are encouraged to make comments and suggestions on 
the draft. He uses two law clerks, although most circuit court judges use three. With the 
additional research he or his law clerks have done, Posner then revises the opinion on his 
computer until he has what he wants. He writes every word of his opinions and has read 
all of the authorities cited in them. 
ld. at 122-23. 
395. Set general!J id. at 14 7. 
He has eclectic reading taste and is as likely to move through all of joyce as he is to read spy 
novels by John Le Carre or books ofRussian history. He rereads much of Shakespeare each 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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With the exception of William Domnarski's excellent book, In the 
Opinion of the Court, which devotes a long chapter to Judge Posner's 
opinion style, 396 there is little extant scholarly discussion of Posner's 
judicial opinion style. This article is an attempt to start the scholarly 
process of providing more thought and attention to following up 
Domnarski's seminal work. I have examined what I have referred to as 
Posner's "rookie season" as a federal appellate j~dge a little over one 
ful~ year ftom the time that he assumed his office in late 1981 through . 
the end of 1982. 
Research of Judge Posner's rookie season lead me to several 
conclusions. First, Posner burst onto the scene. as a newly minted federal 
·appellate judge with an extraordinary amount of intellectual energy that 
he has continued to ~xhibit for nearly two decades. Second, Posner 
writes his opinions in what he has himself labeled an "impure style": 
''explaining to a hypqthetical audience of laypersons why the case is 
being decided the way that it is."39~ Posner eschews what he calls the 
prevailing style of appellate judicial opinion writing-the "pure" style 
that is "solemn, highly polished and artificial far removed from the 
tone of conversation impersonal ... and predictable in the sense of 
conforming closely to professional expectations about the structure and 
style of a judicial opinion. "398 Third, from the very start of his service as 
a federal appellate judge, Posner wrote several "beautifuP' opinions 
during 1981-82 for his panel of the Seventh Circuit, which opinions 
exhibited such positive stylistic qualities as context awareness of legal 
issues of first impression, penetrating policy-based analysis, 
extraordinary narrative skill, intense doctrinal scrutiny, illuminating 
economic insights, and miscellaneous stylistic virtues (by way of 
illustration use·of analogy, use of epigrams, use of creative and helpful 
hypotheticals, use of simile, deployment of vivid and colorful slang). 399 . 
Fourth, during his rookie season on the bench,Judge Posner's opinion 
style also reflected occasional and isolated "ugly" opinions, or portions 
thereof, which exhibited such negative stylistic qualities as overly-harsh 
criticism oflower court judges, argu~bly free-wheeling, speculative and 
untethered law and economics· analyses, apparent egotism, pos~ible 
presumptuous questioning of settled legal doctrine, sloppy and imp.recise 
·use oflanguage, over-intellectualization, intellectual grandstanding, and 
/d. 
• 
year and reads 'Th£ American Sclwlar, Commentary, The 1imes literary Supplement, the New York 
Reuinv of Books, 1k Economi.rt, Rarilan, 1k Public Interest, and the New Republic regularly. 
396. See id. at 116-55 (Chapter 6 of his book called ''Closing the Circle"). 
397. Posner, supra note 16, at 1430; ste supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
398. Id. at 1429-30. See Jupra note 57 and accompanying text. 
• 
399. Sees:tpm notes 180-254,261-62,268-326 and accompanying text. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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short-shrift treatment of the facts of the case.40° Fifth, given the few 
instances of Judge Posner's in-chambers, concurring an.d dissenting 
opinions during his rookie season, his judicial opinion styl«; ·is generally 
more uneven than his· oveiWhelmingly .attractive styl¢1 ·of writing 
majority opinions for the court during this same timeframe. In this 
regard, Posner's two concurring opinions during 1981-82 although not 
without stylistic virtues largely exhibit unattractive styli~tic attributes 
includin.g gratuitous discussions of law and policy; inappropriate 
criticism of the Supreme Court, imprudent commentary on a pending 
certiorari petitio.n, political pandering, and intellectual exibitionalism.401 . 
Sixth, the handful of dissenting opinions written by Judge Posner during 
1981-82 show a mix of relatively attractive stylistic qualities · such as an 
exposition of a non-pejorative alternative remedial appro-ach to deciding 
the case, and astute contrarian probing of the purposes, history and· 
language of the federal statute at issue with relatively unattrac.tive 
stylistics, such as overdy vitriolic rhetoric, failure to exercise a sense of 
proportionality and equitable sensitivity, confusing, rambling, and 
unstructured digressions on the role of federal courts vis-a-vis federal . 
administrative boards, argumentative overkill and whining, and political 
pandering).402 • 
In closing, I wish to emphasize that appellate judicial opinion style 
matters. It matters because, from a practical standpoint, good 
substantive legal reasoning is inextri.cably intertwined with attractive 
style. It matters from a purely aesthetic perspective, because published 
appellate judicial opinions are a separate genre ofliterature and desetve 
to be crafted in ways that create beauty. In this regard, while legal 
.· 
philosophers have given some attention to aesthetic theory and the law 
through isolated discussions the literary "poetics" of judicial 
opinions like those discussed at the outset of this article403 and 
glancing treatment of aesthetics theory and the law through delineation 
of matters of ''coherence" and the law;404 much· more remains to be 
done. Lawyers, judges, scholars a.nd citizens need richer, more 
. . 
• • 
. 
400. Se~ supr(l notes 255-260, 263, 327-338 and accompanying text. 
40 I. See suprfl notes 345-58 and accompanying text. 
402. See supra notes 359-89 and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 82,·113 and accompanying text. 
404. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Coherence in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
533 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
I d. 
• 
An idea or theory is coherent ifit hangs or fits together, ifits parts are mutually supportive, 
ifit is intelligible, ifit flows from or expresses a single, unified viewpoint. An idea or theory 
is incoherent if it is unintelligible, inconsistent, ad hoc, fragmented, disjointed, or contains 
thoughts that are unrelated to and do not support one another. 
• 
• 
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particularistic, more nuanced, more comparative, more historically 
situated assessments of the nature ·and practice of appellate judicial 
opinion· style.~ . I offer this article as a modest start along that path ~th 
.. regard to one· very prominent and respected appellate judge. 
Judge Richard A. Posner's appellate judicial opinion style during his 
rookie season on the feder~ appellate bench, by and large, is uniquely 
beautiful, with isolated pockets of ugliness. At their core, Posner's 
judicial_opinions· exhibit what might be called an essayistic sryle--a style 
• 
generally des.cribed by Edw_ard Hoagland as "caroming thoughts not 
• 
merely in order to convey ·a certain packet of information, but with a 
special edge or bounce of personal character in a kind of public . 
letter. "405 · 
One might call Posner's ·"special edge" in his first batch ofjudicial 
opinions as possessing an intangible, "sexy style," a way of legal 
reasoning that "'cal) be serendipitous or domestic, satire or testimony, 
tongue-in-cheek or a wail of grief' that is, at its essence, 
[ m] ulched perhaps in its own contradictions, it promises no su~e · 
objectivity, just the condiment of opinion on a base of observation, 
and sometimes such leaps of illogic or superlogic that they may work 
a bit like magic realism in a novel: namely, to stimulate the mind's 
own processes in a murky and incongruous world.406 . 
. 
Posner's legal reasoning exhibits, in the words of Professor Robert S. 
Summers ''the capacity to understand complex and subtle issues and the 
capacity to bring reason to bear in articulate balanced ways."407 
. 
• 
•· 
• 
•• 
•. 
• . 
• 
• 
405. ·Edward Hoagland; Wrilus AjooL· Essl!Jists as !rifantry, 68 AM. SCHOlAR, Summer 1999, at 103. 
406. ld. 
407. RobertS. s·ummers, lAw tis More 17zan a Livelihood, 26 CORNELL L. FORUM 13 (1999)., 
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